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ABSTRACT 
his thesis addresses the need to reduce inefficiencies in management of 
insurance company risk capital. The laxity in managing the cost of capital is 
a result of dysfunctional property/casualty risk classification and capital accumulation 
practices in the insurance industry. We reclassify risk based on both peril and financial 
functional features, in order to capture all the facets of risk affecting a firm and 
ultimately to achieve optimal capital allocation. 
With the purpose of reducing inefficiencies in mind, we explore and isolate the 
impact of regulation on insurance company profitability. We use barrier option pricing 
models to mimic the impact of solvency requirements on firm-wide risk. This 
methodology of measuring risk is better than plain vanilla option pricing models, in 
that, through the option to an early default, we are able to capture the economic 
significance of financial distress, and allocate firm-wide risk capital. The firm-wide 
risk is incidentally used to empirically test the impact of risk on the cost of carry, the 
quality of operational profitability and forward asset commitment per unit of liabilities. 
Our empirical test confirms a strong relationship between firm-level risk, and the 
cost of carry, return on policyholders' surplus and the cost of capital per contract 
underwritten. The results are better than previous results obtained using plain vanilla 
option-pricing models and reveal the importance of incorporating solvency 
requirements in defining the economic significance of insolvency. The results also 
points to the importance of advised risk classification procedures to the whole process 
of integrated risk measurement and financing, which we explore in this study. 
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CHAPTER 1:
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Overview of the Study 
According to Santomera and Babbel (1997) the insurance industry is 
evolving to a higher level of risk management techniques and approaches 
of which much improvement is needed. The objective of this study is to show how 
insurance companies seek to reduce the costs of transacting risk in their portfolios 
using integrated risk management systems to engineer optimal cash flows. We 
examine the problems caused by various risks on insurance company profitability and 
solvency thresholds. We also isolate the impact of integrated risk management systems 
on cost structures of insurance payoffs. 
The main reason for us carrying out this study is underpinned by a barrage of 
criticism labelled against the insurance industry for their lax management of risk 
capital. Inefficiencies in capital management are a result of excessive accumulation of 
relative capital against all the risks defining the loss distribution. Insurance companies 
accumulate capital relative to risks they face in the portfolios, in order to satisfy 
- 
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regulatory and rating agents' solvency requirements. Risk classification by the 
insurance industry and regulators fail to take into consideration financial attributes of 
each liability account. The classification adopted in this study recognises duration and 
convexity risks defining each liability account and matching it to assets with similar 
duration. It helps establish effective insurance transfer pricing systems that link 
insurance risk to capital required. Empirical evidence from our study supports the idea 
of using transfer pricing systems to improve spreads on both asset and liability 
accounts. 
Relative capital does not specify what capital is really required to sponsor each 
section of the loss distribution, which is why it is inefficient in financing all cash flows 
of the loss distribution. Thus, the lack of specifications in capital requirements based 
on specific risk category in the insurance portfolio is the main reason behind the 
under-performance of the property/casualty insurance sector compared other financial 
sectors. Absolute capital composed of bespoken equity-to-risk components over the 
loss distribution is the only efficient way of reducing the cost of risk capital. The 
definition of risk capital based on absolute capital gives insight into the problem of 
inadequate capital for sponsoring certain sections of the loss distribution. In order to 
improve the efficiency of risk financing programmes, we define instruments used in 
balancing the relation between risk-capital-usage and loss distribution characteristics. 
Another important aspect of our study is the derivation of firm-wide risk by using 
barrier option-pricing theory. Firm-wide risk is computed from the insolvency put 
option incorporating an exogenously determined solvency margin or knock-out barrier. 
The knock-out barrier is used to define value enshrined in the option to an early default 
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brought about by an intervention of regulatory authorities when a company's assets 
drop below this barrier. Risk defined by this extended version to the standard 
Mertonian option pricing methodology brings us closer to insurance cash flow 
behaviour in practice as confirmed by our empirical analysis. It helps explain why 
insurance companies hold at most thrice the statutory solvency margins. The study also 
confirm that most of the contingent capital purchased by insurance companies is used 
for surplus relief, due to the consequences brought about by trading at asset levels 
close to the solvency threshold. We are also able to explain why many insurance 
companies fail to fully comprehend the whole distribution they are faced with, hence 
the tendency to resort to relative capital accumulation rather than capital allocation. 
The study also attributes the firm-wide risk as the single most influential factor on 
risk-taking behaviour and financial structures of insurance companies. Insolvency risk 
is used to explain the strength of the relationship between firm-wide risk, carry traits, 
return on policyholder surplus and the cost of capital per contract underwritten. Our 
findings confirm a strong correlation between default risk and these variables, which is 
quite consistent with our theorems. These results reveal the real drivers of value 
creation within an insurance company, and how they are managed to enhance 
profitability and improve efficiency in risk capital utilisation. They also point to the 
importance of advised risk classification procedures on the whole process of integrated 
risk measurement and financing, which we also explore in this study. 
1.2 Motivation for this Study 
Insurance literature has established that intrinsic cost of trading risk is the ruin 
probability an insurance company is bound to face the moment it enters into the 
- 
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business of trading risk. The intrinsic cost is looked at as the starting point of analysing 
insurance company profitability, since the various cost components are then used to 
inflate this distribution into a more encompassing distribution. The theory that 
underlies our analogy is based on the fact that the price of risk is equivalent to the 
intrinsic value of the firm. The theory further asserts that given risk is carried from 
origination to settlement date, the price at time should incorporate the cost of capital 
required to service this risk to settlement date. It is from this insight that we can 
segregate the intrinsic and time value components, in any insurance pricing contract. 
This distinction is important since insurance pricing currently concentrate more on 
factors affecting the intrinsic value rather than the cost of capital element, hence the 
under-pricing and failure of insurance companies to manage risks for the 
policyholders. 
Value creation over a holding period depends on the ability of management to 
capture costs associated with these components into the pricing of individual risks. 
These two components determine the level of capital required supporting a risk 
portfolio and its cost during the holding period. It is also apparent that these two key 
components should be targeted and controlled within an insurance company in order to 
stabilise pay-off profiles. The reason for this being that both the intrinsic and time 
value components vary from one risk holding period to another. That's why it is 
important to establish what the key drivers are as far as their impact on economic value 
volatility is concerned. This is done in order to effectively control risk in a portfolio by 
targeting volatility at its very source. 
- 
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It is within company cash flow patterns that risks ingrained can be pinpointed, 
controlled and new pay-off profiles engineered to alternatively and effectively finance 
risk. Portfolios using integrated risk management systems have stable earnings and 
capital structure, with the efficacy of reducing the cost of debt, and consequently the 
overall cost of capital (Doherty, 1997). Integrated risk management impacts a 
company's financial structure through earnings and costs configuration. We measure 
the impact of the key drivers on value creation, by striking a balance between the cost 
of capital and profitability. We address the implications of under-pricing and how the 
model proposed in this study could be used to stabilise earnings and profitability 
within an insurance company. 
The main objective of this study is to establish the relationship between risk and 
the essential value drivers within an insurance company brought about by the nature of 
the financial structure. Barclay and Smith (1999) pointed out that financial structure 
determines risk-taking behaviour within an insurance company, as the level of capital 
available depends on what each stakeholder perceive to be adequate protection/return. 
As pointed above previous literature by Doherty and Garven (1986), Daykin and Hey 
(1989) and Babbel and Santomera (1997) on the subject of insurance risk management 
ignored this intricate relationship to the detriment of results obtained. They failed to 
explain insurance cash flows behaviour in practice, because risk taking behaviour 
defines the endeavour of companies in trying to resolve conflicting stakeholder 
interests. f 
We establish what different stakeholders of an insurance company consider as the 
cost of risk capital required for them to release their funds, or regard adequate for 
- 
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healthy transaction of underwriting risk. Capital needed to carry a claim forward to 
settlement date is referred to as risk capital. Merton and Perold (1993) defined risk 
capital, as the smallest amount that can be invested to insure the value of an insurance 
company's net assets against a loss in value, relative to the risk-free investment of 
those net assets. Given fixed liabilities, riskiness in the net assets is similar to the 
riskiness of gross assets, which mean that risk capital requirements' are the same. 
Capital required to support risk assumed has been defined in insurance literature by the 
probability of ruin, risk-based capital (RBC), expected policyholder deficit (EPD) and 
Value at Risk (VaR); (Cummins (1988), Jorion (2000), Bustic (1994), Sommer and 
Cummins (1996)). Our model derived from the intrinsic value component is extended 
to incorporate the cost of capital, a more comprehensive economic value distribution 
approach. 
The EPD is an option pricing methodology first used by Bustic (1994) in 
measuring the cost of default in insurance companies. This method has been herald as 
a closed form solution to measuring the level of capital at risk, since it does not only 
account for the probability of default but also the severity of default. In fact it's a 
better measure of the level of capital required by insurance companies than the Value 
at Risk (VaR) and ruin probability methodologies. However, the EPD methodology 
assumes that default occurs at the end of the period, which is not true for insurance 
companies. Default in insurance companies occurs at any time during the life of the 
company, especially when large losses with very low probabilities of occurrence, 
exceed the going concern value of the firm. 
- 
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The EPD methodology is opaque in its computation of default in that, it fails to 
clearly link the pricing formula to the state of the firm. Under this methodology the 
probability of default remains generally positive, during the life of the company. In 
practice the probability of default is low for firms that have survived through the 
underwriting cycles. Mutenga, Dinenis and Hatgionnides (2001) developed a model 
that takes into account the price of early default and the influence of regulators in both 
the cost and probability of default. Their methodology brings us closer to the actual 
behaviour of insurance cash flows as driven by the cost of compliance. 
Option pricing theory in insurance literature is used to value assets and liabilities 
of insurance firms, pricing of individual insurance contracts and to show the portfolio 
effect on risk and capital requirements (Doherty and Gavern (1986), Cummins (1988) 
& (1991), Cummins and Danzon (1997) and Cummins, Allen and Phillips (1998)). 
Merton's default model envisages that the value of equity increase by virtue of a put 
option that allows shareholders to transfer wealth from policyholders when things go 
pear shaped. The asymmetric nature of shareholders' claim on the company's assets is 
due to limited liability option, which allows them to walk away if the value of assets 
falls below the value of liabilities. This leaves human equity without jobs, and 
policyholders with a depleted portfolio and limited guarantee funds available to 
personal lines policyholders. 
Default rate brought about by increased risk in a portfolio reduces the value of 
debt, but it also increases the value of equity and the cost of carry with it. This prompts 
policyholders to require insurance companies to pay them a premium commensurate 
with the risk of default, a value well captured in the cost of carry methodology. Thus 
- 
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the lower the asset values the more expensive it will be to borrow money from the 
policyholders, since high cost of carry ratios are reminiscent of poor underwriting cash 
flows. Also the higher the probability of default, the higher are the bankruptcy costs 
and the lower will be the net asst values (NAV). This means policyholders will 
demand a premium from the company for committing their funds upfront to buy 
securities promising to deliver in the future. 
Capital required supporting risks assumed by a company is derived from 
premiums, equity and leveraged through engineered risk financing payoffs. It is a 
condition for entering the market to comply with minimum solvency requirements and 
this cost is embedded in the intrinsic/fair price of every insurance contract. The cost of 
minimal security capital should first be factored in the fair price of a contract as 
propounded by Mutenga, Dinenis and Hatgioannides (2001), Cummins (1988), 
Cummins, Allen and Phillips (1997), and Barth (2000). This unit of capital factored in 
the price of risk is equal to the cost of financial distress to all stakeholders, should one 
occur either during or at the end of the holding period. 
1.3 Theoretical Background to this Study 
Our work parallels that of Black and Cox (1976), Merton (1977), Kim, 
Ramaswamy and Sundaresan (1993), Longstaff and Swchwartz (1995), and Briys and 
De Verene (1997). We introduce the impact of solvency margins on risk premiums, 
return on policyholder funds, portfolio risk and the total cost of risk management. By 
taking into consideration the impact of solvency margins and stochastic liabilities, our 
approach is not only consistent with financial literature in Myers and Read (1999), and 
Merton and Perold (1993), but also actuarial in Daykin, Pentikainen and Pesonen 
- 
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(1994), Bustic (1994) and Barth (2000). This means that risk levels computed by our 
model are close to those observed in practice. We are also able to explain the reason 
why it is expensive and difficult to finance extreme asset values close to the barrier for 
insurance companies using this methodology. 
We also extend the option pricing methodology in Cummins, Allen and Phillips 
(1997) by introducing variable interest rates, in measuring the firm-wide risk 
embedded in insurance cash flows. Our methodology does not depend on a single 
boundary, which assume that default occur at the end of the period as envisaged by 
Black and Scholes (1973), Merton (1974), Cummins (1988), Bustic (1994) and 
Cummins, Allen and Phillips (1997). In this thesis we allow for the effects of solvency 
requirements on the default profile of the firm, given the possibility of regulators 
coming in to take control of the company if the required solvency margin is reached. 
The solvency requirements define the boundary that should not be breached; i. e. asset 
values fall below the solvency margin, if the company is to continue operating. This 
barrier is determined by the regulators and is a structural barrier that defines the 
economic meaning of the insolvency-causing event. The barrier defines the 
policyholder's payoff upon bankruptcy. 
The role that regulators play is similar to the objective achieved by covenants in 
corporate bonds, which gives the bondholders the right to bankrupt the company if its 
asset values fall below a pre-specified solvency threshold. This feature in insurance 
companies resemble the characteristics of barrier options, which knocks out 
Equityholders' option on the company's assets, if asset values go down and reach the 
pre-specified insolvency threshold. The pre-condition to risk trading which triggers 
- 
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insolvency upon being breached is enshrined in the minimum solvency margin 
requirements. 
Minimum solvency margins are a safety mechanism that gives regulators the 
right to intervene in the company's operations, force reorganisation or liquidate the 
company if its performance fails to match the threshold specified. The threshold at 
which insolvency will occur follow that of Black and Cox (1976), Merton (1977), 
Cummins (1991), and Longstaff and Schwartz (1995). This constitutes the barrier that 
need not be breached, if the company is to continue with its operations. It means that 
the value of insurance assets are path-dependent, in that the payoff is dependent on the 
realised asset path, which trigger certain parts of the contract if the asset price becomes 
too low. This barrier when breached invokes action from the authorities to suspend 
operations to limit the dissipation of assets. In other words, default occurs the first time 
when the value of assets is lower than the stochastic barrier. Upon achievement of this 
out-strike price of assets, it is assumed that all other liability classes are simultaneously 
defaulted. 
The out-strike price of assets is set as a pre-condition to underwriting a specified 
amount of liabilities, upon which asset values should not go below during the life of 
the option. If they go below the specified asset values, the regulators will take over the 
company for the policyholders. In order to avoid the eventuality of a knock-out, the 
insurance company should continue meeting their contractual obligations to all 
policyholders irrespective of the class of business. If regulators intervene at such a 
point, the option of Equityholders on the firm's assets is extinguished and they will 
receive nothing from their investments. 
- 
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The fact that regulators intervene before liabilities are greater than assets mean 
that shareholders should give up the company before they have recouped the residual 
assets earmarked for this cushion for policyholders. Early intervention takes us a step 
closer to how insurance company cash flows behave in practice, given a higher exit 
price than envisaged under the perfect market scenario of the standard firm Black 
Scholes model. This makes insurance cash flows unique from cash flows of ordinary 
firms, because they have to give up the company even before the face value of assets is 
not yet equal to the value of liabilities. 
This mean that there is no possibility of equityholders recovering value in the 
company and all liabilities are considered to have equal bargaining power and there is 
no priority over settling another. In other words, policyholders receive an exogenously 
specified fraction of the remaining assets; asset values will usually be lower after take 
over by regulators than it would be the case if the company had remained in the hands 
of equityholders. Regulatory company take over reduces liquidity, which tend to 
dissipate asset values (dead-weight cost of bankruptcy), a phenomenon well known 
practice because most of the companies placed in administration rarely survive and 
become operational again. What regulation does is that it tries to reduce bankruptcy 
costs, if it is efficient according to consumer protection theories (Skipper, 2001). 
Usually, regulation does not totally reduce bankruptcy costs, because it does not only 
reduce liquidity, but also the firm is not run under a capital market regime, where 
positive NPV projects are considered. The aim of regulators of preserving assets when 
they intervene defeats the whole purpose of asset building, because the best strategy is 
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not to preserve but to build. In preserving no value is added in the form of net asset 
value (NAV), but value is destroyed. 
The contribution we are making in this paper is underlined in the ability of our 
risk measurement model to better explain the behaviour of insurance cash flows than 
methods used before. The fact that more variables are captured by our option-pricing 
methodology means risk levels computed are closer to what is actually observed in 
practice. The risk classification methodology used also help capture peculiar financial 
aspects of insurance cash flows, rather than the mere underlying risks embedded in 
perils insured. What we are able to show for the first time is that insurance cash flows 
are financial and they should be viewed as such, as we are able to show that under- 
performance of the insurance industry has been due to cash flow misspecification. This 
thesis enable insurance companies to better measure their firm-wide risk with precision 
and help to improve risk control, financing and capital allocation for the firm. The 
paper also help broaden our understanding of firm-wide risk as measured under 
regulatory constraint as the major driver in insurance company operational 
profitability. 
Theorems and conditions: 
I. The risk premiums measured by default risk are inversely related to the cost of 
carry of the insurance company and the exogenously determined insolvency 
threshold. 
H. The price of liabilities is an increasing function of the default-risk, and the 
barrier-to-asset value ratio, as policyholders' surplus is inversely related to 
risk and cost of compliance. 
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III. The cost of risk capital factored in liabilities contracts is a function of both 
default risk and hedge instruments used. 
Q The price of risk is equal to the intrinsic cost plus the cost of servicing 
capital required carrying risk forward to claim settlement date; 
Q The distant price of liabilities is equal to the nearby cost of liabilities plus 
the cost of capital required to support the liabilities from a nearby to a 
distant settlement date; 
Q Insurance companies' value creation bounds are a function of the cost 
structures and the cost of borrowing external capital, and; 
Q Default risk is reduced through hedging arrangements that reflect the 
characteristics of underlying risky cash flows 
Our theorems are consistent with antecedent literature by Cummins (1991), Kim, 
Ramaswamy and Sundaresan (1993), Briys and De Varene (1997) and Klein and Inglis 
(1999), who emphasised the importance of incorporating the cost of default when 
pricing contingent liabilities. Cummins, Allen and Phillips (1998) pointed out that 
liability prices computed under the option pricing methodology are close to prices 
observed in practice. Irrespective of the fact that they were using vanilla option pricing 
methods (Merton (1973), Cummins (1988) and Sommer (19996)) in deriving their 
prices, this methodology capture risks that have not been captured by the Myers and 
Cohen (1987) and other financial economics pricing methodology. 
1.4 Methodology 
The model used in this study to measure portfolio risk is designed to capture risk 
levels defined by the financial structure. Our extended model for measuring insurance 
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risk using the barrier option pricing captures the real drivers behind insurance 
company operational profitability. Solvency margins reduce the value of claim 
shareholders have on the company's assets following default, whilst increasing the 
value of liabilities. Risk increases for shareholders and human capital, since the level 
of solvency margins determines the probability of default. The higher the level of 
solvency margins the higher will be the probability of default, but the lower will be the 
level of loss to policyholders. 
The methodology used is robust and has produced consistent results when used to 
price insurance liabilities by Doherty and Garven (1986), Cummins (1988) and (1991), 
Sommer (1996) and Cummins, Allen and Phillips (1997). Our model is an extension to 
previous work on option pricing of insurance company by these authorities, whose 
empirical work is based on the Mertonian option pricing methodology. Their models 
although insightful, are limited in their ability to capture the actual dynamics of an 
insurance company, when subjected to the cost of compliance. They are based on the 
assumption that liabilities are not guaranteed, which is difficult to justify in practice 
given the role regulators play in protecting policyholders. 
1.5 Implications of this Study 
This thesis develops a simple new framework for measuring insurance companies' 
firm-wide risk that incorporates an early default option. The option pricing 
methodology is applied to derive the closed form valuation for overall firm risk as 
measured by the insolvency put option. The main advantage of using the option 
pricing is that it can easily be used to value insurance companies even for companies 
with complex financial structures and loss settlement pattern. 
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Through this study, we are able to establish the relationship between risk and cost 
of carry traits that are observed in practice, and the ultimate financial structure adopted 
by a firm. The risk measurement methodologies used in this study capture the 
following functional features missed by preceding risk measurement models: 
Q Risks classified according to financial attributes of liabilities rather than perils 
insured; 
a Risks are decomposed into components that are economically modelled into 
loss distributions on a standalone basis; 
Q The effects of variable interest rates on an insurer's risk profile; 
Q The effects of management quality; 
Q Market price movements; 
Q Hazard seasoning; 
Q Liquidity embedded in solvency ratios and the price of illiquidity is defined 
and built into illiquid positions, in order to capture this risk; 
Q The dynamic features allowing us to measure an insurance company's risk 
profile over time; and 
Q The effects of firm-wide risk on operational profitability and cost of capital 
per unit of contract insured. 
The establishment of a functional relationship between these components and risk 
gives greater insight into the deficiencies of current practices in the market. It helps us 
establish the missing link between absolute risk, required capital and cost of carry 
traits. This is crucial to establishing the importance of insurance transfer pricing 
systems in insurance companies, which could be used to control spreads. Transfer 
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pricing systems are required to improve the cost of originating funds from 
policyholders, as liability accounts are obliged to generate commensurate return based 
on functional financial aspects of risk rather than insured perils. It also brings the 
classification of insurance risk in line with the treatment of risk by other financial 
institutions, by using duration and convexity attributes. Our empirical tests confirm 
that most of the risk in insurance portfolios originates from liability classes, 
reinforcing the need for discipline in liability classes. 
One important aspect yielded from this study is that firm risk measured by the 
insolvency put is equivalent to expected policyholder's surplus deficit and an even 
more efficient tool for measuring risk than VaR. We show that the correlation between 
assets and liability have significant effect on the overall risk profile of the firm, as well 
as the overall spread paid for originating liabilities. We also show that the model 
provides three primary empirical evidence: firstly that spreads paid for originating 
insurance business are negatively related to the level of cost of carry and default risk; 
secondly that insolvency risk with an early default option is functionally related both 
to operational profitability and the cost of capital required to carry liabilities to 
settlement date; and finally, our model has many implications for hedging default risk. 
1.6 Limitations of the Study 
The major limitation of this study is our inability to use market values of equity 
and liabilities to measure portfolio risk. We use balance sheet figures because there are 
too few insurance companies trading on the London Stock market. Differences in 
accounting practices before the introduction of the EU Insurance Directive made it 
statistically suicidal to use European insurance companies' data. A similar study using 
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publicly traded insurance companies data for European companies will be carried out 
in the future, that is for the period after the adoption of the directive by each member 
state. 
Another limitation is enshrined in our model adopted, which uses lognormal 
distribution to characterise insurance liability losses. This tends to understate the real 
risk embedded in the tails of liability accounts prone to internal contamination or of 
longer duration. The Weibull or Pareto distribution would be more appropriate to use, 
but studies using standard option pricing methodology by Cummins, Allen and Phillips 
(1997) show that the predictive power of lognormal distribution methodologies is still 
good. Our method incorporating the effect of solvency margins provides stronger 
predictive power of insurance cash flow behaviour and gives spreads 'closer to those 
observed in reality than these standard models. 
We are also unable to classify assets on balance sheets based on their duration, as 
statutory accounts used for empirical analysis do not specify asset duration. However, 
we believe that our classification can be used in practise easily as duration of assets 
bought by the company is known in advance. The default asset classification used in 
this study do not compromise the quality of our results as every attempt was made to 
put assets in their right class. 
We also did not manage to capture current risk levels in the industry since most of 
the companies that merged after 1989 were excluded from our study. Such a study 
would be able to capture the changing trends in risk capital costs in the industry. The 
inclusion of data for merged companies would have distorted our results, since our aim 
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was to capture going concern companies' data without any alterations in profiles due 
to start-ups. 
1.7 Structure of the Thesis 
The second Chapter of this study deals with the issue of insurance risk 
classification, risk measurement and the market for insurance risk. We begin in the 
first section of this Chapter by defining risk and risk capital, with respect to the way 
various practitioners perceive risk in the insurance industry. A review of literature on 
risk classification is carried out culminating in the development of a generalised risk 
classification structure used in this study. The main purpose of our model is to identify 
various cost components within the loss distribution domain, their impact on payoffs 
and how integrated risk management can be used as a vehicle to deliver optimal and 
stable payoffs. 
In the second section of Chapter (2) we explore the market for insurance risk and 
its implications on insurance company profitability and cash flow volatility. The first 
section reviews literature on risk financing instruments used to manage insurance 
company cost structures. A broad classification based on the section of the loss 
distribution they target is discussed to give insight on the efficiency of these 
instruments at matching risk attributes to equity by blending risk financing 
instruments. Theorem (3) proposed in Chapter (3) is based on the discussion in this 
section. It is empirically tested in Chapter (4) to establish the relationship between, the 
cost of risk capital per contract written to the cost of risk financing and firm-wide risk. 
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The third chapter proposes a risk measurement model for firm-level risk exposure. 
The model is developed from a standard Black-Scholes model, which is then extended 
to incorporate the effects of solvency thresholds on the value of the default put. The 
default put option is used as a measure for financial distress or policyholder surplus 
deficit, which is the value likely to be lost at anytime for a given probability. We 
consider asset and liability risk distributions on a stand-alone basis and the aggregate 
risk after taking into consideration the covariances. We also make propositions for 
theorems 1 and 2 tested in Chapter 4, based on the impact of default risk and liability 
spreads on the quality of operational profitability and the cost of borrowing. 
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CHAPTER 2: 
INTEGRATED RISK MANAGEMENT 
SYSTEMS 
2.1 Introduction 
Jn this chapter we are going to 
look at risk classification as the gateway to 
integrated risk management. Without a comprehensive risk classification some 
risks will be overlooked in the risk measurement process and will be left unfunded 
because they are not all quantified. Risk classification is an essential part in the risk 
management process, because each risk component can easily be measured and its 
importance in the portfolio known. It also brings enlightenment to management on the 
characteristics of risks faced by the company, their correlation features, and natural 
hedges. 
There has been failure among insurance practitioners to dimension risk according 
to its financial functional features, and to agree on a method that links risk and capital. 
These disagreements are a result of the diversity in the methods that are used in 
classifying insurance risk. The harmonisation in the classification of risk from either a 
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regulatory or financial economics point of view means the same standards will be used 
to quantify risk across the industry. In the USA, harmonisation of risk categorisation in 
the industry from regulatory framework come from the quantities defined in the 
NAIC's Risk-Based-Capital formula (RBC). In fact this formula has been adapted by a 
number of firms in measuring insurance company risk, by making it the basis of 
dynamic financial analysis (DFA) methodology (AM Best, 1999). This makes the 
RBC risk classification the basis for an all-encompassing risk classification and 
quantification methodology. 
This all-encompassing methodology does not only classify risk according to the 
hazards underlying the contract sold, as is with under an underwriting and regulatory 
viewpoint, but also looks at the financial functional features, such as the duration of 
cash flows being underwritten. Our all-encompassing methodology seeks to capture 
both functional features not only in the classification but also the measurement 
processes, so as to capture all the risk inherent in cash flow exposures. 
This chapter is divided into two sections. We classify risk in section one by 
making reference to three main sources of insurance risk, actuarial, financial and 
operational. We also propose a risk classification model with the aim of enhancing risk 
quantification and risk financing. The model isolates risks that are used in Chapter 3 
for risk measurement using option-pricing theory. We wrap up the chapter by looking 
at the market for insurance risk. 
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2.2 Risk and Risk Capital 
Risk is generally defined as the volatility (a) of net cash flows of a business unit 
arising from uncertainties in outcomes. Insurable risk volatility has only one 
dimension, whilst financial risk has dual dimensions. Insurance companies generate 
cash flows with both functional features, for example underwriting cash flows are 
exposed not only to underlying perils but also to duration risk. 
Risk also relates to fluctuations in the value of shareholder investments in 
portfolios, in both absolute and relative terms to benchmarks. Traditionally risk has 
been measured in absolute terms by the standard deviation of portfolio returns, which 
computes historical dispersion of returns around a portfolio's average return after 
subtracting a portfolio's risk free return. 
A variant definition of risk is found in traditional risk management, where risk is 
defined as the possibility of that positive expectation of a goal-oriented system that 
will not be fulfilled. This definition is similar to the one given in FRS5 of 1994 
Reporting the Substance of Transactions, whereby risk is defined as uncertainty to the 
benefits that a business will derive from pursuing its objectives and strategies. 
Individual insurance business risks are constituents of uncertainty because business 
objectives and strategies generally relate to creation of future values. These definitions 
capture the two-way dimensions to risk; the probability of a financially favourable 
deviation or the possibility of loss. A mathematical definition of risk for a portfolio 
with two exposures is given by 
Var[L +L2]= Var[L 
,]+ Var[L 2]+2 Cov[L 1, L21 (2.1) 
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Where: Var[L1+L2] is the variance of two liability exposures, 
L1, L2 are liability cash flows for exposures 1 and 2, 
Cov[L1, L2] is the covariance of liabilities 1 and 2. 
The risk of the portfolio is obtained by taking the square root of the equation (2.1) 
above, which is the standard deviation of the portfolio. This equation (2.1) reveals that 
when two exposures are combined there are benefits to be reaped, resulting from the 
covariance component, which defines the diversification benefits. This is called the 
covariance risk, which defines the resilience of a portfolio's net worth to extreme 
movements in the market. A portfolio with greater diversification is should experience 
less vulnerability to covariance risk than a less diversified portfolio. Thus, even when 
the portfolio size grows a covariance matrix is used to measure the uncertainty 
between any two risk exposed cash flows. 
It is apparent from the above discussion that in order for a portfolio to be well 
diversified, it either has to write many policies or hold many assets. In order for this to 
hold the law of large numbers should apply, but because of the central limit theorem, 
there is a limit to the amount of risk diversified away. The diversification benefits 
depend on how the risk classes co-move, and on the weights of assets or liabilities in 
the same risk category. Risk for a portfolio with N risk exposures taking into account 
adjustments for exposure weights is given by 
NN 
Var[p] 
= V; Vj Cov(i, j) (2.2) 
i. 1 j=1 
Where V is the value of the cash flow exposure 
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The risk of the portfolio is measured by the size of its net worth relative to its 
standard deviation. This is the relativity capital to volatility of the portfolio, measuring 
the resilience of the portfolio to any adverse market movements. The riskiness of a 
portfolio defined by the number of standard deviations of capital in the portfolio is 
captioned by 
CSD 
_ 
(NA- D) / (2.3) /SDP 
Where: CSD = standard deviation of capital, 
SDp = portfolio standard deviation ('Var(p)), 
A= assets, 
D= debt. 
Thus, the probability of default depends on the number of standard deviations of 
capital, supporting the level of risk in the portfolio'. The number of standard 
deviations depends not only on the level of capital held but the level of risk in the 
portfolio. The level of debt, which should be deducted when calculating the risk score, 
also affects the level of capital used in the calculation. The higher the level of debt the 
lower will be the risk score, which defines the financial strength of the company. This 
score should be used to balance the level of capital that is held and the return that is 
required, since excessive capital dampens rate of return on capital. In other words 
capital held should correspond to the level of risk in the portfolio. The more risky a 
portfolio is the more capital is required to support the business activity. 
' VaR(T; c) = 
-acV 
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Wilson (1997) defined risk capital as the amount of economic equity which must 
be held to support that particular level of risky business activity. This capital provides 
a given level of safety (the "solvency standard") to policyholders for a given maximum 
possible loss within a known confidence interval over a given holding period. This 
level of capital held relative to risk in the portfolio has been defined as the value at risk 
(VaR). This capital in an insurance company provides policyholders with a level of 
protection against default. 
Economic capital for a given portfolio is tied to a hurdle rate of return that is 
acceptable to shareholders on the commitment of their capital to this investment. The 
hurdle rate is derived from the capital asset pricing model, which measures market 
return on a traded insurance stock with an equivalent risk level. An activity that will 
generate return above the hurdle rate will widen the risk trading bounds and generate 
shareholder value, whilst those below the hurdle reduce the risk trading bounds, 
destroying shareholder wealth in the process. Return generated on economic capital is 
termed risk-adjusted return on capital (RAROC). It is calculated as the present value of 
expected net income as a percentage of economic capital attributed to the activity. 
2.2.1 Risk and Risk Capital 
-An Actuarial Science's viewpoint 
An insurance definition of risk is based on the expected value of losses. It has also 
been characterised by Cummins (1993) in terms of relativity, by extending the 
expected value definition to capture the contamination characteristics of portfolios. 
The definition of risk in terms of relativity is based on the implications of the 
application of the law of large numbers and the central limit theorem on the overall 
insurance risk. His definition characterises an insurer's risk exposure as relative and 
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absolute, depending on the operation of the law of large numbers and the implication 
of the central limit theorem on the overall risk portfolio. Relative risk operates under 
the assumptions that exposure units are independent and identically distributed (IID), 
that the law of large numbers successfully operates, and that average loss exposure 
unit becomes arbitrarily close to the true mean of the loss distribution with probability 
approaching 1 as N approaches infinity. According to Cummins it means that we can 
define relative risk either by the standard error of the portfolio or the ratio of the 
standard error of the mean to the distributional mean loss per exposure unit2. 
The fact that both parameters tend to zero as N goes to infinity, implies that this 
risk will be insignificant in large portfolios, due to diversification benefits. On the 
other hand Cummins defined an insurer's absolute3 risk in terms = of correlation 
characteristics of the exposures in the portfolio, in other words the covariance risk as it 
is known in finance. In this case risk is looked at from the point of view of imperfect 
portfolio correlation, due to contamination. Contamination results in poor resilience of 
net worth from severe movements in the markets arise from individual exposure units 
coming into the portfolio, being correlated to risks already in the portfolio. This 
enigma risk is embedded in the tails of the portfolio loss distribution, and is difficult to 
finance using all-purpose financing due to the drawback of its accumulation 
characteristics, which makes it expensive. 
2IRRI 
=/VN 
IRR 2=Xi N) 
Where: IRR is the Insurer's risk; 
N is the number of exposure units comprising the portfolio; 
a is the standard deviation of loss of each exposure unit; 
g is the mean loss per exposure unit. 
3 IAR 
=a 
4iNý 
Where: IAR is the insurer's absolute risk. 
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Due to the covariance risk, absolute risk tends to increase with the size of the 
portfolio (N) approaches infinity, implying it cannot be eliminated in large portfolios. 
The distinction between these two risks is that whilst relative risk can be reduced by 
portfolio diversification, this cannot be said for absolute risk as the portfolio grows. 
These concepts are linked to capital required to fund the risk carried in a portfolio, in 
so far as maintaining an acceptable level of financial distress is concerned. Total 
capital required for a portfolio is a function of absolute risk, whereas relative risk is 
important when considering the per policy capital requirements. Therefore capital 
requirement for individual policies declines as the portfolio becomes large, but the 
total capital for the portfolio tends to infinity with the portfolio size. 
Adding risk does not reduce absolute risk, but through subdividing it, making 
insurance risk management similar to that achieved through portfolio management of 
financial risks. When exposure units within a portfolio are not IID, they lend 
themselves to contamination. This internal contamination is a result of covariance risk, 
which is the non-diversifiable component similar to systematic risk in capital asset 
pricing. Cummins used Samuelson's "1/SIN Law" to show that risk cannot be 
eliminated if the element of independence does not exist and that variance does not 
vanish with infinite subdivision, but approaches the common variance between the 
units. 
Meyers and Heckman (1983), Wang (1999) and Meyers (1999a, b, c) used 
parameter uncertainty to illustrate the impact of portfolio contamination in property 
insurance, emanating from correlation because of geographic proximity and exposure 
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to catastrophes. This entails that a book concentrated in an area exposed to catastrophe 
generating perils is bound to consume more capital, than a portfolio that is 
geographically diversified. In fact the geographic diversification of a portfolio is 
important when determining which type of risk financing instrument to buy and the 
rate on line that should be paid to finance a portfolio. Marginal risk increments to a 
portfolio mean that it might not be economic to accept an exposure unit that is 
correlated to exposure units in the portfolio, as this has the effect of increasing the 
absolute risk. Therefore, allocating capital to incoming risk exposures might not be 
economic, due to higher marginal risk compared to return generated by the business 
already underwritten. Meyers (1999), Myers and Read (1998) used the marginal risk 
factor as a determinant of the level of capital consumed by an exposure. 
This is done on the understanding that the insurer's potential liability on an 
exposure unit is limited by its entire capital, not the capital allocated to individual 
exposure units. The allocated capital based on the marginal capital argument is a result 
of the behaviour of risk as the portfolios grow. Its shortcomings are endowed in its 
inability to accurately measure the equity that is necessary to fund an activity while 
maintaining a target default probability, as it ignores the interest paid by debtholders. 
This approach to risk management in insurance companies denotes the need for 
the distinction of these risks in order to determine the level of capital required and to 
whom the burden of paying for this cost should fall. Cummins's study asserts that the 
decline in the insurer's relative risk linked to per policy capital does not mean the 
insureds should not pay for the cost of capital. On the other hand, Meyers (1999) and 
Myers and Read (1998) used marginal risk factors to measure capital requirements in 
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an insurance portfolio, their methods places the burden for paying the cost of carry on 
the policyholders. The observation is that capital requirements tend to a mean value for 
exposure units with different risk characteristics and that if they are correlated the level 
of capital required will be unusually high. 
2.2.2 Risk and Risk Capital 
-A Financial Viewpoint 
Financial risk anchors on two pillars the mean and the variance of a portfolio, and 
the contribution of each risk exposure is measured by its contribution it makes to the 
portfolio, according to these two parameters. According to Markowitz (1952) risk of 
an investment is measured in terms of covariability of its rate of return, to the rate of 
return of the portfolio. As pointed in equation (2.1), whilst variance measures the 
potential dispersion of future rate of return of a security, it is the portfolio risk that is 
important in measuring risk, as specific risk can easily be offset against the returns of 
other securities. In finance according to Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) a risky asset 
is priced according to its relative contribution to the total risk of the market portfolio. 
The total risk of the market portfolio is measured by the variance of its rate of return 
distribution, is given by 
COV(RigRm) 
_ 
ßi (2.4) ß=2 Pi 
m 6m 6m 
Where: Rm & R; = return rates on market portfolio and asset i, 
Ym and ßi = standard deviations of returns on the market portfolio and 
asset i, 
p;, m = correlation coefficient between i and m. 
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This capital asset pricing risk denoted the ratio ß (beta) measures how a security 
co-moves with the market i. e. the systematic risk of the asset, and is priced based on 
the non-diversifiable component. Total market portfolio risk is obtained by the 
weighted sum of all covariances: 
N 
X; COV(Ri, Rm) =aP (2.5) 
i=1 
Where: xi = weight of security I in the market portfolio, 
N= number of assets in the portfolio. 
N 
X=I 
, 
_1 
Similarities with the insurance risk arise from the fact that they both assimilate 
absolute risk as the portfolio becomes large. The most important point is beta being 
used as a relative measure of co-movements of the securities for which the 
shareholders are compensated. The same concept has been used in insurance literature 
to value how much policyholders are paid, for buying an insurance policy with a risky 
company. Cummins (1990) used the ß coefficient in financial pricing models for 
insurance companies. The betas of individual business units were linearly decomposed 
as a measure of risk and were also used in the beta-based capital allocation by Albrecht 
(1997). The problem with these methods is that they tend to deconstruct company risk 
from a single source, like the underwriting betas (Cummins and Harrington (1985)) or 
market betas. By taking the portfolio risk and coming up with portfolio betas a 
company's overall risk can be measured. 
It should be borne in mind that each of the methods of measuring risk discussed 
above in an insurance company only measure risk in part, with the financial economics 
methods concentrating on the market risk and actuarial methods on underwriting risk. 
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Cummins's relativity method is good for internal control purposes because it stipulates 
risk factors that are taken into account when allocating capital. Capital requirements 
per individual policy decline, as the portfolio becomes large because of the decline in 
relative risk. Conversely, growth in a portfolio entail contamination arising from the 
correlation between exposure units, meaning more capital will be required because of 
the increase in absolute risk as diversification benefits will cease. Therefore, what 
drives capital consumption in insurance companies is this absolute risk component; it 
occupies the upper tail of the loss distribution. 
The cost trading insurance risk is a function of individual exposure units or the 
overall risk characteristics of the exposure units of a portfolio. In fact there is need for 
the insured to pay for the cost of carrying risk forward to a settlement date, though 
they pay close to the risk premium, insurance companies arbitrage risk trading by 
exploiting the margins earned from holding insureds' funds in the form of technical 
reserves. What is really paid for by the insureds should be the cost of utilising these 
reserves because in a competitive environment it is difficult to charge a rate above the 
risk premium. Otherwise what this study will show is that contribution to equity by the 
insured is not through direct utilisation of rating methods but through reserve 
utilisation. The shortcoming of this way of defining risk is that it doesn't take into 
consideration other operational risks affecting insurance cash flows, as it only 
considers capital requirement costs based on liability risk. 
As we saw from the discussion above risk level is also a function of the 
covariance risk characteristics of the business being underwritten into the portfolio 
[Meyers (1999)]. This means that capital requirement for renewing an exposure unit is 
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related to the marginal risk added to the portfolio by writing an extra exposure unit 
[Myers and Read (1999)]. Marginal risk depends upon the properties of risks already 
in the portfolio, because exposure units already in the portfolio have a bearing on the 
magnitude of risk added to the portfolio by an incoming risk. Thus whatever impact an 
exposure unit might have on a portfolio's absolute risk, the determining factor is a 
portfolio's risk characteristics, irrespective of underwriting standards and financial 
goals. The nature of capital required to sponsor risks in the portfolio is determined by 
the characteristics of the absolute risk. In a way not only capital requirements are 
defined by absolute risk, but also by the type of capital used to effectively quell 
volatility in the return profile. 
Option pricing methodology has also been used to measure firm-wide risk, by 
taking into account the effects of both assets and liabilities on the return profile of the 
portfolio (Cummins 1988). The portfolio risk parameter ap, by using portfolio theory 
to compute risk arising from both assets and liabilities. ap is then used in the option- 
pricing model to compute default risk which represents the overall risk of the firm. The 
advantage of this risk measurement parameter is the incorporation of asset-liability 
risks and leverage risks and liquidity risks, which are not captured by other risk 
measurement methods above. Therefore, our more encompassing methodology 
discussed in chapter (3) has a stronger predictive power of fair insurance contract 
prices and provides an efficient way of allocating risk capital. 
2.3 Risk Classification 
Risk classification has evolved from a disintegrated form where only two broad 
categories were considered (pure and speculative or financial risks), into a holistic 
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approach encompassing total risk faced by a company. According to Brenner (1996) 
theories about risk aversion originated from the days of disintegration of risk. Under 
this theory those who like risk, gamble, while those who are risk averse, insure, and 
the theory stressed out that one couldn't both insure and gamble. Speculation is seen as 
an action motivated by the desire to increase wealth, whilst insurance is an act of 
protecting the wealth which has already been achieved. 
These acts both involve risk and its management, as well the cost of carry to be 
paid by those off-loading risk to those willing to assume these risks in the form of 
premiums, profits, interest, which is deemed to be sufficient for the level of risk. The 
only difference is the nature of risk being sold at each point of trading, the profiles 
underlying these risks and risk dimensioning. Otherwise, managing positions exposed 
to these risks is beneficial to a company because it preserves shareholder value. In 
each case risk is costly because it destroys value and should be managed in order to 
preserve value. 
2.3.1 Traditional and Regulatory Risk Classification: 
Risk is looked at in a contextual and integrative manner in the works of Levin and 
Schneider (1997). Their classification is based on the processes of handling risk 
- 
exposure management and risk management. Exposures were considered to involve 
the same events as risk, but at a different level depending on materiality of its effect on 
an organisation's finances. Risk analysis done using a variety of actuarial, statistical or 
financial techniques and their management is not a strategic function. The 
management of risk entails planning, organising, directing and controlling risk to 
respond to chance; since it undermines a business's management process. This 
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classification of events, exposures and risks is more amenable to integration of risks 
but it does not tell us what the nature of the risks are, the measurement methods 
whether based on embedded hazards or their impact on cash flows. 
Kloman (1992) classified risk by dividing risk faced by an organisation into two 
major groups, global and organisational risks. The global risks segment is composed of 
risks related to the factors that affect the organisational risk environment. 
Organisational risks which under his model drive the global risks are further classified 
into four divisions financial or market operational, political and legal risks. Kloman 
also distinguished the extent to which these classifications have to go to be strictly 
delimited to business risks or hazard risk. However, his method of classification still 
separates speculative risks from pure risks by only looking at the causative factors and 
not their effects on cash flow structures within an organisation. In this study we 
believe cash flow behaviour should be the overriding factor in the determination of a 
risk segment. His classification based on global risks was also echoed by Troy (1995) 
who pointed out that increasingly globalised business operations has led to the 
development of a new economy, which is transitional, fluid and characterised by 
extreme complexity. Insurance business is global in nature but our perception is that 
risk is indivisible by nature and this dimension of risk is just one component of a host 
of risks faced by an organisation. For example when underwriting a line of business, 
the company will not only be exposed to liability risk, but also duration risk in relation 
to the tail of business. Thus, classifying exposure to risk, according to all exposures a 
stream of cash flow is exposed to, makes the classification more robust and complete. 
This methodology bridges the gap between actuarial and financial risk measurement 
methodology. 
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Insurance-based classifications are diverse in nature, the commonly used being 
the quantities in the standard NAIC's Risk-based-capital formula. The risk categories 
used to calculate minimum capital requirements termed Ro to R5 are given as follows: 
R o: Investments in insurance affiliates 
" Non-controlled assets, Guarantees for affiliates and Contingent liabilities 
R i: Fixed income securities 
" Cash, Bonds, Bond size adjustment factor, Mortgage loans, Short term 
investments, Collateral loans and Asset concentration adjustment for fixed 
income securities. 
R 2: Equity investments 
" 
Common stocks, Preferred stocks, Real estate, Other invested assets, 
Aggregate write-ins for invested assets and Asset concentration adjustment for 
equity investments 
R 3: Credit risk 
" Reinsurance recoverables, Other receivables 
R 4: Reserving risk 
9 Basic reserving risk charge, Offset for loss-sensitive business, Adjustment for 
claims-made business, Loss concentration factor and Growth charge for 
reserving risk. 
R 5: Written premium risk 
" Basic premium risk charge, Offset for loss-sensitive business, Adjustment for 
claims-made business, Premium concentration factor and Growth charge for 
premium risk. 
Total capital requirements =R0+ (R; +RZ+ R3 + Rä + RS )o. s (2.5) 
-Page 44- 
Feldblum (1996) raised three issues pertaining to this formula are particularly 
important: 
" the lack of covariance terms in the square root rule; 
" the exclusion of the Ro charge from the square root rule; and 
" the marginal capital effects of each risk element. 
According to Bustic (1994) the square root rule, used under the RBC 
methodology overestimates the amount of capital needed to achieve a given "expected 
policyholder deficit" ratio if the risk elements have normal or lognormal probability 
distributions. Furthermore, it has been observed that the correlation among the risk 
factors is weak, to such an extent that they underestimate the need for capital, which is 
small. The movement of one-half of the credit risk charge into the reserving risk 
category accounts for correlation between the risk of adverse reserve development and 
reinsurance credit risk. 
The RBC requirements are largely dominated by the underwriting risk charges; 
particularly by the reserving risk charge. According to Feldblum (1996) reserving risk 
charges are just ad hoc extrapolations from historical happenstance, they do not 
adequately distinguish financially-troubled companies from sound companies, and 
they provide perverse incentives that may raise insolvency risks. 
This classification is based on the regulatory framework; it goes to some extent in 
harmonising the way risk is classified within an insurance company. Regulatory 
classification has formed a basis for dynamic financial analysis techniques used in 
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quantifying risk as well as RAROC. Modifications of risk classification as envisaged 
under RBC, is due to shortcomings in the regulatory framework arising from rigidity 
and failure to capture actual characteristics of absolute risk. This method of classification 
also fails to take into account the functional cash flow exposures, because underwriting cash 
flows are exposed to both liability and duration risks. Our classification methodology will 
try to bridge this gap. 
2.3.2 Actuarial Risk Classification 
Insurance risk is also anatomised from an actuarial point of view, by adopting a 
framework used by the Society of Actuaries' Committee on Valuation and Related 
Matters, which put risk into categories C-1, C-2, C-3, and C-4: 
9 Cl risk is defined as volatility in cash flows arising from invested assets 
other than volatility brought about by interest rate risk. 
" 
C2 risk is defined as volatility in cash flows arising from obligations or 
underwriting aspects of insurance risk trading portfolios. 
" 
C3 risk is defined as volatility in cash flows brought about by interest rate 
movements in the presence of a mismatch of assets and liabilities and risk 
of disintermediation caused by embedded options that are sensitive to 
changes in interest. 
" 
C4 risk is defined as volatility in cash flows emanating from management 
decisions, fraud, and errors or omissions. 
Risks pertaining to the C-1 category are asset risks which include interest rate 
risks, credit risk, market risk, and currency risk. The second set of risks C-2 is pricing 
and reserving risk based on the premise of inadequacy to meet policyholder obligation. 
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C-3 risk is asset/liability-matching risks, with its underlying causative factors based on 
movements in interest and inflation rates affecting both values of assets and liabilities. 
The last sub-set of risk C-4 is a miscellaneous component and is similar to what 
Kloman classified as global risks, and what we classify as operational risks. 
The Casualty Actuarial Society also uses the same classification of grouping risk 
from cl to c4 in their dynamic financial analysis (DFA) models. These models seek to 
integrate separate functional areas of insurance risk trading, to reflect the interplay 
between assets and liabilities and the resultant effects on income, cash flows, overall 
return structure and the cost of capital. DFA is a process of analysing the financial 
condition of an insurance company. Financial condition refers to the ability of the 
company's capital and surplus to adequately support the company's future operations. 
I 
This model is good at linking between strategies and results. It uses scenarios to 
illustrate the impact of the risk environment on strategies and decisions in the context 
of information about risk exposure in insurance portfolios. 
DFA models are complex but good for internal controls when it comes to the 
value of insurance portfolios and assessing performance given a range of economic 
environments. Thus it provides a platform for strategic planning, tax planning, risk 
financing, pricing or market strategy and isolates those risks exposing equity to 
financial distress. Since it is not standardised it is affected by the model input, and it 
also determines whether deterministic or stochastic models are the most appropriate 
given the resources and data at hand. This technique has been criticised for being 
descriptive rather than prescriptive, since it starts with a methodology and not the 
framework for linking the actual levels of capital required to risk as the decision is left 
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to the user (Nakada et. al. 1999). Its complexity and flexibility means that it gives 
tailor made solutions to individual risk portfolios, but detailed DFA models require 
significant expenditure on software, time in assumption determination, maintaining the 
model and interpreting the results. 
The drawback for the actuarial view which focuses on risks in isolation and their 
impact on statutory accounting statements is that it tends to foster risk measures that 
do not aggregate well at the firm level and leads to a piecemeal approach toward risk 
management (Santomera and Babbel 
- 
1997). Actuarial classification and models fail 
to measure the risk management engagement. What insurance companies need is a 
framework that links the cost of carrying risk forward to settlement date to the level of 
capital required to optimise risk in an economic way. Our risk classification model will 
address these shortcomings. 
233 Financial Risk Classification 
Risk has also been classified on a financial basis. The generic groups financial 
risk is dimensioned into are actuarial, systematic, liquidity, operational and legal risks. 
Financial risk classification looks at risk only insofar as it impacts firm economic 
value; aggregation and covariance are the focus. This view is the one, actuarial 
practitioners are now considering in their risk quantification methods, especially under 
the DFA techniques where financial techniques are used. Therefore, financial risk 
classification can be seen as the window to greater risk integration in insurance. 
However, these models fail to capture risk characteristics of individual risks as 
blending of the portfolio increases. 
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A risk classification we are looking at is the one that should not only enable us to 
integrate the firm-level risk but also enable us to model the risks for frequent reporting 
intervals. Santomera and Babbel (1997) raised a view we also share, when they 
pointed out that these analyses are complex, difficult, and not easily communicated to 
non-specialist in the risks considered. Another problem is that risks are not 
dimensioned in similar ways, and management's technical expertise to appreciate the 
true nature of both the risks themselves and the analyses conducted to illustrate the 
insurer's exposure to them is limited. They also pointed out that aggregate risk 
exposure is receiving greater attention, with risk being measured in terms of variability 
of outcome and cash flow or earnings effect of risky positions. These methods are both 
amenable to the examination of correlation of different risks and the extent to which 
they can or should be viewed as offsetting. At the moment most insurers due to their 
categorisation of risk evaluate these risks separately and aggregate total exposure by 
simple addition [Santomera and Babbel (1997)]. Achieving integration of risks within 
an insurance set up however, requires significant work to be done on these risks on an 
individual basis. 
Another classification adopted by Nakada et al (1999) divides risk into three 
broad categories namely asset, liability and operating. These risks are further put into 
subgroups based on characteristic inherent in each risk, of which we have credit and 
market, catastrophe and non-catastrophe, and business and event risks respectively. 
The advantage of this classification is the ease with which value distributions can be 
integrated, as the underlying distributions are developed based on differences in risk 
drivers and distribution type. Furthermore this classification enables the generation of 
standalone distribution for each risk component, and the measurement of economic 
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capital on each standalone risk, which can be used in determining the contribution to 
economic capital of each component to an aggregated risk component. The risk 
measurement techniques used incorporating both actuarial and financiäl risks, help to 
capture the characteristics of each risk component, as depicted in the specific loss 
distributions, matching the frequency to the severity. This classification has been used 
in determining economic capital requirements; the conceptual framework followed in 
generating and aggregating individual distributions by Nakada et al (1999) is robust, 
which makes this classification an anchoring point in our study. 
23.4 Classifying Insurance Risk a Pragmatic Approach 
The classification used in this study derives from various models elaborated 
above, especially the VaR methodology which is consistent with the current practice. 
We view this as the starting point in our classification process because this 
methodology helps us aggregate the risk easily, as well as enabling us to capture all the 
functional features of cash flows. Our classification goes a step further by categorising 
risk, not only with respect to cash flow behaviour, but also on pliability to 
measurement and coalescence into the firm-risk-level framework. The model used is a 
decomposition of the collective risk profile, in that; it looks at risk from the source, its 
consumption and its layoff at acceptable levels. This methodology directly measures 
the total variability of potential outcomes through a priori distribution specification 
and does not depend on subjectively pre-specified range of risky environments to 
derive the worst-case scenario. We propose a broad-based risk classification in this 
thesis, so as to address the shortcomings of both traditional and regulatory risk 
treatment in the insurance industry. The proposed risk segments, which we can use to 
aggregate insurance risk, are captioned as follows: 
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Operational risks. 
These two major groups are further subdivided into segments and sub-segments 
according to the nature of underlying causative factors, and their impact on cash flow 
structure (as shown in Table 2.1). The model also takes into consideration the 
correlation between the sub-sets, requiring interlocking risk measurement, control and 
financing tools. A step-model is considered the most appropriate model to employ, 
since it eliminates rigidities in risk perception, dimensioning and management. We 
decompose insurance risk, based on underlying cash flow characteristics, and present it 
in an integrated way using the step model depicted in Table (2.1). 
The impact of risk in insurance risk trading ranges from the expected losses to 
unexpected losses leading to financial distress or insolvency. Insolvency occurs when 
a company's capital has eroded to the point where its ability to generate cash to pay 
outstanding claims is jeopardised. The materialisation of insolvency results from the 
lack of market liquidity or the demise of liabilities exceeding the assets backing the 
liabilities, thereby preventing quick or effective liquidation of positions or portfolios 
and limited access to funds. Liquidity risk has two components, the timing and pricing 
adequacy element. Adverse movements in these components can lead to a funding 
crisis, resulting from any of the following: 
9 occurrence of unexpected events such as large claims, 
9 assets write down, 
" 
loss of confidence or legal crisis, 
" early settlement of claims than expected, 
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" 
failure to make quick recoveries from reinsurers, and 
" accumulation of claims due to natural catastrophes. 
The framework that is used in this integrated risk classification framework is 
underlined by the basic principles of Modigliani and Miller that the value of the firm 
does not depend on the reengineering of the financial structure, given the prevalence of 
perfect markets, but on choosing projects with positive Net Present Values. Therefore, 
the identification of risk factors that are used in this model depends on their potential 
to destroy value in the firm. It is also those risks that are actively managed by 
insurance companies at the moment, though in a haphazard manner. The risk that are 
identified and categorised into the groups below are easy to measure and manage 
because historical data are available for use in quantification and management. 
Table 2.1: An Integrated Risk Classification Franiewoi i 
Flow Engineering Risk 
Operational Risk 
Credit Risk Asset Ratings 
Reinsurer Ratings 
Interest Rate Risk Asset and liability Duration 
Reserve Duration 
Duration Matching 
Liability Risk Line of business and size 
Reserve type and size 
Equity Risk Project Financing 
Public and private equity 
Currency Risk Insurance Operations held in foreign currency 
Currency matching 
Assets and liabilities held in foreign currencies 
Operations Risk Expenses Risk 
Compliance 
Business risk 
Required cost of Carry 
Event Risk Event: 
- 
fraud, error 
Catastrophic Risk 
Financial Crisis & Liquidity 
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We called the first set of risks cash flow engineering risks because; these risks 
have to be traded in order to create value. They arise during the process of generating 
value for shareholders and their operation has the effect of reducing shareholder value 
or making decisions uncertain. For a risk to be classified under this heading there must 
be a stream of cash flow exposed, because the very existence of such a stream is to 
generate value. Operational risks on the other hand are inherent in the processes of 
engineering cash flows; for example, fraud or errors arise not from the cash flows 
traded but from process risks. Therefore, we envisage two measurement processes in 
this thesis. The first entails the measurement of engineering risks using portfolio 
theory methodology. Operational risks are measured as residual risk using the top- 
down approach, like the option pricing methodology and stress testing. In fact, the 
model developed in Chapter 3 goes a long way to incorporate evcn the cost of 
compliance to an insurance company. 
The models that have been used to measure risk have concentrated on certain 
aspects of the insurance company, like the underlying perils in liability classes and 
market risk in assets. One such methodology that looks only at asset and liability 
classes without looking at all the risks affecting a firm's cash flows is the award 
winning option pricing paper by Cummins, Phillips and Allan (1997). Their 
methodology failed to take into account all the functional features of insurance cash 
flows, in that only perils insured and market risk were used to measure firm-wide risk, 
whilst other important risks are ignored. A more encompassing methodology like ours 
accounts not only for perils affecting an account but also the duration of reserves held 
for each account. 
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The same concept of making operational risk part of the risk measurement 
methodology is also shared by Shepheard-Walwyn and Litterman (1998), who 
integrated this risk component in expected rate of return and volatility determination. 
Another model showing the importance of operational risks in value creation is the one 
that further developed Myers's model by Tigeorgis (1988) and Pindyck (1988)4. 
Equation (2.6) is more reminiscent of dynamic cash flows, with moinentum stored 
within an insurance portfolio over a period of time is dependent upon how mangers 
exploit the growth opportunities. According to Shepheard-Walwyn and Litterman 
(1998) the Sharpe ratio5 can be maximised in year (t), by determining the expected 
return [E(Rpt)] and standard deviation [apt]. Shepheard-Walwyn and Litterman's 
equation is used to show not only the interaction between assets and liability accounts 
but also the role that operational risk play in optimising risk-return as given in 
equation (2.6) below: 
E(Rpt) = E(DAt +Yt-Lt) (2.6) 
Where: E(Rpr) represents forecast value for earnings at time (t); 
DAt represents the change in the value of the insurance company's 
portfolio of assets in time (t). 
4 NPV = "Static" NPV + Increment in Future Growth Opportu nties. 
5 
Sharpe Rario, =Q 
RPt 
- 
Rr` 
pt 
Where: Rpt is the company-wide return on invested finds, in time t. 
Rft is the return in the risk-free rate at time t., and 
at is the standard deviation of Rpt measured at time t. 
This ratio is an expression of return in relation to risk, measuring return relative to the total risk of an 
insurance company's portfolio, where total risk is the standard deviation of portfolio returns. What we will 
be evaluating is the ability of management to alter the portfolio, given the risk level at which they it is 
constrained to operate. By comparing Sharpe ratios for the portfolio and the benchmark, we can establish 
whether an insurance company has performed positively, that is when the ratio is greater than that of the 
benchmark. 
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Yt is the value of the insurance company's new business revenue 
(growth) in time (t). 
Lt is the cost that the firm incurs in time (t). 
Equation (2.6) gives an insight into the value stored in the goodwill (future 
growth prospect) of an insurance company, which is mainly determined by the 
prudence in management decisions. If decisions by management are poor, this will 
soon be reflected in the firm's ability to generate and maintain existing business. An 
example of a management decision that will affect both profitability and risk levels 
might be that of under reserving which will not only affect capital structure but also 
the credit ratings and share prices. Portfolio risk outlined in equation (2.7) considers 
factors under the cost of management actions in as far as they affect the realisation of 
growth, because value enhancement is a function of Yt, which should efficiently be 
exploited. The risk parameter for a portfolio that takes into account the effect of 
management decisions is given in equation (2.7) as follows: 
6t =62AAt+02Yt+62Lt+2[Cov(DAt, Yt)-Cov(DAt, Lt)-Cov(Yt, Lt)] (2.7) 
The portfolio risk parameter computed using risk classification based on the major 
groups of assets, liability and operational risks shows the feasibility of this type of 
classification for practical application. We use this methodology for measuring 
portfolio risk in this study. We are able to show that this classification is easy to apply 
and to be understood by those using the model to implement policy. The advantage of 
this classification over the other methods is its simplicity when it comes to application 
and the ease with which problem areas can be diagnosed and corrected. 
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2.3.5 Cash flow Engineering Risks 
Risk is identified and measured according to the process of generating cash flows, 
which has two dimensions, the underwriting and market risks. Insurance companies 
borrow funds from policyholders at a rate directly connected to the underwriting risk, 
and this rate determines the cost of carry. The products underwritten by an insurance 
company generate premiums received at time zero, and losses are paid at time one [the 
assumption that all premiums (claims) are received (paid) at time zero (one) is not true 
in practice]. The time lag between receipt and payment of losses means that the 
premiums will be available for investment, with the interval for holding the funds 
depending on the loss payment pattern. 
The payoff profiles of insurance companies are downward sloping, and derive 
from the underlying risks and how they are managed. The building blocks of any 
financial engineering is its strength in describing any risk trading position by making 
reference to the underlying cash flows. The definitions of an exposure can be a claim 
settlement date, amount of investment, or a risk financing return profile or credit 
profile of counter-party. The funds generated might not be enough to cover the losses 
that will be paid, the deficit which is usually known as the underwriting loss is what 
we call the liability risk. It is the variation in cost of risk trade arising from various risk 
factors that constitute underwriting risk. The utilisation of the trade (funds raised but 
not yet paid out as losses) is usually affected by market risk factors, because it is 
invested in uncertain markets, which mean that these underwriting cash flows are also 
exposed to duration and convexity risk. 
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Table 
 
": i-'rtsh Flow z ; I. t'. zt : `cri 
Cash Flow Engineering Risk Credit Risk Asset Ratings 
Reinsurer Ratings 
Interest Rate Risk Asset and liability Duration 
Reserve Duration 
Duration Matching 
Liability Risk Line of business and size 
Reserve type and size 
Equity Risk Project Financing 
Public and private equity 
Currency Risk Insurance Operations held in foreign currency 
Currency matching 
Assets and liabilities held in foreign currencies 
We have pointed out above that cash flow engineering risk is the uncertainty in 
the surplus of a company associated with changes in variables used to engineer cash 
flows in order to create value. These variables have been identified in Table (2.2) 
above, as the drivers of value in an insurance company. The risks in column two define 
the main exposure that will be used in our portfolio risk measurement fonnula. The 
formula that is going to be used in defining risk of the cash flows of a portfolio is 
given by 
a2 =V2a2 +VBaB+2VAVBCov(A, B) 
6p =V2 62 +VB6B+2VAVBpa A 6B 
2V 
_ 
(V" 
VB 
teA (YAýBP A= VS2v' (2.8) 
P6AGB 6B B 
V 
(v 0 (1 P)((5,1 0V 
0 ßA p10 a13 
JVß 
Where: V=1x2 value vector, 
Q= Variance-covariance matrix, 
V1= the transpose of V. 
C=2x2 correlation matrix, 
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6=2x2 diagonal standard deviation matrix. 
This formula as pointed out in equation (2.8) can also be applied to a portfolio 
with N risks, the dimensions of the vectors and matrices are adjusted accordingly. This 
portfolio extension is done to incorporate risks identified in Table (2.2). In order to 
capture all the functional features of the risks above, the risk categories in column 2 
above are further divided into further sub-categories. These subcategories enable us to 
capture all functional cash flows as captioned in column 3 of Table (2.2), i. e. the 
causative factors behind these risks. For example, in the credit risk category we will be 
able to know whether the risk is coming from assets held or contingent capital. This 
however, does not tell us the market they are coming from, the currency of that credit 
exposure, the industry the obligor is in or the duration of the bond. By doing this, a 
whole range of risks are identified and included in the measurement process. The same 
process is used to identify risks in each category, until all the possible exposures are 
identified. We discuss the processes of mapping these risks and measurement in the 
following sections. We first of all adopt a descriptive approach of the risks before 
looking at the computation of variance and the covariance in each risk category. 
2.3.5.1 Liability Risk 
Liability Risk Line of business and size 
Reserve type and size 
This risk pertains to uncertainty in policyholder surplus associated with futurc 
insurance liabilities. This risk is largely dependent on the lines of business 
underwritten, the pricing policy and the size of reserves set aside for each risk. This 
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was quite clear in the Independent Insurance case, when the size of reserves and the 
type of business it was underwriting lead to its demise. Its demise was not a result of 
an event risk, but the normal on the grain underwriting risk assumed by the company. 
The fact that this risk is contained in products sold by an insurance company mean 
that, it derives from contingent events underwritten, exposure of insurance portfolios 
to hazard losses, reserve risk, and catastrophic risk. Underwriting risks are unique to 
specific contracts sold and are primarily related to the terms in the contract document. 
The timing and amount of liabilities associated with engineering insurance cash flows 
vary from expectations or assumptions underlying models employed. These variations 
bring with them obligations that must be met by capital commitments from 
shareholders and the cost of trade paid by policyholders. 
Liability risk is not limited to actuarial risk only, but also extends to include 
financial risks on the liability side of the balance sheet. Insurance markets are evolving 
into complete risk trading machines, underwriting both actuarial and financial markets 
business. Therefore, liability risk can no longer be adequately assessed based on 
actuarial liability risks only, but also on their primary risk participation in the financial 
markets. What we have in mind is an insurance company that has a dual role of being a 
conventional insurance underwriter and that of being an investment banker. The 
primary cash flows engineered bring with them obligations, which will have the same 
effect on the underwriting loss profile as any conventional insurance portfolio. 
In order to compute the risk for liabilities for all the liabilities underwritten by an 
insurance company, incurred losses for each line of business have been used in 
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determining liability growth rates. Cummins (1988) and Sommers (1996) computed 
liability growth rates by using the variance-covariance approach assuming that 
changes in incurred losses are normal. This characterisation of losses by their mean 
and variance mean that these parameters can be derived from the multivariate 
distribution of the risk factors and the composition of the portfolio. The risk factors are 
the losses incurred by the insurance company, which we assume to be log-normally 
distributed, so the log growth rates during a holding period is given by 
RLt 
=1n(L/ ) (2.9) 
Where: Lt denotes the value of the incurred losses at time t, 
Lt-1 is the value of incurred losses at time t-1, 
Ru denotes growth rates of liabilities at time t. 
Liability growth rates for the portfolio follow a multivariate normal distribution 
with mean . LL, volatility and correlation between two growth rates of two lines of 
liabilities of ßL, and p, respectively. We know that since the marginal distribution for 
each liability growth rate is univariate normal, the portfolio liability growth rates on 
the portfolio, being a linear combination of normal distributions, is also normally 
distributed: 
RL 
- 
N(JIL, aL) (2.10) 
The mean growth rates are the weighted average all the lines of business in the 
portfolio. It can also be said that the standard deviation is computed using equation 
(2.8) above, with the dimension of the vectors and matrices adjusted accordingly. We 
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can calculate the value at risk for liabilities using the expression in equation (2.8) 
- 
VaRL= a[VaCaVT]'/'"L. This is just part of the model; we need to compute the value 
at risk of all the cash flow exposures in the portfolio. 
When we incorporate financial risk the cash flows are not usually correlated, 
inasmuch as they have different cash flow attributes, which bring with them a window 
of diversification benefits as envisaged by our model. Traditional insurance portfolios 
are difficult to diversify as the assets backing liabilities are generated mostly from cash 
flows attributed to the liabilities. In any case, either of the engineered cash flows has to 
perform in order to maintain profitability, which shows the limitations of 
diversification in conventional portfolios. The expansion of the scope of liability risk 
in an insurance portfolio brings with it the diversification of the liabilities faced by an 
insurance company that are not correlated in any way. It's this principle which we 
apply to insurance companies in order to improve portfolio performance and diversify 
liabilities portfolio, rather than just the asset/liability match applied at the moment. So 
as long as we view the trading of risk from the liabilities side and the creation of a 
portfolio from both actuarial and financial liabilities, better returns can be expected in 
insurance portfolios. 
2.3.5.1.1 Non-Catastrophe Risk 
This risk component relates to volatility embedded in absolute loss costs. The 
determinants of this risk are diverse in nature resulting mainly from changes in loss 
costs and loss adjustment expenses and claim randomness. Risk resulting from 
expected losses is categorised into two major distinct classes, catastrophe and non- 
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catastrophe, according to the characteristics of loss distributions and the level of 
surplus required underwriting the policy. 
The level of claims in the market are assumed to be represented by the burning 
cost component of premiums written and claims cost in respect of supplementary 
cover provided. Premiums are determined in advance and based on expectations of 
carry commitments. They are a function of the attributes of liabilities written and each 
assuming distinct parameters depending on the growth rate, claim settlement pattern, 
volatility of claims, and market share initially held by the company. This means that in 
determining them we face the challenge of choosing a good model that will be able to 
explain the process risk affecting underlying fundamentals of carry assumptions. 
Apart from the model risk, the determination of premiums is also at the mercy of 
competitive pressures, regulatory interventions, and market cyclicality. Some variables 
like cyclicality are incorporated into models, with positive results of reducing the 
overall risk exposure to underwriting cycles. Therefore what we are concerned with 
when dealing with risk embedded in premiums, is whether the underlying premium 
assumptions are adequate to cover the underlying carry conditions. Otherwise, 
deviations from the underlying risk carry conditions makes fair premiums hard to 
obtain and widen spreads characterising the cost of capital required to buy insurance 
risk. 
Claims level should vary with underlying stochastic nature of the risk profile, the 
length and shape of the cycles linked to the type of liability. Claims outgo for non-cat 
risks is not highly skewed as it follows a lognormal distribution, whilst that of cat risks 
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follow the Pareto or Weibull distributions. The model we use in measuring insurance 
firm-wide risk in chapter (3) does not take into account the effect of super-cat risks. 
The idea is to keep the model simple, without losing the intended goal of providing a 
framework that is not too complex and easy to communicate to those implementing it 
on a day to day basis. 
It is important to note that since actuarial literature has concentrated on dealing 
with the problems associated with forecasting losses, we will not attempt to explore 
this area as it is well documented. What we shall make mention of in this case is how 
this risk is segregated into cat and non-cat components as this has a bearing on capital 
requirements. Whilst not-cat risk is closely related to factors affecting reserve risk, mix 
of policies in the book, moral hazard and adverse selection, cat risk is attributed to 
nature coverage, international tort, geographical concentration of book and legal 
jurisdiction. Modelling the size of cat losses and their probabilities has lead to 
improved certainty in prediction levels, though their frequency, severity and nature 
remains uncertain. This is the basis of insurance liability, because both non-cat and cat 
risks affect the overall cost of borrowing funds from policyholders and hence the 
pricing of individual policies. 
Another important risk is reserve risk, which is a result of disparities in the actual 
cost of losses for liabilities incurred under the valuation date from expected values. A 
number of factors can be attributed to this risk ranging from the credibility of the 
database, the volatility of the claims process, currency fluctuations, inflation, legal 
environment, corporate culture and pricing patterns. Risks embedded in the model 
used to calculate reserves, for premium reserves otherwise defined as a portion of 
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premiums that is equivalent to unexpired risks, depends on the model used and its 
appropriateness to the cash flows patterns. In other words, the earned premium is the 
average of premiums written in year (t) and (t-1), and unearned premium reserve is 
given at end of year (t). Reserve risk is a function of the size of the company, as large 
companies hold colossal reserves than in small companies where volatility in loss 
reserves is more conspicuous (A. M. Best, 1998). In fact big reserves are more 
diversified and give greater flexibility due to greater resources available to the 
company to better control reserve and price risks. 
Required capital depends on the variance in incurred loss development between 
accident years, and the variance in accident year of the incurred loss development 
between companies. These two measures of variance provide an indication of volatility 
in loss development for each line of business. Growth in premium income is an 
additional risk incorporated in measuring variance in reserves, to reflect the change in 
exposure profile. However, the provisions for outstanding claims and future claims are 
made on a nominal basis and then discounted at a risk-free rate of return (treated in a 
similar way by Myers and Cohn (1987)). 
Case Study 1: 
First Central Insurance Company started operations writing commercial lines in 1979 as a stock 
insurance company in New York. It had an A. M. Best rating of A (excellent) in 1986 because of 
good underwriting results in the preceding four years, a trend, which continued in the 1990s. 
However, its initial reserves or rates to cater for the rapid growth it was experiencing were 
inadequate. Premium underwriting doubled during the four years to $65.6 million during the four 
years but capital to support the growth only rose $2.6 million to $20.3 million. A. M. Best lowered 
their rating to A- due to the company's weakening capital position continued high growth and the 
quality of investment. The company held significant equity position in each portfolio; it had 
straining dividend requirements to the holding company and market losses in the carrier's 
portfolio, but still showing positive underwriting and operating performance. The company's loss 
ratio increased by 20% despite an unusually low-accident year, which was lower than each of the 
preceding growth years. The 20% loss ratio was masked by an excellent portfolio increase that 
provided a 30% growth in surplus, the slither in underwriting results was a result of reserve 
deficiencies in the previous years. First Central continued to pay dividends to its parents, limiting 
any further capital growth. A. M. Best downgraded the rating to B++ due to the continued 
deterioration in capital levels, reserve deficiencies and substantial dividend requirements to 
service the parent's debt. 
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First Central tried in 1996 to restore profitability and stability by reducing exposure through 
reinsurance protection, cancelling policies and restructuring its investment portfolio to reduce 
volatility. After announcing a reserve strengthening in early 1996, halving the surplus, the 
company was place under surveillance by the New York Insurance Department. A. M. Best further 
reduced their rating to D and in 1997, the company was placed into rehabilitation. (A. M. Best 
1999 
kl_?. '?; Fit +r, ,1 Five 4 . t" Rating History 
Effective Date Rating & Modifier 
05/94 A+ 
06/95 A- 
06/96 B++ 
02/97 D 
02/98 E 
Source: Best's Averages & Aggregates 1998. 
Fa 1iý6 1. F a, st (t ati i. 
1992 27,16 44,170 u- 93.6 15u 12,6 77 
1993 35,127 59,732 70 111.9 139.5 23,955 
1994 45,968 75,643 64.6 145.9 151.1 42,446 
1995 65,607 84,879 29.4 73.1 160.0 62,441 
1996 86,229 86,229 
-- 
176.3 86,229 
1997 
- 
2d. 7 
40.1 
56.1 
73.6 
100 
Table 2.5: First Central Key Financial Indicators 
Profitabili Leverage Liquidity 
Period Combined Investment Pre-tax ROR NPW to Net Overall Operating 
Ending Ratio Yield % (%) PHS Leverage Liq. (%) C/F (%) 
1993 92.9 6.1 12.0 2.1 5.0 134.4 135.5 
1994 91.3 6.1 13.5 2.7 6.7 125.3 143.2 
1995 110.6 5.9 
.3 1.9 5.7 126.5 123.6 
1996 133.3 5.1 
-27.4 3.8 13.4 112.6 122.3 
1997 
- - - - ----- 
5-Year 106.2 5.8 0.4 
Source: Best's Averages & Aggregates 1998. 
The collapse of First Central is a classic case of how inadequate reserving can 
affect a company's long term financial viability especially when it is writing 
unseasoned business. As shown in table (2.4) above there was a severe adverse reserve 
development in 1996, which exceeded the original reserves by about $20million or 
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29%. The first nine months of 1997 also underlined the problem of inadequate 
reserving which saw adverse reserve development crowning the year with a total of 
$24million. It can be inferred from the same table that if history is to go by reserve 
development for this company has been unfavourable, with deficiencies recorded in 
each of the past seven calendar and accident years. 
It is from the demand curve risk that by undercutting rates in a bid to increase 
market share; First Central failed to provide for the long-term cost of risk. The 
company's investment policy and continued demand from its holding company for it 
to pay dividends even in the lean years further exacerbated their weak financial 
position. The reserving risk should have been managed by taking cognisance of the 
company's long term cost structures vis-a-vis the prevailing risk factors so as to 
adequately rate business written into the book. In the case of First Central it was the 
impact of demand curve risk and the failure of sponsoring capital to meet the actual 
capital needs of its risk portfolio. 
Risk consumption is supposed to be matched with the capacity. Available capacity 
was not adequate because it did not equate to the actual risk factors faced by the 
company. The combination of under-pricing and excessive growth rates was a cocktail 
for disaster, and spell out the underlying factors behind the silent assassin, demand 
curve risk. It is apparent in Table (2-5) that the fundamentals went wrong in 1995, 
becoming worse in 1996 when the combined ratio was 110.6% and 133.3% 
respectively. The operating ratios of 104.7% and 128.2% in these years, lead to a 
decline in the overall liquidity during 1996, from 101.2% to 95.65, a further decline 
ensued in the first nine months of 1997 to about 87%. 
- 
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If this demand curve risk was well managed, growth rates should have been the 
first indicators to management that their fundamentals were wrong and that there was 
excessive utilisation of all-purpose equity. This case shows that irrespective of good 
underwriting results, if the fundamentals are missed, a company is bound to face the 
consequences of failing to define its risk parameters and the type of equity it should be 
utilising for each sector of its loss distribution. A proper risk classification should have 
warned them of the danger of relying on accumulated equity to sponsor the whole loss 
distribution. In Table (2.5) it is clear that good performance in the earlier years with 
rates of return on equity (ROE) of 12% and 13.5%, did not reflect the realised five- 
year return of 0.4%. Therefore, the false impression painted by the high rate of return 
on equity did reflect the quality of risk management, but the problem of relying on 
ROE as a measure of performance. We believe management compensation systems in 
insurance should be based on the cost of risk or spreads they deliver on equity supplied 
to them. 
In this study we distinguish between performance and risk management, because 
performance management without risk management always fail to deliver long-term 
quality returns. This issue is discussed in detail in Chapter (3) when we deal with 
default/liability spreads. It measures the cost at which management borrows funds 
from the policyholders and how these funds are utilised to earn a commensurate return. 
The management of spreads on both liability and asset accounts is a virtue, since 
through this art quality operational profits can be delivered to shareholders. 
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23.5.1.2 Event Risk 
This risk is prevalent in portfolios underwriting property classes covering natural 
perils such as hurricane, flooding, earthquakes, drought, hail, windstorm, tornadoes or 
cyclones, international tort, and liability classes. It's also prevalent in asset portfolios 
as a financial crisis, resulting from unusual increases in the covariance risk that 
reduces the resilience of the surplus. Thus a single financial crisis (a recession in the 
US due to a terrorist act at the World Trade Centre, dampening other major financial 
markets) changes the correlation between various assets in the portfolio to unity. This 
raises the level of risk in the portfolio as well as the capital requirements. 
Losses resulting from these perils are uncertain as to their occurrence and are 
usually full of unpleasant surprises as to their magnitude. This entails that the 
distribution profile of this risk is highly skewed with fat tails. Risk measured in our 
model, can further be developed to capture catastrophe risk using scenario analysis and 
stress testing, by looking at the magnitude of extreme historical events, both financial 
and catastrophic. This is necessary because the overriding assumption in this study is 
that risk factors are log-normally distributed, so a smooth behaviour is implied, which 
excludes the possibility of jumps. Stress testing and scenario testing will help identify 
the vulnerabilities of the surplus to a variety of catastrophic events. The fact that when 
these events occur, historical correlations change with increases in volatilities, mean 
that resilience of the surplus to market movements is reduced. 
The vulnerabilities depends on the particular characteristics of the portfolio, with 
insurance companies more susceptible to liability catastrophic risks if they are 
underwriting most of their business in geographically prone areas. A word of caution 
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is that there are a lot of permutations on the basic stress shocks which might be 
ignored, for example whoever thought that the twin towers of the World Trade Centre 
(WTC) will be obliterated by the same event and accelerate a world-wide economic 
recession. This methodology is just useful for highlighting those hot spots in the 
portfolio, because it does not tell us the likelihood of the events. 
The existence of this risk within a portfolio exerts more strain on the cost of carry, 
meaning extra capital requirements. This risk has high capital consumption attributes, 
especially when the degree of contamination is high within a portfolio that is the units 
insured within a portfolio have a high correlation. The contamination usually arises 
from geographical concentrations of the exposure units insured by a portfolio. 
It has been observed from the US market that the cost of carry has always been 
high in catastrophic years, from 1938 to 1998 on the overall industrial statistics. The 
number of insolvencies occurring in respective catastrophic years also supports this 
observation (A. M. Best, 1998). This show how the cost of carry is affected by risk 
throughout the entire loss distribution profile, adding the catastrophic risk component 
to the non-catastrophe, increase the cost of carry as the distribution profile becomes 
more risky. The distribution shown below becomes more risky because of the 
correlation inherent in the units modelled in each separate distribution. We believe that 
in the case of insurance risk, combining separate loss distributions on the cost of carry 
profile increase, rather than diversify the risk away. 
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FIGURE 2.1: CAT AND NON-CAT Loss DISTRIBUTION CHARACTERISTICS 
Pt 
Aý Plus F-Býp- 
0 
Loss Loss 
Equal 
The Aggregate Distribution is More Risky 
Fc-I (A+B=C) 
Loss 
An insurance company underwriting a portfolio characterised by loss distribution 
(A) will experience less volatility in its cost of carry, than a company underwriting the 
loss distribution (B) in figure (2.1). In fact these distributions show portfolios with 
different loss distributions and how these when combined affect the overall cost 
structure of an insurance company. The three loss distributions also determine the 
level and type of capital required sponsoring inherent risk. It is evident that more 
capital is required for the catastrophe distribution than for the non-catastrophe 
distribution and even more capital is required for the combined loss distribution (C). 
This also entails that the required return on capital supplied is directly linked to the 
characteristics of the distribution as its representative of the level of volatility 
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embedded within a portfolio. Combining the cat and the non-cat distributions does not 
improve the predictability of cost of carry trends, because the risky element is not 
diversified away as it is still present within a portfolio and will to a large extent 
influence volatility. 
Case Study 2: 
MCA started trading risk in Tulsa, Oklahoma as a conservative insurance company in 1929. In 
1988, MCA decided to expand its business into writing homeowner and other property 
coverage in Florida, this was to prove a costly decision. In August 1992, Hurricane Andrew 
devastated south Florida coast resulting in insurance losses more than $17 billion. The initial 
estimates revealed that MCA suffered losses exceeding $50 million, with reinsurance 
arrangements expected to release capital up to the tune of $20 million the net loss falling back 
on MCA was $30 million. MCA after the catastrophe agreed with the Oklahoma Insurance 
Department to suspend writing new business. In September 1992, it was placed under state 
supervision to guarantee that claims from catastrophe event victims would not exhaust the 
company's resources. In October 1992, MCA was placed into receivership, with claims 
estimated to be 3000, with a pecuniary value of more than $90 million. This far outstripped its 
financial reserves of $21 million in reinsurance and $15 million in capital. Insurance claims 
covered by Florida Insurance Guaranty Association were only up to the limit of $300,000. 
(Source: A. M. Best, 1999) 
Case study (2) shows how risk-equity mismatch wrecked a sound company on 
paper. The company changed its business mixture bringing with it new risks and a 
different loss distribution to the one faced by MCA previously. This required the 
company to redefine its risk profile and equity requirements to reflect changes in its 
business mixture. The company's perception of risks inherent in its new profile was 
impaired by the omission of a thorough risk and equity strategy redefinition. This 
meant that equity funding the new portfolio was inadequate, hence its demise. We 
believe that, had the company reclassified its risk profile and redefined its risk 
parameters properly, it would have survived this catastrophe. 
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Risk is classified according to the tier it occupies on the loss distribution, so it 
should be financed from an economic point of view by equity with matching risk 
characteristics. This was ignored in the MCA case. This characterisation of risk 
according to the level of severity and probability of occurrence makes the task of 
matching risk to equity easier and the utilisation of equity more efficient. The paucity 
of equity for risks occupying the super-cat tier of the loss distribution, has led to the 
development of new risk financing instruments aimed at diversifying sponsoring 
equity. The alternative risk financing methods for risks in the super-cat region targets 
the financial markets as the source of diversified equity suitable for off-loading 
insurance risks. 
Alternative capitalisation methods have come in the form of insurance derivatives 
traded at the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT), swaps traded at Catastrophic Risk 
Exchange (CATEX) and the securitisation of none-performing assets and/or losses. No 
single instrument is efficient in financing insurance risks faced over the entire loss 
distribution, but different instruments deliver different coverages at costs reflective of 
the underlying risk financed. The decision on the type of sponsoring equity used in 
financing risk throughout the loss distribution should be based on the underlying risk 
characteristics and the economics of using that particular instrument. 
Reinsurance capital is inadequate to finance super-cat risks because its equity 
accumulation characteristics are not amenable to financing all risk in the upper tail. 
Risk financing methods discussed below are intended to improve cost effectiveness in 
equity utilisation whilst delivering desired portfolio stability. This entails that the cost 
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of risk financing should be factored in the fair price charged the policyholders and in 
capital allocation to activities. 
2.3.5.2 Interest Rate Risk 
Interest Rate Risk Asset and liability Duration 
Reserve Duration 
Duration Matching 
Interest rate risk is the uncertainty in surplus associated with the change of interest 
rates in the future. It emanates from four distinct sources which expose insurance cash 
flows; these are repricing risk, yield curve risk, basis risk and optionality. These 
mismatches expose insurance company income and economic value to unexpected 
fluctuations, as underlying economic factors change. Movements in interest rates 
resulting in repricing rematches expose an insurance company to changes in the shape 
and slope of the yield curve (steeping or fattening). Yield curve risk results From 
changes in the slope and shape of the yield curve when unexpected shills have adverse 
effects on the income and economic value of an insurance company. In this case, an 
insurance company that is funding a long-tail liability with a short term interest 
bearing asset could face a decline in income arising from the position and its 
underlying value if interest rates increase. 
Yields vary differently depending on the quality of instruments employed, 
liquidity and maturity, which may not be in line with the liabilities, as they fluctuate 
independently. The reinvestment rate has a significant impact on the result of the 
model, which means that there is bound to be under- or over-statement of risk because 
of the inexact choice of reinvestment rate. Another source of risk crop up from 
imperfect correlation in adjustment of rates earned and paid on different instruments 
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with otherwise similar repricing characteristics. Basis risk gives rise to unexpected 
changes in the cash flows and earnings spread between assets, liabilities and off- 
balance sheet instruments of similar maturities or repricing frequencies. 
Insurance companies use options in trading and non-trading accounts, with 
instruments having embedded options bearing greater significance in non-trading 
activities. Instruments like bonds and notes have option provisions, as well as policies 
issued to policyholders, that give them the right to claim recovery or bonuses on the 
occurrence or non-occurrence of pre-specified events; the recourse to reinsurance and 
other capital market payoffs also have embedded options. These cash flows are 
characterised by asymmetrical payoffs as they are generally exercised to the advantage 
of the buyer and to the disadvantage of the seller. There is also a high level of leverage 
in these instruments, which tend to magnify exposure/risk level to portfolio, hence, the 
need for prudence. 
The timing of exercising these securities is uncertain, which exposes the portfolio 
to the risk of repricing, as these options are exercised in a pattern that does not usually 
follow the repricing process of backing assets. Thus at any stage when the repricing of 
assets happens, there will be a change in their profile, the liability portfolios at each 
stage should be readjusted to match backing assets, as if the pricing was done at the 
initial period. This interaction between liabilities and assets points to an internal 
insurance risk pricing process that takes into account the rollover risk encountered at 
each repricing stage. Dinenis and Mutenga (1999) used a model that disintegrates the 
insurance risk pricing process into various risk cost components, by deciphering 
spreads inherent in both asset and liability accounts. This helps in accounting for the 
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effect of risk dimensionally, according to time and against a benchmark for re-trading 
a risk portfolio. 
A study by Santomera and Babbel (1997) on risk management in general 
insurance companies pointed out that the management of risk appears to be 
concentrated on the asset side, ignoring the effects of duration variations of liabilities. 
Another important observation by these two authors is the failure by current duration 
and convexity measurements to incorporate the equity risk in asset/liability models. 
Assets available should not only be looked at as a means of sustaining value within a 
company through meeting all future claims outgo but also act as a stabilising factor 
over the long run. This means that assets should be able to create a surplus in good 
underwriting years, whilst asset realisation should be effected in lean years when a 
shortfall occur. 
If the asset/liability duration model was complete in characterising asset portfolio 
risk then a factor could be assigned to asset/liability risk determined by, the probability 
that desired level of mismatch is achieved ceteris paribus. The problem with such 
modelling is that it does not fully characterise the loss distribution of asset risk, so the 
default-put option method will be more advantageous to use as it go some way to fully 
characterising the loss distribution of assets and liabilities. The reason for this is that 
asset portfolios contain more options, that simple linear measures such as a basis point 
value or duration are inappropriate; even if convexity is included, the measures are not 
accurate enough to estimate risk associated with large fluctuations in underlying prices 
(Smithson and Minton, 1996). It is practise to use the market value for assets, though it 
is difficult to do this for liabilities, past loss data or simulated data is all that is close to 
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the market value of a liability. A continuous time valuation of insurance liabilities as 
the one utilised in some dynamic financial analysis would have been best to use, but 
due to a lack of standardisation and the economic rationale behind such a model, we 
will use models that model historical losses to measure insurance liabilities. 
Adjustments should also be done to reflect altering liquidity horizons in the 
default-option model, so that the anticipated time to close or hedge positions is taken 
into account. Factors inherent in these risks are dependent on the purpose of the cash 
flow altering instrument and the potential to deliver stored value required backing 
liabilities. Therefore, the following should be considered when making'adjustments in 
the default-option model: 
" The liquidity structure of the instrument; 
" Tradability of these instruments; 
9 Elasticity of demand and supply of a product, e. g. some products used to back 
liabilities in highly liquid markets may become illiquid when they are 
substantially in the money or out of the money. 
" 
Credit rating of the product issuer or the company selling the contingent 
capital, 
" 
Scale of the company's presence within a geographical insurance market or 
the financial markets (the MCA demise). 
" 
Size of individual positions relative to the issue size; insurance companies 
have limitations as to the proportions they can invest in a security, offered by 
the same issuer, such limitations also apply to reinsurance capital sourcing. 
" 
Bid-offer spreads within a market are also an indication of typical liquidity of 
individual securities; 
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" Daily turnover of the securities market is also important. 
In the VaR at risk model this risk is measured by changes6 in duration' or 
convexity8, which is also a measure for asset/liability risk9. This method will work 
perfectly well for those companies investing in the bond market like Munich Re, but is 
not reflective of the risk of assets backing liabilities in the then Commercial Union's 
(now CGNU), which was heavily invested in the equity markets. This means Munich 
Re will be more interested in how adverse movements in interest rates markets affect 
its assets and liabilities. 
The investment policy of a company is a major determinant factor on how these 
cash flows interact, for Munich Re Company performance is highly correlated to bond 
market performance. Conversely CGNU's investment policy made it more prone to 
equity market performance. Thus, the current measure of immunisation of using 
interest rate risk cannot be a good measure for those companies with liabilities backed 
by assets invested in the equity market. 
6 
dP 
= 
-P 
D= 
-PD 
* 
dy l+y 
Where: P= price of the security, 
Y= yield to maturity, 
D= Macaulay Duration of the security, 
D* = modified duration, 
dP/dy 
= change in the security price for a change in the yield to maturity. 
'D* =%+y) 
8 ^X= 
1" (AP) 
(ý 
P oy Ay 
Where: CX = convexity of the bond. 
AP = Change in price corresponding to a change in yield, 
Ay 
= 
Change in yield 
OP=-PD*Ay+2P"CX. Ey2 
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Margins or mismatch reserves in an asset portfolio can effectively be established 
if the cash flows are unpacked and variability attributed to the underlying risk factors 
of the market they are placed in. Assets are considered individually under this 
valuation method and their behaviour evaluated to establish their effectiveness in 
immunising the portfolio. Beard (1974) considered margins, which are required for the 
various components of liabilities, and indicates that assets and liabilities must be 
considered when assessing capital strength. The inclusion of various investments in a 
portfolio to measure and manage duration improves its precision ais aI measure and on 
limiting exposure. This study shall also endeavour to see how various investment 
instruments can be incorporated in the measure of asset/liability risk. The issue of 
substantiality should be emphasised since the out-laying of resources to track and 
manage these risks over and above the existing measures should be economic. 
The asset/liability duration or convexity model"' does not completely charactcrisc 
the asset portfolio risk due to inherent options, so the value at risk (VaR), as defined 
by the default-put option is used as it goes sonic way in characterising the loss 
distribution of assets (Smithson and Minton, 1996). Default-put risk is defined as the 
largest likely loss from asset and liability risk that a portfolio will suffer over a time 
interval, and with a degree of certainty. It is used to test the cost of risk capital in this 
study. 
2.3.5.3 Equity and Currency Risk 
Equity Risk Project Financing 
Public and private equity 
106AP=PD boy 
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Currency Risk Insurance Operations held in foreign currency 
Currency matching 
Assets and liabilities held in foreign currencies 
These risks arise from uncertainty in net-worth associated with the risk of equity 
market valuation and future exchange rates. Insurance companies invest their assets in 
publicly traded equity holdings, in affiliated companies that might not be publicly 
traded and venture capital projects. Movements in the stock markets will expose an 
insurance company's cash flows to risk specific to the industrial sector and the market 
the stock traded. Equity risk will be computed using equation (2.1), based on the 
market and industry, and we also take into account the weightings in each market 
category so as to capture the contribution of each market and industry. 
In order to compute the risk for shares in the portfolio of an insurance account, tie 
have to use the prices of the stocks. The price of shares are assumed to be log-normally 
distributed, which we use we use to compute log-returns, for a chosen holding period. 
The log returns computed as follows are log-normally distributed, 
R, 
=1n(S; S, 
_, 
) (2.1 1) 
Where: St denotes the price of the share at time t, 
S, 
_i 
is the price of the share at time t-1, 
R, denotes that rate of return of the share at time t. 
Since the distribution of these returns is characterised the mean and the variance, 
this is true with the portfolio since it follows the multivariate normal distribution oithe 
risk factors. This describes return as a linear combination of normal distributions with 
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a mean µE, a standard deviation GE, and p is the correlation coefficient between returns 
of two shares. The portfolio return (RE) normally distributed and is given by 
RE 
- 
N(µj, a1) (2.12) 
The computation of the mean and standard deviation are important at the 
computation of equity portfolio risk, we extend Markowitz's (1952) model and use 
equation (2.1) to compute portfolio risk. The portfolio mean is just a weighted average 
return (µE) of all the shares. We can use this to compute the value at risk for equity the 
equity portfolio [VaR(T; c)= 
-a"6E"Ev], but this is just part of a jigsaw in our risk 
computation puzzle. In other words we are more interested in all the risk factors 
affecting an insurance company's operations. 
Currency risk results from assets and liabilities, and insurance operations held in 
foreign currencies, as well as from currency matching. This risk significantly affects 
big insurance companies trading mostly in developed markets and the so-called 
emerging markets. Currency exposure in the EU has been greatly reduced because at 
most 12 currencies were reduced to a single currency on the 1S` of January 2002. 
However, insurance companies are still exposed to currency risk from emerging 
markets, which do not have floated currencies and even if they are floated it is very 
volatile and hard to repatriate. 
The computation process of these risks is quite simple, we just choose a time 
period in which we want to measure the risk, two currencies at a time is all you want to 
use in the computation of the covariance matrix and repeat the same process to 
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compute the portfolio risk. The data is readily available even on an hourly basis, but in 
our case we use the daily data. 
2.3.5.4 Credit Risk 
Credit Risk Asset Ratings 
Reinsurer Ratings 
This is the inability (default) or unwillingness on the part of the counterparty to 
perform on their pre-committed terms, or uncertainty regarding the collectibility of 
recoveries arising from the financial condition of the reinsurer or the ambiguity about 
cover provided. This is how we view this exposure in our valuation model. Direct 
credit risk results from counterparty default on traditional on-balance sheet products, 
such as reinsurance; the exposure is the financial value. Counterparties may also 
default on unmatured off-balance sheet products such as risk exchange contracts, flnitc 
risk contracts, swaps, cat-options; with the credit equivalent exposure being a function 
of the prevailing prices. Another dimension to the credit risk is the one related to 
settlement where a counterpart defaults on transactions in the process of being settled 
and value has been delivered to the counterpart but not yet received in return. 
Credit risk is low frequency and high severity and is correlated to the magnitude 
of losses incurred by a reinsurer, because there is a tendency to default reins1. u'aance 
contracts when catastrophic losses affect a counterparty. On financial instruments like 
bonds, credit returns are highly skewed and fat tailed, because improvements in credit 
quality brings limited upside to an investor, while downgrades bring with then 
substantial downsides. This makes credit risk in insurance quite unique in that the very 
purpose for obtaining reinsurance, which is to cover losses on the tails are the very 
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losses that are most likely to lead to a default. Thus, there is a high correlation between 
the size of cover obtained under a reinsurance arrangement, and the probability of 
default as it is usually arranged to portfolios with high sums insured. 
In order to compute credit risk for an insurance company's portfolio the exposures 
should be classified according to their rating. The information of ratings on bonds, 
loans and reinsurance bought, is obtained from credit rating companies like Standard 
and Poors', A. M. Best or Moody's. These rating agencies rate obligors based on more 
than 20 years of data, on which default probabilities are published. We use this 
information to identify non-rated bonds, project loans and mortgages, and map them to 
a rating. We specify the transition matrix from the chosen rating system, which mean 
that if we choose the S&P rating, we will have seven categories from a AAA to a CCC 
and then default. The transition matrix is a summary of the historical pattern of 
migration for bond ratings over a holding period, which is usually specified as one 
year. An adjustment is made on the average historical values so as to make the data 
consistent with the assessment of the current economic environment. 
We first have to compute the volatility of each instrument in a rating category, 
before moving on to measure portfolio credit risk exposure. The overriding assumption 
is that all issuers with the same rating category class are homogeneous; they have the 
same transition probabilities and the same default probability [Crouhy, Galai and Mark 
(2001)]. Using equity return correlation to generate the joint migration probabilities 
generates the portfolio diversification effect. There are a number of methods used to 
measure credit risk, like the modified Merton option pricing method, the actuarial 
approach, the KMVTM and the reduced form approach. These are alternative methods 
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to the CreditMetricsTM used to address the shortcoming of using equity as a proxy for 
company risk determination. The mathematical methodology for measuring credit risk 
exposure is beyond the scope of this study and the RiskMetricsTM group gives details 
of the methodology in the CreditMetricsTM technical document. 
On a prudence note, the financial position of the counterparty must be assessed 
thoroughly when deciding on buying capital or exchange risk in the secondary risk 
market. This is because the risk of default declines with the strength of the balance 
sheet of a company, and the consistency in their underwriting and accounting policies. 
However, it should also be borne in mind that default risk might also result from 
systematic risk factors. Correlation between default risks in an insurance portfolio is 
low on the asset risk side but high on the reinsurance securities side. This correlation 
mentioned above is also affected by the asymmetric nature of loss distributions, which 
means that when losses occur they will be in many multiples of the expected loss, 
hence the need for more economic capital to absorb them. At times reinsurers default 
where the balance sheet indicators do not predict the possibility of default; but default 
might arise from variance of portfolio performance from the mean value. Even if we 
use the mark to market methodology, it does not protect the balance sheet, because a 
position with a nil exposure can turn into a multi-million exposure within seconds of 
catastrophe event occurring. The levels of asymmetry, arising from the way exposure 
values grow within a short period of time at devastating rates makes it very difficult to 
hedge this risk. Therefore, this risk cannot be completely diversified away and some 
other instruments as credit derivatives can also be used in managing it, where the 
underlying risk can be marked to market. 
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2.3.6 Operational Risk 
Operational Risk Operations Risk 
Event Risk 
Expenses Risk 
Incompetence 
Compliance 
Business risk 
Required cost of Carry 
Event: 
- 
fraud, error 
Catastrophic Risk 
Financial Crisis 
Terrorism 
Operational risks are inherent in management decision and agency problem, in the 
form of spread costs incurred by virtue of being in the business of trading risk. 
Compliance, quality of human capital, ingenuity of staff' and reputation are at the 
centre of this model. The ability to continue creating wealth is enshrined in the quality 
of management decisions and rationality in management of risk taking behaviour. A 
model similar to the one above (equation 2.6) is the one given by Myers (1977), which 
divides the value of a company into two components, value of assets in place (Va) and 
value of future growth opportunities (Vgo). 
V=V;, + Vg (2.13) 
V, is defined as the value at the current balance sheet date which is not dependent 
on further discretionary management efforts in the form of investments, contrary V,, 
 
does depend on profitability of these investments. In equation (2.13) cash flows in V, 
represent the Net Present Values (NPVs) of asset and liability, which are considered 
static. On the other hand V. 
 
represents the company's ability to gain access to 
markets, the abilities of its qualified personnel, goodwill, security and ability to 
provide capacity on demand. Risk ingrained in operations are diverse, including but 
not limited to strategic changes in competitive advantage, due diligence, inflation, 
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unemployment, technological and legal changes, economic depression, terrorism and 
political risk due to globalisation. We will measure this risk in Chapter 3, where we 
compute residual risk using the option pricing methodology. 
23.7 Functional Risk Classification 
The classification proposed above focuses on all risks faced by an insurance 
company. However, it fails recognise financial aspects of cash flows generated on 
liability and asset accounts. So, within this traditional structure we further propose a 
classification that endeavours to group liability and asset risks according to their 
duration and convexity rather than just the underlying perils insured. This 
classification divides risks according to the time they take to settle and risks affecting 
them during the carry period, and not just risks arising from underlying perils insured. 
It sees insurance cash flows as a fund affected by risks of financial nature, brought 
about by the time they take to extinguish. This classification categorises asset and 
liability risks into three major accounts based on the duration of cash flows, i. e. short- 
term, medium-term and long-term risks. Each liability risk category is matched to 
assets with similar functional features. This makes it easier to manage duration and 
convexity risk in insurance portfolios as risks are matched according to their functional 
attributes not diverse and irreconcilable risks embedded in perils insured. 
It also helps insurance companies establish better transfer pricing systems, where 
liability accounts are paid interest by asset accounts for lending underwriting 
originated funds for investment purposes. The rate paid to each liability account is 
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based on the duration of cash flows, irrespective of the nature of liabilities in that 
account. The rate paid to liability accounts for these funds is the rate prevailing in the 
financial markets of cash flows with similar functional characteristics. This means that 
both liability and asset accounts should be able to generate commensurate return to 
shareholders after taking into account spreads paid to policyholders for originating 
funds and interest rates to liability accounts respectively. 
Transfer pricing systems instil discipline in liability accounts, as their interest rate 
is not based on underlying perils but competitive rates in the market. If the 
underwriting policy is poor, the cost of borrowing funds from policyholders will be 
high and the account will fail to generate return commensurate to the risk inherent in 
the portfolio. The same applies to asset accounts if investment return is lower than the 
interest rate they pay for borrowed funds from liability accounts (they will be 
destroying value). The main purpose of this classification is to make accounts perform 
based on financial aspects as each is forced to generate a return commensurate to the 
portfolio risk. We are able to bring insurance risk classification in line with banks that 
already classify their risks this way and have been performing much better than 
insurance companies. We use this classification in chapter 4 and 5 when developing 
our risk measurement model and empirical analysis respectively. 
23.8 The Impact of Risk on Insurance Companies 
The cost of financial distress becomes apparent when a company is placed under 
some form of regulatory supervision, such as receivership, liquidation or 
conservatorship (A. M. Best 1999). A study by A. M. Best in the US in the period 1969 
to 1998 the property/casualty companies failure rate peaked in 1975 at 1.4%, then in 
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1985 and 1992 at 2.3%, and 1989 at 2.0%. In the table (2.6) it is apparent that 640 
insurance company insolvencies were identified in the US since 1969, with the annual 
failure frequency of 0.89%. 
Table 2.6: Primary Causes of Property/Casualty Insolvencies in the US (1969-1998) 
Primary Causes Number of 
Companies 
% of Total 
Identified 
Non-Catastrophe Risk (Deficient Loss Reserves) 1 11 145 1134 
Non-catastrophe risk (Rapid Growth) 1 1 86 1120 
Operational Risk: 
- 
Alleged Fraud 
1 1144 1 1 10 
Asset Risk: 
- 
Overstated Assets 
1 1 
39 1 19 
Operational Risk: Significant Change in Business 1 128 
1 117 
Credit risk (Reinsurance Failure) 22 5 
Liability Risk (Catastrophe) 36 8 
Asset Risk: (impaired Affiliate 26 6 
Total Identified 426 100 
1 
Miscellaneous/Unidentified 
Total Insolvencies 
214 
640 Source: A. M. 
Best 
-1999 
The major cause accounting for 34% of insolvencies is attributed to deficiency in 
loss reserves, which in this case is directly linked to inadequate premium rates. If this 
finding is to go by demand curve risk then it is a major cause of insurance company 
failures. Demand curve risk results from deterioration in the underwriting book when 
an insurance company tries to increase its market share by undercutting premium rates, 
thereby leading at times to inadequate loss reserves. Demand curve risk is usually 
accompanied by rapid growth, the second greatest cause of insolvencies in this study, 
which accounts for 20% and usually reflects the quality of management decisions. 
A. M. Best found that 38 out of the 44 insolvencies caused by alleged fraud 
occurred in the past 15 years. However, with better regulatory methods demanding 
ever increasing tighter audits and market conduct reviews, this cause can now be 
detected earlier. Middle of the road causes like the overstatement of assets and a 
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significant change in business has also contributed to the demise of 39 and 28 
companies respectively. Asset risk as defined in Table (2.6) occurred when assets are 
reduced greater than the value of a company's surplus or when an audit reveals a 
misstatement of asset values. On the other hand, operational risks are a result of a shift 
in the carrier's territorial or product focus (A. M. Best 1999). 
Insolvencies resulting from affiliate impairment all arose in the past 10 years, 
confirming that insurance companies are more likely to use the corporate veil when 
faced with bankruptcy in its associated companies (Cummins, Allen and Phillips 
1997). Failure in reinsurance occurred mainly in the 1980s when insurers were riding 
the demand curve risk. It has also been observed that there is a strong correlation 
between the industry's combined ratio, and reinsurance failure frequency rate. Since 
the combined ratio is a benchmark to the industry's profitability, it provides the impact 
of various risks on the industry. Therefore, this ratio reflects the financial health of a 
company and the probability of insolvency. 
2.4 Market for Insurance Risk 
Instruments targeting underwriting risk reallocation have been developing over 
the years. The evolution of these instruments gives a vivid picture of how insurance 
practitioners have been developing their knowledge of trying to understand cash flow 
behaviour. The understanding of certain cash flow bundles have led to the 
development of each instrument, starting with reinsurance in the 19th century to the 
late 20th century instruments of securitisation. It gives insight as to how the developers 
of these instruments have sought to mitigate negative cash flow movements, given 
their perception and understanding of insurance cash flows at each stage. The essence 
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of developing instruments at each stage is to engineer cash flows that optimise return 
structures best understood by developers of these instruments at each stage. We can 
construe that each instrument developed at each stage shows us the level of 
understanding developers had on the underlying insurance cash flows. The level of 
understanding of underlying cash flows is essential to the acknowledgement of the 
limitations each instrument has in solving the super-cat cash flow puzzle in insurance. 
FIGURE 2.2: CASH FLOW ENGINEERING INSTRUMENTS 
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Insurance cash flows display characteristics that either provide opportunity or 
threaten return structures if they are not managed. If they provide opportunity then 
companies opt to either retain more cash flows if there are arbitrage opportunitics or 
transfer if they sub-optimise risk-return profiles. Figure (2.2) shows stages in the risk 
financing process, which we believe to be essential to an efficient way of utilising 
equity. 
Given the nature of risk ingrained in each section of the loss distribution, each 
method is more efficient when applied to its matching layer of the risk profile. It also 
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reflects the attributes of engineered cash flows and their efficiency in optimising 
underlying cash flows. In the diagram it is apparent that retention based techniques are 
more likely to be used than contingency financing and securitisation; because of the 
layer they occupy in the financing structure. Whilst it is important according to Lamm 
(1998) that the frequency of use declines as one moves fro one risk tier to the next, this 
is to do more with efficiency and costs rather than the tier occupied. 
Higher layers have low and uncertain loss probabilities of occurrence, so the use 
of these instruments is not economically viable if the company is small (Froot, 1998). 
The main reason for high cost structures in these instruments is due to the paucity of 
credible data, which limit the level of knowledge we have on these cash flows. 
Structuring risk financing entails understanding specific characteristics at each 
layering, because efficient risk financing structures recognise underlying cash flow 
features. What makes an instrument efficient in financing is its equity accumulation 
features matching to the level of risk at each layering. Therefore, the new paradigm in 
insurance risk financing is that of matching cash flow characteristics to instruments 
(Figure 2.3) attributes, to utilise equity available in financing insurance risks. 
Given the existing knowledge on insurance cash flows behaviour our risk finance 
programming is designed to reallocate risk to those who have the competitive 
advantage to bear it, enabling those seeking to strengthen their financial position to 
source leveraged capital at reduced costs. Within this framework also present is the 
issue of replicating cash flows to create hedge positions. This measure is intended to 
stabilise risk portfolios through the enhancement of the cost of risk trading, lower 
default probability, and making contingent capital available, whilst maintaining target 
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financial structures. Insurance companies should satisfy the appetites of their cash 
flows for funds required to trade risk at lower rates than those prevailing in the 
alternative money market, by doing so they will be able to trade narrow their non- 
value adding bounds and stabilise return. We believe that risk financing should be able 
to release assets committed to liabilities and should reduce the cost of risk capital on 
sponsoring all-purpose equity. 
The use of different risk financing instruments in sourcing contingent capital is 
mainly aimed at smoothing the cost of carry component, thereby stabilising return. For 
effective and optimal risk, trading an instrument should target a specific bundle of cash 
flows. That is why it is difficult to mitigate negative cash flows arising from 
catastrophic risks, through traditional insurance and reinsurance systems alone. There 
is need to use instruments that explain the underlying cash flows because reinsurance 
and retention instruments have failed to fully mitigate risk inherent in these cash flows. 
Retention and reinsurance based instruments do not go far enough in satisfying the risk 
transfer requirements of cash flows occupying the upper tails of the loss distribution. 
Instruments used in hedging fine-wide risk are also categorised into three main 
groups according the nature of cash flows they target. The first group is composed of 
those instruments that target expected" cash flow deviations; they are termed 
retention-based because the original carrier retains risk in total or in part. Retention- 
based techniques are efficient at financing risk in this region using the all-purpose 
equity supplied by shareholders or accumulated from retained earnings. The second in 
figure (2.3) is composed of reinsurance-based instruments like traditional reinsurance, 
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financial reinsurance and swaps. These are used to provide protection for cash flows 
occupying the unexpected loss'2 region up to the tails of the loss distribution. 
FIGURE 2.3: EFFICIENT UTILISATION OF INSURANCE EQUITY: A LAYERED RISK FINANCING 
STRUCTURE 
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Losses in the tails of the loss distribution are best financed by equity based 
instruments which are the final group in figure (ý. > >. Equity-based instruments are 
bought from the financial market with the sole purpose of using diversified equity to 
fluff up equity levels when depleted after a cat event. They are efficient at financing 
the upper part of the loss distribution because capital is superficially accumulated, 
making it cheaper than accumulated reinsurance and retention-based equity. 
Various methods of financing risk are listed in fig. (2.3) above will be analysed as 
to their effectiveness in stabilising cash flows. Another test they have to pass is their 
Expected loss 
=Y Loss, x Likelihood of losssi 
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ability to enhance capitalisation in the event of a catastrophe occurring. We believe 
risk-financing instruments should be able to bridge the gap between sound asset-to- 
liability ratios and the solvency threshold. The figure (2.3) represents the major 
instruments available to an insurance company to manage risks affecting cash flow 
behaviour. The use of any instrument is determined by the requirements of the 
underlying risky insurance cash flows, meaning all instruments ought to at least to 
explain some elements of these underlying cash flows. A brief description of each 
instrument shows how each instrument is designed to interact with the underlying cash 
flows, in the process delivering optimal return structures. 
2.4.1 Retention-Based Techniques 
This method of finance focuses on the profitability of retaining pound swapping 
risks, usually the high frequency and low severity occupying the expected loss layers 
of the loss distribution. The perception of insurance cash flows under this method is 
different from a reinsurance perspective in that retained cash flows are viewed as being 
efficiently financed by all-purpose equity. The levels of retention in all the major 
markets have been increasing at a faster rate than that of the overall capacity limit as 
shown in figure (2.4). Retaining risk within a portfolio is a healthy thing as it is 
essential for profit generation to assume risk commensurate to the capital supplied; it is 
from risk assumed that a competitive advantage is generated. In fact, insurance 
companies add value by underwriting risk, because the essence of being in the 
business of trading insurance risk is to earn a commensurate return from liability risks. 
Funds generated from underwriting insurance risks are a source of investment income, 
12 Unexpected loss 
=Likelihood of lossi x (Lossi 
- 
Expected loss) 2 
eventi 
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which means that the more a company originates underwriting risk the bigger would 
be its investment fund, but also the greater the risk. 
FIGURE 2.4: AVERAGE RETENTION AND LIMIT PER PROGRAMME AND RATE ON LINE 
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The level of retention is based among other factors on the financial capacity to 
bear risk, that is, on the ability of sponsoring equity to explain the nature of underlying 
cash flows. It should be noted that the retention of risk is done when cash flows spell 
out that the equity available is efficient in sponsoring the risk at hand. If retention 
levels are not in line with cash flow characteristics; i. e. target financial structures 
should be satisfied and return structures be stabilised, then will the cost of excessive 
risk levels become apparent in cash flow behaviour. The cost of excessive or 
inadequate risk retention can be measured in terms of missed target cash flows, over a 
period of time say five years, because that's where most risk factors are captured. 
Page 94 
- 
Various risk retention techniques have been developed in order to make cash flow 
structures more profitable and less risky when retained against a level of equity. Figure 
(2.4) above shows that average retention levels of insurance companies have grown at 
a faster rate than the overall capacity offered, irrespective of the fall in the rate on line 
since 1994. It shows why retention based techniques are important in engineering cash 
flows. They are at the core of any efficient risk financing programme as the evidence 
in figure (2.4) suggest, because more companies are increasing their retention levels, 
irrespective of the reductions in the rate on line. The decline in the rate on line 
propounds a cheaper cover, this has not been accompanied with increases in cessions 
but more is being retained. It is not only the price of cover that matters, but also the 
efficiency of equity in financing risks within a portfolio. 
Pure retention is also a function of a firm's capital structure. The capital structure 
spells the level of capital available to sponsor liabilities carried forward to settlement 
date and its suitability for use on risks underwritten on a day to day basis and the 
realisation that value can be added by retaining cash flows. Certainly, the use of all- 
purpose equity becomes inefficient when risks coming into a portfolio are correlated to 
risks already in the portfolio. We have already shown how contaminating classes could 
be identified using integrated risk classification and portfolio theory based risk 
analysis. In the same way, insurance companies can compute these statistics to identify 
classes correlated to the whole portfolio and decide the best risk-financing tool to use. 
Retentions also serve as a disciplinary measure required by those providing risk 
capital on higher layers, to encourage a company to be more prudent in managing its 
loss portfolio. Retention is essential in any risk-trading situation, as it is a means of 
- 
Page 95 
- 
reducing moral hazard and adverse selection arising from information asymmetry 
inherent in insurance cash flows. Traditionally reinsurance requires cedants to retain a 
portion of the risk portfolio before participation; it is also a requirement for 
securitisation to pitch a high retention in order to make catastrophe bonds tradable. 
Retention is also important in cost determination, as a layered portfolio is easier and 
cheaper to finance. Voluntary or pure retention can not easily be extended to risks in 
the upper tail, as equity supplied as an all-purpose instrument is not efficient to fund 
catastrophic risks characterising this region in insurance cash flows. 
Retention-based methods can be implemented in two different ways; those that 
are executed within a portfolio and those that are engineered off-balance sheet under a 
separate financial set up. The decision to engineer retention within or outside a 
portfolio depends on the attributes of the risk presented the objectives of managers and 
the profitability of resultant cash flows. The discussion above is based on retention 
done within a portfolio; cash flows retained are financed by the all-purpose equity 
available and are viewed as a source of float. These cash flows are important to the 
intrinsic value of firm, retaining them enhances the value of the firm if the cost of float 
is lower than the cost of raising funds prevailing in alternative finance markets. The 
underwriting profit or loss determines the cost of float on the cash flows. 
Secondly, retention-based instruments point to efficiency in financing risk through 
the separation of portfolios, by financing risk through a separate equity arrangement. 
The intention behind using this later method is to arbitrage certain cash flow 
components that cannot be extracted when risk is actively retained in the portfolio. 
Cash flow attributes which could be arbitraged are those pertaining to tax-efficiency, 
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financing flexibility, development of new financing products, pricing efficiency and 
integrating the risk financing structure. Such arrangements like captives are used to 
reinsure risks of the parent company in an offshore location (not necessarily always), 
in a way achieving an efficient equity-to-risk financing. They enable an insurer to have 
access to the risk reallocation market at terms that are more favourable, the key is to 
reduce the cost of risk financing over a period of years and ensure the availability of 
cover after major catastrophes. With an integrated structure in mind, it enhances the 
vision that an insurer has towards risk management and makes it more focused on risk 
management issues. 
Berkshire Hathaway is retaining super-cat risks on its books, on the basis that 
major catastrophes are rare occurrences; they expect this business to be profitable in 
most of the years and occasionally to show huge losses. There is paucity of 
information on cat losses, which makes estimates fuzzier, the loss for a worst-case 
scenario for Berkshire on its California Earthquake Authority (CEA) is about $600 
million, which is only 1% of the company market value. Thus, retention-based 
techniques can be used relative to the capital in the portfolio, as long as they are 
efficient in financing the risk characteristics displayed. 
Portfolio diversification has its limits as it tends to a systematic risk profile that is 
denominated by risks present in the upper tail. Therefore, it would not be efficient for 
an insurer to carry a portfolio with an undiversifiable cat risk and financing it with an 
all-purpose equity accumulation, suitable for risks in the lower layers. In both cases 
retention based methods are inefficient in transferring risk embedded in these cash 
flows, as they do not redistribute upper tail or cat risk. Therefore, shareholders are 
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implicitly made to insure as they are the first in the line to suffer when a cat event 
occurs, implying that they will require a higher return if all-purpose equity rather than 
other methods of funding finance this risk. Obtaining high returns in the insurance 
industry has proved elusive, Figure (2.5) below shows that the property/casualty and 
reinsurance markets have over the past 15 years up to 1997 under-performed the 
Fortune 500 Index and other stock markets. 
When deciding to use retention methods, target cost of capital must be considered 
with the benefit of arbitraging these cash flows accruing to shareholders and human 
equity. Excessive risk taking activity would be viewed as threatening by managers, 
putting pressure on the cost of capital due to missed targets emanating from 
management decisions. The right retention is just right for the target financial structure 
and should only be utilised up to the level where equity attributes indicates when 
inefficiency in financing is setting in. 
FIGURE 2.5: THE PROFITABILITY OF PROPERTY/CASUALTY AND REINSURANCE MARKETS 
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Source: Guy Carpenter 
2.4.2 Reinsurance Based Techniques 
Reinsurance based techniques can be classified into two broad groups those with a 
traditional flair and those that are financial in nature. The difference is a transitional 
one, in that financial instruments evolved from encumbrances inherent in traditional 
techniques. In other words, they are a result of a better and informed understanding of 
insurance cash flows, not well catered for under traditional reinsurance. Traditional 
reinsurance will be referred to as reinsurance as in its own right its evolving from an 
underwriting risk focused instrument to a more integrated financial technique of 
managing all the risks. 
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2.4.2.1 Reinsurance 
Reinsurance has been the main vehicle used by insurance companies to finance 
underwriting risk. The main forms of reinsurance are proportional reinsurance, 
composed of facultative, quota share and surplus share, and non-proportional 
reinsurance composed of facultative, per risk, catastrophe and aggregate excess of loss. 
Under Quota share the ceding company transfers a specified percentage of all the 
premiums originating from a defined portfolio of business to a reinsurer, meaning the 
loss is also in the same proportion to the premium received. Surplus share are 
characterised by cession of risks individually in the reinsurance treaty. Thus, premiums 
and losses are distributed between the ceding company and the reinsurer according to 
the ratio of the retention to the sum insured and therefore, variegate from one risk to 
another. 
The trading of non-proportional reinsurance implies that there is no 
proportionality; in as far as the distribution between premiums and the portion of loss 
is concerned. The determining factor of this form of reinsurance is the level of loss and 
not the premium, since the loss should exceed retention before the reinsurer could be 
called upon to pay up to a certain limit. The retention may be for an individual risk, 
that is a loss arising from an individual risk known as working excess of loss (XL) 
cover, an accumulation of individual losses per event (catastrophic XL covers), an 
accumulation of losses or loss ratio within a portfolio known as a aggregate XL or stop 
loss cover. A detailed description of how these treaties operate is outside the scope of 
this thesis. The aim of this section is the determination of how reinsurance explains the 
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behaviour of insurance cash flows, as it is apparent that each form of reinsurance is 
tailored to alter specific cash flow attributes in the payoff structure. 
The cash flow structure targeted by reinsurance is that embedded with 
underwriting risk, which is the risk that the actual losses paid differ from those 
expected due to changes in the nature of risk, stochastic nature of random events or the 
risk of error in the calculations. Froot (1993) pointed out that hedging is driven by the 
interaction between investment and financing consideration. Establishing the relation 
between the existing assets and cash flow behaviour is essential as pre-existing assets 
determines the firm's capacity to contain risk. What then can be said of reinsurance is 
that it targets a section of the loss distribution below the tails that affect economic 
capital, profitability and buffer capital. 
FIGURE 2.6: EXPENSE RATIOS FOR US REINSURANCE COMPANIES 
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Losses determine the level of spreads paid by insurers on liabilities so they should 
be managed. Reinsurance as a means of managing spreads targets that section of the 
loss distribution that could be altered to deliver an acceptable level of risk. 
Reinsurance can only effectively alter the loss distribution up to the level where the 
cost of contingent funds is optimal as compared to other sources of financing. The 
problem with reinsurance is that equity in sponsoring risks is also accumulated, putting 
it in the same class with all-purpose equity used in funding retentions. Therefore, it is 
still dogged with inefficiencies encountered under retention-based techniques, because 
accumulating equity for an event occurring once in a hundred or thousand years is 
uneconomic and prohibitively expensive. Furthermore, reinsurance is traded on a 
piecemeal basis making it more costly than other risk financing methods. 
It is evident from the graph in Figure (2.6) above that expenses in the reinsurance 
sector are high and have been rising dramatically in the recent years despite a galore of 
cost reduction mergers in the industry (the number of professional reinsurers in Guy 
Carpenter's composite declined from 64 in 1992 to 38 in 1997). Such types of 
expenses and levels of compensation for business defy economics, those who feel 
comfortable with such inefficiency in pricing reinsurance contracts, should be 
reminded that the cost of capital is the determinant of profitability. 
The combination of all risks within a portfolio brings in diversification across the 
exposure units; a lot of literature has been devoted to the effects of diversification 
within a portfolio. So if ever reinsurance is used emphasis should not only be on what 
it does to the loss distribution, but what the overall payoff looks like when we apply 
any reinsurance instrument. It is possible to simulate the overall payoff structures for 
- 
Page 102 
- 
any an instrument applied. The effectiveness of any instrument should not only be 
limited to the local distribution but on the overall and distant distribution. The whole 
distribution process shows the appetite for capital, how much the instrument cost and 
the levels of return brought by the instrument. 
2.4.2.2 Financial Reinsurance 
Finite risk reinsurance represents a combination of risk transfer and risk financing 
techniques by emphasising on the time value of money. These instruments are used to 
cover underwriting and timing risks. The first part has been discussed under 
reinsurance above; the second part pertains to those risks resulting from erroneous 
expectations regarding the rapidity of loss settlement. Since loss payments may occur 
earlier than expected insurers are exposed to liquidity risk and also suffers loss of 
interest bearing capital, in the form of loss reserves. They can also be treated as a 
retention-based method, which deals with risky cash flows off the balance sheet, and 
suitable to finance losses in the middle layers of the loss distribution. The following 
discussion on these covers supports this fact as the underlying cash flows points to a 
specific equity accumulation attributes compatible with these instruments. It means 
that they are efficient in financing risk, if they are used in funding lower and middle 
layers, because these instruments can not meet the equity attributes amenable to 
catastrophe risk. 
The multi-year nature of most finite reinsurance contracts means that the 
prospective and retrospective covers can be provided. Prospective contracts cover 
current and future business underwritten, catastrophic losses and act as a device for 
cost-effective covers smoothing future fluctuations of asset-to-liability ratios. On the 
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other hand retrospective covers in addition to providing cost-effective coverage, they 
enable the insurer to exploit the possibility of high investment income from long tail 
business. 
This multi-year nature of contracts also means that greater credit risk, should be 
taken into account when pricing these instruments, as it is difficult to assess with 
precision the financial status of the counterparty. Risk and the cost effectiveness of 
these covers should be balanced, when taking the decision to arbitrage cash flows 
retained under such an arrangement. Such decisions depend on the nature of cash 
flows as a source of float and how these cash flows affect the financial structure, had 
they been managed on the balance sheet. Retaining them helps preserve float as a 
company is able to benefit from investment income generated and improvement in the 
efficiency of all-purpose equity financing. The goal at the end of the day is to reduce 
the cost of capital by matching cash flows to the risk-funding instrument. 
Loss Portfolio Transfers (LTPs) relieve the insurer of its existing obligations to 
pay losses already incurred on the book, by transferring these obligations to a third 
party in exchange of a premium. They are retrospective in nature, in that, the transfer 
of liabilities is only for outstanding losses. They remove that portion of the book which 
is seen as unprofitable, or a threat to the stability of the portfolio. The premium ceded 
is approximately equivalent to the net present value of the ceded loss reserves. The 
reinsurer charges a profit and cost margin, for underwriting risks reflecting the timing 
and subsequent reserves assumed. They provide a means of managing timing risk, 
relating to claims settlement over time, and provide a good vehicle when the 
uncertainty of claim settlement pattern proves costly to the insurer. The insurer will be 
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able to reduce the overall volatility of the portfolio indirectly reducing return and 
security levels required by both shareholders and suppliers of human equity. 
Since they provide a means of converting future income from investments to 
current underwriting income, the pressure on solvency margins is reduced. Implied 
discounting of the loss reserves strengthens equity and effectively increases solvency 
since liabilities ceded will be greater than premiums ceded, if the loss development 
pattern follows the estimated trend. Insurers also use portfolio transfers when 
withdrawing from certain lines of business or closing peripheral business to 
concentrate on the core business. This cash flow engineering technique have also been 
useful in bringing precision to planning and in facilitating mergers and acquisitions as 
well as controlling latent liabilities spiralling out of control (Sigma 1996/99). Equity 
release under this technique improves financing efficiency, reduces the cost of capital 
by alleviating pressure on components of the financial structure, and it makes cash 
flows left in the portfolio easier to manage. 
Adverse Development Covers (ADCs) provide cover for losses resulting from 
contracts concluded in the past, they do not cede loss portfolios in this case. They 
provide protection against losses that have been incurred but not reported (IBNR) and 
for protection against inadequate loss reserves (IBNER). The premium paid reflects 
the scope of the underwriting risks assumed and takes into account the net present 
value of the loss payments expected during the term of the contract. In this case, the 
time value of money can be used to come up with a more cost-affective way of 
funding this risk. They also facilitate acquisitions or mergers of insurance companies 
since long latent claims can be partially protected using these covers. Considering a 
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company with liabilities that are difficult to assess, ADCs offer an information 
arbitrage to shareholders and rating agencies in that the company will trade the 
unknown for the known. Finite risk reinsurers at times do assume credit risk for the 
primary insurer in circumstances where one or more traditional reinsurers are 
insolvent. These covers through assumption of subsequent reserve risk also further 
enhance the insurer's access to traditional excess of loss covers (Sigma, 1997/99). 
Finite Quota Shares (FQSs) provide cover for business of the current and future 
underwriting years, by ceding a part of unearned premiums in return for commission. 
They are a result of a US statutory instrument (Statutory Accounting Principles) which 
did allow for accruals of acquisition costs as in the accounting principles, they were 
accounted for immediately. FAQs can correct the inter-temporal reduction in equity, 
by removing distortions on the balance sheet, and profit and loss account arising from 
volatile acquisition costs. Volatility in cost components has the impact of undermining 
target capital structures, reducing underwriting capacity and profitability, as well as 
increasing the overall capital costs. The provision in advance of the profit expected by 
the insurer on that business future underwriting years, help smooth results the same 
function performed by traditional build-up quota shares that finance acquisition costs. 
However, they are a source of moral hazard and adverse selection as this risk is 
subjective, even though there might be safeguards of liability linked sliding scale 
commission and specific limits on liability (Sigma, 1997/99). FAQs are essential 
engineering cash flows affected by disparities in acquisition costs and can only be used 
on cash flows displaying yearly disparities significantly affecting return on equity. 
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Our final risk engineering technique under this section targets uncertainty of loss 
distribution from year to year, by dealing with underwriting risk and balancing risk 
over time effectively smoothing fluctuations in the financial structure. This technique 
known as Spread Loss Treaty (SLT) derives from accumulation of bespoken annual 
premiums into an experience (loss experience) account over the whole term of the 
treaty (funded cover). Apart from being a reinsurance-based technique, it also has 
retention-based attributes in that interest income is credited to the ceding company, 
with the payment of losses and reinsurers' margin being paid from the experience 
account. The losses incurred are distributed over a number of years, with the result in 
the account each year determining the level of premiums to be paid and which of the 
parties is liable to pay if the contract is in its last year. 
The fact that the ceding company is not compelled to totally balance the 
experience account means that underwriting risk can be financed efficiently. The 
stabilising effect of the timing risk management component is similar to that unlimited 
equalisation reserves do to a risk portfolio (Sigma, 1997). They enable companies to 
adopt an underwriting policy oriented toward continuity, refocusing and concentrating 
on core business, efficient utilisation of equity, profitability improvement, improving 
certainty and utility in pursuing strategic goals, and stabilisation of the costs of 
financing risk by insulating the insurer from market cycles. Improvement in equity 
financing efficiency is the core to the success of any instrument, these instruments 
work well when used to reengineer specific cash flows which sub-optimise equity 
usage if they are allowed to remain in their original state. By targeting specific cash 
flows, these instruments are easily bespoken to suite the characteristics displayed by 
risks underlying the portfolio. Remember that the management of insurance risks is 
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done on the assumption of understanding the cash flow behaviour, which makes 
financial reinsurance special to those explaining any specific cash flow in a portfolio. 
2.4.2.3 Swaps 
This technique involves reciprocation of risk though an exchange, with the 
intention of either eliminating risky business from the portfolio or arbitraging from 
ceded business. They involve two or more risk-bearers assuming partial and/or 
reciprocal liability for a defined component of each other's risk. The early risk 
exchange mechanism was done in London at a Lloyd's coffee shop where traders came 
and posted or advertised their risks on a notice board; assessments were done on site 
and risk acceptance communicated by indication of proportion assumed and a 
signature at the bottom of the sheet. If such a mechanism were maintained we would 
not be talking of the revolutionary Catastrophic Risk Exchange (CATEX). Insurance 
market inefficiency structure was incorporated into the distribution system, making 
Lloyd's more of a reinsurance market than a swap market. 
CATEX and CATEX Bermuda began operating in early 1996 and 1997 as a 
reinsurance intermediary facilitating reinsurance transactions and licensed by the New 
York Insurance Department and Bermuda Parliament respectively. Trading is based on 
an electronic trading system with subscribers gaining access to the trading system on a 
global scale. The exchanges allow members to buy, sell or exchange insurance risk and 
trade index-based insurance derivative products. 
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The CATEX is a world-wide system for the exchange of risk by insurers and other 
financial service firms on an exchange. Under the CATEX mechanism subscribers 
place and advertise risks they seek to exchange with other companies around the world 
on the exchange. Risk bearers and their brokers negotiate and complete trades through 
the communications systems set, and these trades are registered, published to the 
system and archived with LATEX. Risks are exchanged on a risk-for-premium or risk- 
for-risk basis with rights and obligations set forth in CATEX-traded contracts flowing 
only between the contracting parties. Thus, it is not a risk-bearing facility as the 
exchange of risk between subscribers is treated as a reinsurance transaction; existing 
insurance statutory accounting practices are utilised to record CATEX trades. 
Therefore, this market provides a platform for electronic reinsurance transactions, 
where subscribers swap risks by allowing exposed insurers to obtain additional 
financial protection antecedent to a catastrophic event. In this case, the risk bearer's 
ability to propagate its risk across geographic regions, perils and business lines is 
enhanced. 
This risk-spreading feature protects the insurer's capital and surplus in case of a 
major catastrophe, and reduces a company's value at risk for particular catastrophic 
events. CATEX facilitates flexibility in risk financing by providing an opportunity for 
insurers to adjust and rebalance their risk portfolios on a real-time basis in response to 
market forces (Sweeney 1997). This new distribution channel reduces risk distribution 
costs than under the piecemeal reinsurance approach, and acts as a way of obtaining 
coverage for risks that are difficult to place. It allows prompt and easier analysis of 
transactional information by company underwriters. 
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Capital accumulation characteristics now are similar to those under reinsurance; 
hence, the classification under reinsurance based techniques. Most of the participating 
companies are from the insurance market, meaning an undiversified insurance surplus 
portfolio is being used to fund these risks, making capital generated from this market 
suitable only for middle layers. The nature of subscribers in this market makes the 
funding of risk in the upper layers inefficient, because surplus generation is done 
through the accumulation of equity. 
2.43 Equity Based Instruments 
The main purpose of equity-based instruments is to match equity type to the 
nature of cash flow characteristics displayed by an insurance risk portfolio. Risk 
portfolios currently traded in the insurance industry behave in a way which can not be 
explained by a single or all the instruments in use at the moment. The enigma risk 
within an insurance portfolio is found in the upper tail of the loss distribution, which 
makes capital expensive if it is financed by the all-purpose equity supplied by 
shareholders. The nature of this risk is that it makes it expensive to finance by 
traditional techniques, when long-term risk financing and risk transfer consideration is 
considered. 
Capital required to service risks presented to the insurance market by insureds and 
society is not adequate. The insurance market surplus before the WTC attacks was 
estimated at round US$465billion, which is only a fraction of capital market 
capitalisation, with volatility levels in a single day quoted around US$75billion. 
Fluctuations of this magnitude do not affect the viability of the market. A similar loss 
in the insurance industry will reduce the industry surplus by a significant amount, 
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given that competitive pricing is done in line with a normal loss year and usually 
conforms to cost structures of companies with the lowest possible cost structures. 
The reason for contemplating losses of such a magnitude emanates from the fact 
that catastrophic activity have been on the increase and losses arising from a single 
event are ever on the increase. So in order to stabilise rates and capital availability 
when such events occur (see Figure 2.3); a more robust way of accumulating equity to 
finance the risk is needed and this is found in the capital markets. The magnitude and 
attributes underlying risk capital provided by capital markets in relation to spread of 
risk over time and incidence of risk occurring means that they have the stamina to deal 
with these risks effectively. 
The cost of capital required to finance all catastrophic risks in exposed areas is 
phenomenal and providing such capital require instruments that package these risks in 
such a way that the return they give is equivalent to the risk they present. Figure (2.4) 
illustrates that both the reinsurance and the property/casualty markets have been 
underperforming other financial institutions, given the higher level of risk insurance 
companies, as compared to other financial institutions. 
A cost-effective funding method is that which spreads risk between exposure and 
time, by appropriately matching portfolio risk characteristics with equity accumulation 
attributes. These equity based instruments provide features, where capital can be 
supplied at an affordable rate, considering that it will be required to support an event 
which would occur at anytime in the future even before the build up of reserves. 
Therefore, insurers should augment their traditional risk taking approach and expertise 
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with the skill set and expertise more traditionally associated with the capital markets. 
2.4.3.1 Securitisation 
Securitisation techniques can be classified into three broad groups, synthetic 
reinsurance, credit risk based and event puts. These techniques are based on risk 
transfer and financing principles, aimed at preserving the value of the firm post loss. 
Principally it is an assets hedge geared to replenish depleted assets after a catastrophic 
event; thus it preserves the positive net present value (NPV) cash flows embedded 
within an insurance risk portfolio. This method focuses on the loss distribution and its 
impact on the collective cash flows of an insurance company, by separating exposures 
that make the distribution more expensive to fund using retention and reinsurance 
based instruments from the overall portfolio and finances it on its own. It is essential to 
understand that the driving force behind the use of this instrument is the inefficiency 
and overall capital costs in retention or reinsurance funded risk portfolios. 
The way the first technique operates is that an insurer having identified exposed 
cash flows repackages them, to make them tradable to potential investors in the capital 
markets. In the case of credit risk securitisation investors receive contingent surplus 
notes with the insurer having collateral accession rights to the Special Purpose Vehicle 
(SPV) capital and replacing it with its own surplus notes, from which investors will 
receive their return if the right is exercised. The funding of catastrophic risk is done by 
simultaneously selling cat bonds to investors, through the SPV and buying reinsurance 
coverage from the SPV. The SPV invests the principal received from investors in high- 
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grade investments, and issue reinsurance to the insurer effectively ceding its cat event 
risk to the investors. 
Access to capital is afforded when a catastrophic loss event or an exotic pre- 
specified event is triggered. The SPV synthetically replaces the traditional reinsurer, 
with premiums and revenue receivables on the catastrophe cash flows sold to investors 
and proceeds from the fund only made available to the insurer on the occurrence the 
event. The funding arrangement runs for a specified period of time if no event occurs, 
paying interest, premium and the principal to the investors, a partial amount if a 
triggering event occurs or be wound up if the event exhausts the fund. The reinsurance 
is purchased in the capital markets so it is a memoryless transaction (the Markovian 
principles), with no judgements about past events (Froot, 1998). 
Event-puts are securities issued by institutions and bought by insurance 
companies; they give the insurers the right to put the securities in exchange for cash if 
the specified events occur. These were issued by European institutions in the early 
1990s to Japanese insurers; however since then they have lost their appeal. 
The main advantage of securitisation is the elimination credit risk (only investors 
carry credit risk of the insurer if there is a collateral accession rights). It transfers event 
risk totally and separates the funds from any other claims, since they are only triggered 
by the occurrence of a specific event. On the other hand event puts transfer event risk 
with the bond issuer but retain credit risk with insurers as they have a right to put the 
bonds back at par to the issuing counter party in exchange for cash, if the event 
specified occur. The issuer must be liquid at the time of occurrence, due to the 
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uncertainty of earthquakes. Since they have a liquidity-financing component, they 
have been preferred to paying a line of credit, as they are also an investment (Lamm, 
1998). 
The effectiveness of this method anchors on the probability of loss, which is 
directly linked to the layer covered, higher layers have low probability of loss 
importing the notion of low premiums, which might not be enough to cover the costs 
involved in sponsoring the SPV. Therefore, there is a trade-off between effectiveness 
and the costs involved as institutional investors favour high grade bonds which 
coincidentally fall on the higher layers which have low probability of loss, as those 
with a higher probability of loss/low recovery levels are bound to be below investment 
grade. USAA in its issue managed to secure protection for lower layers by 
incorporating the principal protection clause, which delayed the realisation of the 
principal as opposed to higher layers which put the principal at risk. 
The problem with principal protection is that more funds should be raised than 
required to transfer the risk, since the other portion is needed to finance the principal 
protected as it will be invested in risk free assets. This makes the cost of financing 
small issues prohibitive; the cost may be in excess of 150 basis points above the 
actuarial cost of risk depending on the size of the issue (Froot, 1998). The balancing of 
effectiveness and cost is central as higher layers are seen to be beyond the influence of 
the insurer, also its these layers that require capital amounts made available at 
competitive rates as bond returns reflect those prevailing in the reinsurance markets. 
Enigma risk in the upper-tail is ruinous, which makes this source of funding more 
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effective as large capital amounts can easily be made available for capital appetite 
satiation of these monstrous risky cash flows. 
Securitisation removes catastrophic cash flows from the portfolio, by transferring 
a portfolio of catastrophic liabilities from its balance sheet. The impact of the 
transaction on the overall operating result is important, it must reduce the cost of 
capital associated with the cash flows in the portfolio, since the risky cash flows would 
be separated and transferred to a suitable and specific capital vehicle. Remaining cash 
flows can be funded by the all-purpose equity, because they are less risky meaning a 
lower rate of return is required, and more business can be written given increased 
capacity. The use of this method of course depends on the willingness by investors to 
buy these securities, the precondition of investment grade must be satisfied, which 
makes the role of rating agents important as investors rely on them to understand the 
nature of securities issued. 
It also has to be pointed out that the yields of the bonds have to be high, the 
regulation governing such trades should be in place and the cost of producing 
information must be low. By 1998 the Bank of England had accepted repackaging of 
receivables, but it was not yet clear whether the Department of Trade and Industry 
(DTI) accepted this. In the other markets these instruments have been traded 
successfully and much can not be said about their effectiveness as the reinsurance 
market is still soft (as shown in figure (2.5) rate on line fell for the fifth year in 
succession and to below pre-hurricane Andrew levels) 13 
13 The bonds cover the highest-end risk typically damage from 1-in-100-year or 1-in-200-year events, but 
they pay several percentage points above competing investments. 
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Raising external capital does not always resolve a low internal capital generation 
problem; usually corrective measures are required within the loss portfolio. Therefore, 
an understanding of insurance cash flows should be the first thing before any 
instrument is chosen for transfer and financing of risk; otherwise the funding process 
will be inefficient no matter how complex and appealing it is. 
2.4.3.2 Contingent Equity 
This instrument identifies the post loss leverage as the problem that has to be 
addressed; in as far as the impact of catastrophic losses on a portfolio is concerned. It 
is true that losses of unexpected proportions deplete assets, with the result of 
disproportionate increase in liabilities. Such increases alter the overall financial 
structure, impairing the ability to raise capital at competitive rates, credit rating and the 
capacity to write risks of certain magnitude. After the 1992 UK indemnity catastrophic 
losses, it was notable that Independent insurance company was one of the few that had 
the capital to write more business, for other big companies it was hard to trade 
competitively after suffering such huge losses. 
It is characteristic of insurance cash flows that debt levels rise, when there are 
disturbances in upper tail of the distribution, exposing the company to a higher 
probability of ruin. What can be inferred from the use of equity put is that the decision 
should initially be based on the nature of the loss distribution. Thereafter, can the focus 
be on other factors like, the current capital structure, its relation with the risk portfolio, 
the target capital structure and the cost of deviation from the target financial structure. 
Given that post loss investments have a positive net present value, its necessary to use 
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techniques that redress the balance between equity and debt, so that the potential 
embedded in the value of the firm may be realised. 
The fact is, it is difficult and expensive to raise capital when wounded, so the best 
way to protect value embedded in the firm is to prearrange equity to be put at 
favourable rates, when a financially impairing event occur. The insurer is assured that, 
after a severe catastrophic event which reduces the surplus and possibly their credit 
standing, the company will be able to procure capital up to the agreed limits to help 
refinance business operations. Capital raised through equity puts is treated as equity 
which means it adds directly to surplus, providing a stronger balance sheet and 
protection at a cost that is lower than a traditional secondary equity offering and 
competitive when compared to a top layer catastrophe cover. 
Contingent equity14 therefore, seeks to finance and transfer insurer's losses with a 
pre-negotiated sale of securities linked to exchange-traded shares, at a fee for 
maintaining liquidity when the equity is on demand. The cost of contingency capital 
varies from one issuer to another, for example a reinsurer in Bermuda had a variable 
spread over Libor deriving from its credit rating at the time of issue, high when credit 
rating is low and lower when it is high. This instrument is designed to complement 
existing risk market trade payoffs, so it offers the insurer exceptional high layer 
coverage to augment their existing reinsurance/risk trade payoff protection. 
14 Aon Re Inc. and Centre Reinsurance first introduced the contingent equity product to the market under 
the trade name CatEPuts (Catastrophic equity puts). Deals in RLI & Horace Mann and the first syndicated 
deal followed this with the option writers in the La Salle Re being European Re (lead investor), Allianz, Aon 
& CAN, the equity was in the form of convertible preferred shares. 
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If a catastrophic event exhausts the insurer's traditional reinsurance coverage, the 
insurer will exercise the option to put contingency equity to investors, with the added 
advantage of retaining the ability to raise capital in alternative markets. In the case of 
La Salle Re a Bermuda reinsurer writing global based risks, it provided a $100m 
contingent equity facility following either a single catastrophic event exceeding $200m 
or an aggregation of $250m from smaller catastrophes, at a cost of $2.35m p. a. for 
three years. This deal ensures that following a major catastrophe likely to hit the whole 
market, La Salle will be able to spend their time most profitably underwriting risk in a 
hard market without having to raise capital first (Sayers et al 1998). This instrument 
has not been used much, as some big insurance companies believe that they can easily 
raise capital on-the-spot, without the expense of paying for a contingency fee. 
What can be said of both arguments for and against the use of an equity put is that 
it all depends on what the underlying cash flows are dictating, certainly a company 
would not use it if it is an expensive way of financing, given alternatives available. A 
thorough understanding of the underlying cash flows is therefore essential, because 
what equity puts does is just pointing at leverage deficiency given the state of cash 
flows under strenuous conditions, and how to address this deficiency with a 
replenishing strategy. 
This might not be the best strategy for those desiring to transferring risk totally, as 
this strategy only transfers it to shareholders, the use of equity to finance a catastrophic 
risk in the long run will be more expensive. Maybe that is why those who designed this 
instrument applied the pecking order theory where it is only used when other cheaper 
instruments are exhausted. This point to the fact that it works well in a blended state 
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than as a stand-alone instrument, it explains some parts of the cash flow structure but 
not the whole cash flow process. It works well in part; therefore, it should be applied 
on those unique cash flow attributes, which derive from the interaction between loss 
distributions and the overall financial structure. 
2.4.3.3 Derivatives 
Options traded in insurance transactions are usually call options, as they display 
similar characteristic to excess of loss reinsurance risk transfer techniques. Call 
options in insurance risk trading locution are securities purchased by the insurer 
(investor/seller) giving them the right (obligation), but not the obligation to receive 
(pay) funds from a seller (to an insurer) if the index value exceeds a specified level 
during the exercise period. The specified level is known as the attachment point, where 
cover starts to operate by virtue of exercising the right, when the index is in the 
money. 
Insurance option trading is currently done at Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT)15, 
with the underlying trigger being the Property Claims Services (PCS) index. In the 
case of PCS options, an investor will sell this right to an insurer at a premium, with the 
insurer receiving cash payment equal to the settlement value of the PCS index, which 
is above the strike price. Call option spreads entail the simultaneous purchase and sale 
of two or more option contracts, buying one at a lower strike price and selling the other 
at a higher price. 
15 The Bermuda Commodities Exchange which was trading cat-options using the Guy Carpenter 
Catastrophe Index (GCCI), ceased trading in 1999. 
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The trading of contracts on an index brings a number of risks to the insurer, 
namely basis risk, credit risk, model and timing risk. These risks vary from one insurer 
to another and should be addressed if the intended purpose of the hedge is to be 
satisfied. Credit risk under reinsurance is reduced by evaluating creditworthiness and 
regulatory requirements for collateral balances from unauthorised counter-parties, it is 
minimal when trading options on the exchange, as exchanges have a system of 
securing recoveries from counter-parties trading on the exchange. The other risk is that 
the models used in evaluating the effectiveness of these contracts might not accurately 
predict the results of the company or the index. This risk underlies a company's 
capacity to determine the expected recovery and distribution of recovery from an 
option trade, as models do not always fit complex real life scenarios. 
Timing risk comes into play when there are errors in the reporting periods and the 
timing of the cash settlement of the derivative between the event and the settlement of 
the option. It also has to do with delays in receipt of funds to pay claims between the 
date of the catastrophe and the settlement date of the derivative. The option maybe 
liquidated if the market is liquid, with the effect of further exposure to other risks or 
funds may be borrowed until the value of the option is realised. 
A crucial risk is that of basis, which arises when a company's recoveries from the 
catastrophic index contract may be different from its own account's experience from 
catastrophe losses. Such failure by a hedge replicate exactly the losses accruing to the 
insured constitute what is called "basis-risk". Every company is not similar as 
corporate policy affects how much risk is assumed, underwriting ethics, portfolio 
composition and claims management, resulting in company's loss experience differing 
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from an associate index. Indices should be able to incorporate company experiences in 
order for hedging to be economic, so their data composition and breadth are key 
factors to be looked at when determining hedge effectiveness. The GCCI index's 
granularity was different from PCS index in that it was broad-based, and closely 
resembled placing companies' risk portfolios. When the nature and intensity of the cat 
event being covered are broader, event risk is more devastating than localised, hence a 
lower basis risk. 
A company should also be able to precisely determine changes that will happen in 
the composition of the book, as changes that happen during the underwriting period 
imply a change in exposure base underlying the hedge. This reduces the effectiveness 
of a hedge, as there will be a mismatch between the exposure and the hedge. Insurers 
always want their loss experience to correlate with the index, as is with the case with 
some other tailor-made contracts like reinsurance. Another way of improving on hedge 
effectiveness will be to look at the detail in the index and try to match it with the 
company's experience or to use various strategies to improve on recovery without 
actually reducing the basis risk. In this case, recovery on the option is improved by 
shifting the distribution of recovery such that the probability of loss is reduced and the 
probability of gain is improved. 
The correlation coefficient has been traditionally used to measure the 
effectiveness of a hedge. It is considered in practice that the level of correlation 
decrease as you move for reinsurance based instruments that have a correlation 
coefficient of 1 for quota shares, to options that have a high degree of basis risk. A 
study by the American Academy of Actuaries (2000), pointed out that since correlation 
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is a statistic between two variables, it does not consider relative magnitudes of 
movements between the two variables, i. e. it is not always a one-to-one basis. In order 
to address this phenomenon, they used a framework that defines the risks to be hedged, 
identifies the suitable index-based index structure and the causal relationship between 
exposure to be hedged and the underlying index, in mathematically determining the 
effectiveness of a hedge. In defining risks it is essential to consider only those 
transferred by the hedge, outlining the business covered, territory, retentions and 
limits, perils, underwriting classifications and exposure period of losses. This will 
eliminate overlaps in coverage and establish a strong base for monitoring and 
measurement of effectiveness. 
The effectiveness in the hedge instrument will mean delivery of the desired equity 
accumulation components that brings in a well-diversified capital base. Upper layers 
need capital that can spread super-cat risk without any strain on the underlying surplus. 
The separation of risk depicted in figure (2.3), points to the suitability of options to the 
financing of risk in the upper tail, as the cost structure of equity supplied to fund these 
risks is different to that used for all-purpose equity financing. Only an effective hedge 
can deliver unique elements required by upper layer cash flows, a hedge with gaps puts 
pressure on the all-purpose equity, making the overall cost of capital higher. If an 
effective hedge could be obtained for a portfolio, insurance companies can deliver a 
required return that is commensurate with the risk that is embedded in their portfolios. 
The failure of the reinsurance market to deliver a commensurate return on equity 
is due to the nature of risks assumed in the upper layers and more costly in terms of 
capital requirements. Risk in the reinsurance sector is high, but the price needed for 
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trading that risk in the insurance market declines as we move from lower and less risky 
layers to higher risky layers. Thus, with the margins squeezed on insurance risk traded 
in this market, the new markets taking up this risk have exposed the inefficiencies in 
reinsurance pricing. 
Efficiency in equity funding risks is needed in the upper tail cash flows, because 
volatility brought about by activity in the upper tail is viewed as undesirable by 
management, by adopting strategies aimed at protecting their human equity they sub- 
optimise cash flows in the process. It has also been noted that these pressures on 
human equity and all-purpose equity will make the stakeholders demand a high return 
on their equity, making the cost of capital high, lowering the value creation bounds 
(Mutenga and Dinenis 
- 
1999). That is why it is important to obtain an effective hedge 
with equity accumulation characteristics that explain well the behaviour of cash flows 
in the super-cat tails. 
Risks in this area are violent, so handling them requires a thorough understanding 
of what their next move will be and the Academy of Actuaries' findings are a step 
forward in finding the best instruments that managing these cash flows by explaining 
underlying behaviour. We believe that this is the only way forward for improving the 
return on equity supplied to arbitrage insurance risk trading, because the best way to 
manage risk embedded in cash flows is by explaining them. This is what is needed in 
using these latest techniques; we should be so bound to reinsurance methodology in 
coming up with these instruments, as this has hampered development in the trading of 
somewhat efficient risk financing techniques. 
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2.4.4 Blended Risk Financing Techniques 
The fusion of risk financing instruments offers a great deal of advantages to 
insurers. It helps insurers take their risk profiles more realistically, flexibly and strictly 
account for capital costs in an insurance company's portfolio. It is their impact on the 
portfolio's cost of capital that we are interested in, as they should be able to explain 
underlying cash flows. It has been established above that no single instrument explains 
the behaviour of an insurance risk portfolio, so blending techniques discussed above 
will not only improve profitability but also removes unnecessary pressure on equity. 
It can be conferred that the use of certain instruments enables insurance 
companies to manage their target returns with greater intuition. The fact here is that at 
each stage instruments used to correct post-loss capital structures have failed to deliver 
the desired structures that optimise shareholder value. These deviations occur 
irrespective of the use of reinsurance and other financial reinsurance techniques. What 
is the cost of such deviations from targets given that implemented techniques fail to 
deliver and the continual threat of a specific risk? This risk has been identified as 
costly to finance using the all-purpose equity, firstly, large amounts must be amassed 
in order to reduce the risk level, secondly, amassed funds are costly to' maintain, may 
be misused and inefficient given the already low returns in the industry. It should be 
noted that such a method would make sense in as far as explaining insurance cash flow 
is concerned, but what we are interested in, is what constitutes the delivery of optimal 
returns, making the selection of the right instruments essential. 
The problem with insurance traders is that they have been bewitched by their 
over-reliance on reinsurance such that they are so much focused on it as the centre 
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point for development of new instruments. They have to distance themselves from 
reinsurance first before deciding on any new solution on the problem areas in 
insurance cash flows. Even though the level of capitalisation in the reinsurance 
industry in the US in 1998 stood at a premium to surplus ratio of 0.67, meaning more 
capital is supporting premium written; catastrophic risk still poses problems. The 
trends from 1989 have been against the grain as the once upheld standard for 
regulatory attention was 3 units of premium to a unit of surplus, but since then it has 
been below the 0.89. 
If the industry is overcapitalised in as far as premiums underwritten to surplus is 
concerned, why then is the industry undercapitalised when it comes to risks faced on 
the upper tail? Froot (1998) pointed out the distinctness of catastrophic risk, that it is 
expensive to fund when it is included in the portfolio, since those who will be 
supplying funds will require compensation for the extra risk. Therefore, the way 
forward for this problem is to extricate upper-tail risk from the whole portfolio and 
market it in a different market where adverse movements in these cash flows can 
effectively be hedged. 
The problem with reinsurance, captive reinsurance and financial reinsurance is 
that it does not totally transfer risk, credit risk means the company will have to pick up 
losses when a counter-party defaults and capitalisation in the market is not suitable for 
risks embedded in the upper-tail of the distribution. As shown below, the capacity 
utilised in the six markets vary, the US uses a large chunk of reinsurance capacity 
available in the private sector which is not even enough to cover a single catastrophic 
event hitting Miami. This point to the fact that reinsurance is a misfit financing tool 
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given the capital requirements inherent in the upper-tail of insurance loss distributions, 
reinsurance is suitable and efficient to a certain level of exposure. 
Table 2.7: Prot'tvt it Reinsurance Capacity Limit For the Pciva t 
United States I $27.0 Billion 
Japan 512.5 Billion 
United Kingdom S I().,; Billion 
Canada 56.0 Billion 
France S4.5 Billion 
Australia S4.5 Billion 
Source: Guy Carpenter 
- 
Data for Private Sector only. 
There are risks within insurance cash flows that are suitable for certain 
instruments and these should be matched in order to reduce the overall cost of capital. 
The overall capital cost in the industry is of concern, there is need to reduce it in order 
to make the sector more competitive and in line with other sectors on the Fortune 500. 
The use of the all-purpose equity and reinsurance-based instruments has bedevilled the 
industry with the problem of under-funding due to the use of misfit instruments in 
financing insurance upper-tail risks. 
Certainly there must be a way of holistically funding risk, but our 1)roblem is why 
the industry places so much faith on instruments that have proved misfits in the past in 
order to engineer new instruments. There is need to look at the cash flows define them 
over the overall risk trading process, in order to identify the peculiarities within each 
cash flow component. It is true that investors should only be compensated for 
systematic risk. Certainly, the systematic risk should not be catastrophic risk in the 
portfolio, since reinsurance based instruments are inefficient there are instruments that 
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can remove this risk from the portfolio, and make insurance return structures more 
efficient. 
2.5 Conclusion 
The goal of any risk consumption exercise in insurance is to maximise the long- 
term risk-adjusted return to shareholders, subject to a risk profile. Thus, some balance 
has to be stricken between optimal return and the level of risk accepted. Excessive 
assumption might over-stretch the financial capability of an insurance company, whilst 
an over-cautious stance on risk might result in loss of revenue and assumption of a 
sub-optimal position. What is that optimal position, which enhances shareholder value 
without exposing the company to the risk of insolvency? What is the cost of financial 
distress to an insurance company? Such a position is achieved if the price of risk 
factors faced by a firm is set at an arbitrage free rate. This is the subject of the 
remaining chapters of this thesis. 
This study gives an insight into the way that risk is arbitraged through the 
engineering of insurance cash flows. The engineering of insurance cash flows is a 
process, which starts from the identification of risk levels and distinct distributions at 
these levels within a loss distribution. Risk segmentation is a virtue as it allows an 
insurance company to match specific risk attributes with equity that is efficient in 
financing risk at that specific layer. Segmented risk is amenable to instruments that 
explain the behaviour of cash flows, without these explanatory elements an instrument 
is bound to leave gaps in the cover exposing equity to unnecessary risk levels. 
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When equity is exposed to high level of risk those supplying financial and human 
equity, also require colossal risk premiums. Managers supplying human equity 
increase the cost of capital by sub-optimising cash lows, rating agencies' ratings will 
also reflect the level of risk premium commensurate with risk levels in the portfolio, 
and those supplying equity will require a fair return. The inefficient use of equity has 
been identified as the underlying cause of under-performance of the insurance industry 
against peer industries. The realisation that risk capital consumption in insurance cash 
flows is different led to the development of different risk hedge instruments through 
out the centuries spanning from the 19th century. These developments emanated from a 
greater understanding of insurance risk cash flow behaviour, with the resulting effect 
of the creation of hedge instruments with explanatory qualities matching the 
underlying risk embedded in the cash flows. Therefore, inefficiencies embedded in 
cash flows meant that the cost of equity is directly linked to their attributes, 
engineering specific hedge instruments is the answer to this inefficiency. 
This study applies these hedge instruments to portfolios using retention-based 
techniques in varying proportions to the underlying all-purpose equity, efficiency of 
instruments is seen to be largely dependent on the efficiency of equity in financing 
retained risks. It has also been established that in the cash flow engineering process, 
risk is arbitraged by exploiting equity efficiencies at each layer in the loss distribution. 
The effectiveness of a programme is measured by the extent to which a payoff stays 
over and above the knockout barrier and the gradients of the upside and downside 
payoffs. The target of every insurance company is to attain stability; cash flow 
engineering provides the solution as long as risk segments are matched to cash flows 
with amenable equity accumulation structures. 
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CHAPTER: 3: 
MEASUREMENT OF RISK AND COST 
STRUCTURE MANAGEMENT 
3.1 Introduction 
Insurance companies 
like banks borrow funds from policyholders which they 
use to support their investment activities. Policies sold to policyholders are 
promises upon occurrence of a contingent event, insured in the contract. Policyholders 
pay premiums in return for the securities issued to them by insurance companies. 
These features of an insurance contract are similar those of zero coupon bonds, where 
the promised payment is made at the end of the period. The value of the promise to 
pay at the end of the period depends on the financial strength of the company and 
volatility of insured liabilities. Volatility in insurance asset values is a function of time, 
liability and asset growth rates, as the time of payment and payout ratios are not 
known in advance, making an insurance contract a risky debt. 
Investment funds raised by selling securities to policyholders require insurance 
companies to commit shareholder funds as risk capital. This is done to assure 
policyholders that claims will be met and as a cushion to the funds raised. Risk is 
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contained in contingent event products sold by insurance companies and exposure of 
insurance portfolios to hazard losses, investments and risk financing tools. The 
uniqueness of risk characteristics are specific to contract type, the terms in the contract 
document and has payoff profiles similar to those embedded in options. These 
variations bring with them obligations that must be met by capital commitments from 
shareholders and the cost of float paid by policyholders. 
3.2 Motivation and Theoretical Background 
The economic methodology on pricing insurance liabilities before Cummins 
(1988) is based either on the probability of ruin, the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM), the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) or discounted cash flow techniques, 
Ferrari (1967), Bigger and Kahane (1978), Fairley (1979), D'arcy (1983), Witt and 
Urrutia (1983), Derrig (1985) and Doherty and Garven (1986). Those that use the 
weighted average cost of capital techniques did not have a precise method of 
calculating the cost of debt at the beginning of the period, Venezian (1988), Urrita 
(1987), Myers and Cohn (1981 & 87), and Garven and D'Arcy (1991). In order to 
come up with a fair price for liabilities, the cost of equity needed to fund the 
origination of liabilities and credit risk inherent in the originating firm need to be taken 
into account. 
The building blocks of any risk measurement model is its strength in describing 
any risk trading position by making reference to the underlying cash flows. It should 
be able to explain the relationship between liabilities and equity required backing the 
origination of the liabilities. The EPD is an option pricing methodology derived by 
Bustic (1994) for measuring the cost of insolvency in insurance companies. This 
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method has been herald as a closed form solution to measuring the level of capital at 
risk, since it does not only account for the probability of default but also the severity of 
default. In fact, it is a better measure of the level of capital required by insurance 
companies than the Value at Risk (VaR) and ruin probability methodology. However, 
the EPD methodology assumes that default occurs at the end of the period, which is 
not true for insurance companies. In practice, default in insurance companies occurs at 
any time during the life of the company, especially when large losses with very low 
probabilities of occurrence, exceed the going concern value of the firm. 
We, however, start by defining the ownership structure of an insurance company 
using as basic model given by the following equation (3.1): 
Vt 
= 
E+ Lt (3.1) 
Where: Vt = Value of the firm's assets, 
Et = Equity, 
Lt = Liabilities/debt at par value. 
The ownership structure in equation (3.1) above tells us that the value of the firm 
depends on the relationship between equity and liabilities. The assumption underlying 
the financial structure is that, at time t=0, an insurance company issues two types of 
securities; namely a homogeneous liability with cash flow characteristics similar to 
those of a zero coupon bond and a residual claim in the form of equity. Equity is 
provided for by shareholders at a cost commensurate to the level of risk in the business 
being traded, with a value Et at time (t = T). Liabilities, the other form of financing in 
our equation represents money due to policyholders in the form of technical reserves. 
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They have a face value of L, with a holding period of (t = T), and they have a value of 
Lt derived at time (t). Therefore, total asset values (Vt) at time t, are financed at the 
beginning of the holding period by equity (E) and liabilities (L). Time is defined in the 
interval; 0 <_ t <_ T, with the boundary conditions true at time (t = T), since both 
stakeholders have an option on the value of the firm that is expected to be exercised at 
expiry date. Therefore, the total value of the firm (Vt) is independent of the capital 
structure, financing and investment decisions, which means that the Modigliani-Miller 
(1958) theorem holds, as cash outflows are financed by new securities. It can also be 
construed that risk management in either form is irrelevant, and that management risk 
manipulation will not add economic value, if the M&M assumptions holds. 
Since the face value of liabilities (L) is the strike price on the option to pay on the 
occurrence of an insured contingent event, value recovered depends on whether the 
insurance company is solvent or insolvent. The valuation of corporate assets is done to 
establish the financial state of the firm, as this is necessary for the determination of the 
payoffs for each stakeholder in the firm. In order to value the assets, we need to 
establish the asset processes they follow. We base our essential assumptions on Merton 
(1974) and the subsequent application of his methodology by Cummins (1988) on 
insurance cash flows. The firm's assets are assumed to be lognormally distributed, and 
are governed by a risk neutral probability Q-martingale, given by the following 
stochastic differential equations 
dV, 
=rfV, dt+avVdWv (3.2) 
Where: rf = instantaneous interest rate (risk free rate); 
aV & aL = Diffusion parameters for assets and liabilities; 
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Wv & WL = Brownian increments under the risk-adjusted probability 
measure Q, normally distributed with variance dt, and 
correlated, denoted p. 
In the above dynamics, both processes of the drift and randomness are scaled with 
Vt and Lt, by multiplying these though out the equations. Markets are assumed 
complete and frictionless, no taxation, no transaction costs, and trading is continuous 
as envisaged under Black-Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973). 
The advantage of using Merton's methodology in pricing insurance liabilities is 
that it takes into account the effect of limited liability vested with shareholders. The 
fact is that shareholders have limited liability, as they have an option to default if 
things go pear shaped. This option depends on the assessed value of assets at the end 
of the holding period (T), which determines whether the firm is solvent or insolvent. If 
the company is solvent, then the firm will honour its promises to policyholders in full, 
that is, the guaranteed face value of liabilities (L). In this case, the assets would have 
generated enough value to match guaranteed liabilities (Vt >_ L). If the company is 
insolvent, that is the assets have failed to generate enough to match the face value of 
liabilities L, this implies that Vt <_ L. In this case, policyholders will not be paid their 
promised amount, but the residual value of the firm. The total value policyholders 
expect to receive at time (t = T) is defined by the following identity: 
L_ 
Vt if V< <L 3.3 1L 
else. 
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The level of payment expected by shareholders also depends on the financial state 
of the company. Whilst, shareholders enjoy the upside risk, their limited liability 
means they take the residual liability and have the following payoffs: 
E_ 
JV, 
- 
L if Vt >L 3.4 
0 else. 
The realisation of these payoffs is dependent on the probability of reaching the 
critical asset values that could lead to default. We know that the value risky equity and 
liabilities, is closely linked to the critical asset levels (VE), which should not be 
exceeded by liabilities if default is to be averted. This makes default a function of the 
financial structure of the firm, i. e. the leverage ratio given below as follows: 
Le-' it= 
y 0 
Where : lt = leverage ratio, 
Le-rt 
= 
Present value of liabilities at matuity 
(liabilities are not risk- adjusted), 
VO 
= 
Present value of the firm's assets, 
r= risk- free interest rate. 
3.5 
In the above equation the ratio of liabilities to assets, directly affect the probability 
of default, which mean that the financial structure is an important factor in the 
measuring firm-level risk. The assumption is that equity and liabilities are the only 
securities financing the assets, and that no further cash is raised if the L> VT. 
Therefore, the relativity between asset and liability is an important indicator of the 
level of credit risk inherent in the firm. This credit risk affects the amount due to 
policyholders, as defined by the probability of exceedence [Prob(VT<L) > 0]. 
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The cost of originating liabilities like any other debt is linked to the credit risk of 
the company. Credit risk depends on the level of risk capital invested by shareholders. 
Thus, whilst the cost of liabilities depends on the level of capital, the cost of equity is 
determined by the riskiness of liabilities. Therefore, the overall cost of capital to the 
firm is dependent on the financial structure of the firm. This is because risky liabilities 
determine the level of capital required, in order to maintain the value of assets above 
the critical level. The overall cost of capital to an insurance company, is therefore the 
weighted average cost of equity and liabilities. 
This assertion points to the fact that return and financing of an insurance 
company's business are dependent on its financial structure. The cost of shareholder 
funds is measured by the idiosyncratic risk embedded in the business the company is 
underwriting. In other words, it is the risk premium paid over and above the risk free 
rate as a reward to shareholders for supplying funds required to originate liabilities. 
The basic assumption in the standard Merton (1974) option pricing methodology is 
that equity is the only source of funding for liabilities. As we have already seen in 
Chapter 2, equity is not efficient in financing the whole risk profile of an insurance 
company, other forms of funding come in to improve efficiency and enhance the return 
profile. Therefore, the usage of the term equity in this thesis implies that other forms of 
risk financing are already incorporated, unless we specifically state the distinction. 
This means that the cost of equity is equal to the weighted average cost of all risk 
financing used in funding the origination of investment funds. A weighted average cost 
of equity is a better measure of the overall cost of hedging default than just considering 
shareholders' funds. 
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It is apparent from the payoffs above that both equityholders and policyholders 
have contingent claims on the value of the firm. If we retrace our steps, we can rewrite 
equation (3.1) using the put-call-parity formula, as a simple option-pricing model. 
Vt 
= 
C(Vt, L) + [Le-r°` 
- 
D(V,, L)] (3.6) 
Where: C(Vt, L) = call option on assets (V), with exercise price of L, and time 
to maturity T. 
D(Vt, L) = insolvency put option on assets (V), with exercise price of L, 
and time to maturity T. 
These are European options with the following payoff with an exercise price of L 
at maturity (t = T): 
C(V, L) = Max[O, VT-L] and, (3.7) 
D(V, L) = Max[O, L-VT] (3.8) 
The value of the firm is divided between the shareholders (call option) and the 
policyholders (the second bracket 
- 
representing the risk-free debt minus the value of 
the insolvency put). The option pricing model for insurance companies tells us that 
shareholders have the right to receive the residual value of the company at the 
expiration date by virtue of the call option they have on the company's assets. This 
option is exercised if Vt ý! L, in which the residual value (V-L) is received, the owners 
default if Vt < L, giving up the firm's assets to policyholders. 
The second bracket represents discounted liabilities, with the first part defining a 
long position on risk-less liabilities and a short position on a put to default. The default 
option discounts liabilities, because policyholders might not be able to receive the full 
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amount of liabilities if the company is insolvent. We call these bankruptcy costs, 
which are costs incurred after the firm is delivered to policyholders. These costs are 
borne by the policyholders, since the claim of shareholders on the firm expire 
worthless. The payoff for liabilities which capture the effect of limited liability is 
priced as follows: 
Lt 
= 
Le-`'T-D(V,, L, i) (3.9) 
This relationship points to the fact that the value of debt in the firm devalues when 
the probability of default increases. The cost of insolvency to policyholders is defined 
by the value of the put option in equation (3.9), which is rewritten in equation (3.10) 
using the Black-Scholes option-pricing model. 
D(Vt, L)=-VN(-d, )+Le-`'SN(-d2) (3.10) 
Where: 
(V/) 
+ 
(rp 
+ 6/ý1T 
d, 
_ 
(3.11) 
d2 
= 
d, 
- 
a' (3.12) 
N(. ) = Standard normal distribution 
This defines the value of policyholder claims in the company as being the asset 
values multiplied by the probability of a shortfall if Vt: 5 L, and the present value of 
liabilities multiplied by the probability of full recovery. The value of the put option 
represents the premium required for insurance against insolvency risk. The model 
depicts factors that detennine the firm's insolvency risk and its costs. Therefore, the 
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overall cost of insolvency risk is a function of the holding period, the leverage ratio, 
risk free interest rate and asset volatility (a). An insurance company can reduce its 
insolvency risk by reducing asset volatility and the leverage ratio. Variations in the 
risk free rate of return also affect the cost of default, with a decrease in interest rate 
having an opposite effect on insolvency risk. 
If it is true that the put to default is enticing, then shareholders would prefer 
portfolios that are risky to that are more stable. This is due to the fact that, they benefit 
from keeping the upside risk and transferring the downside risk to policyholders if the 
firm is bankrupt (Vt: 5 L). However, in practice, shareholders rarely benefit from this 
asymmetric scenario of enjoying the upside, whilst walking away from the company 
when things go pear-shaped. This is because such payoffs come at a cost, which is 
reflected in the cost of borrowing funds from policyholders and raising external 
capital. Remember that the premium required to originate liabilities is directly linked 
to the perceived insolvency risk in the insurance company and certainly will be 
reflected in the cost of capital. This has impact an on the portfolio's Sharpe ratios, due 
to the effect of non-systematic risk, which will be higher given a level of excess return 
per unit risk. Therefore, management will be obliged to maximise shareholder value, 
by earning a higher margin on investments over and above its marginal cost of capital, 
by reducing risk inherent in a portfolio. Competition in the market, the need to 
continue creating value for shareholders and the costs embedded in regulation deters 
value arrogation activities. 
Whilst Merton's model captures the impact of leverage, it does not explicitly 
account for agency costs. It implicitly accounts for the limited liability option vested in 
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the equityholders, which is equal to the value of the put option equity holders have on 
the value of the firm's assets (V), at a strike price L, at maturity. The value of the 
default option vested with the equityholders is equivalent to the cost of hedging risky 
liabilities. There are other factors that affect the cost of insolvency besides the leverage 
ratio, interest rate, and the holding period. Volatility in both liability and asset 
accounts and the correlation between these accounts also affect the cost of default and 
ultimately the weighted average cost of capital. Therefore, in the next sections we 
extend this model, in order to capture the unique features of insurance cash flows like, 
the interactions between assets and liabilities in a multi-line, multi-asset company, the 
liability growth rates and solvency margins. We address these issues in turn under each 
of the following sections. 
3.2.1 Adjusting for Inherent Insurance Cash Flow Risk 
In this section we will price contingent claims of an insurance company by 
extending standard Mertonian option pricing model to take into account the effect of 
liability payout ratios. This mirrors the relationship established above where liabilities 
and assets interact in creating value, but we relax the condition that liabilities are 
constant. Insurance companies in practise are faced with variable payout ratios, hence 
the need to readjust the risk-free rate used above. From the previous section, we define 
the dynamics governing returns on both asset and liability accounts by the following 
differential equations: 
dVt 
=(rf+1rv)Vtdt+aVV, dWV (3.13) 
dL, 
= 
(rL+ 7ti) L, dt+ 6LLtdWL (3.14) 
Where: rL = payout ratio of liabilities (inflation rate). 
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ICv = the market risk premium for assets. 
7CL: -- the market risk premium for liabilities. 
An Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model (ICAPM) 16 prices assets and 
liability portfolios above applied in Cummins (1988 & 1991), Cummins and Danzon 
(1997), and Cummins, Allen & Phillips (1998) is used in defining the expected return 
for the drift parameters. The rate at which liabilities are discounted is based on 
actuarial principles, due to uncertainty of insurance cash flows. The first consideration 
would be the payout ratio for liabilities, which account for the overall cost of 
liabilities. We compute the payout ratio as follows: 
rL = -In 
L° (3.15) 
Where: 4= The present value of liabilities, 
Lt = The face value of liabilities at time T. 
This is used as a positive expected risk load that should be added to take into 
consideration uncertainty associated with liabilities. If the value of liabilities (L-o) at 
(I. -r,, T ), time zero is less than the present value of risk-adjusted liabilities 
_ 
then the 
cost of liabilities is less than the risk free rate. According to Cummins (1988), the 
dynamics are generalised in such a way that the economy's inflation rates are 
accounted for in the risk-adjusted rate rp, since insurance inflation rate tends to grow 
faster than that of the economy. This tenet seems to deviate from financial principles 
16 71be market risk premium 7c is defined by the following equation: 
7E = Pj. (r. 
- 
rf 
(a j 
Where: r. and a. = the drift and diffusion parameters of the Brownian motion processes for the market 
respectively. 
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which state that the discount rate should only be fixed above the risk free rate when 
systematic risk is expected. The reason for using the actuarial principle is for us to take 
into account the stochastic nature of insurance liabilities, which makes the cash flows 
costly as far as risk taking, is concerned. 
There are also financial reasons for us using the risk-adjusted rate; though 
systematic risk might not be revealed in the traditional underwriting beta which 
rewards a firm for bearing systematic risk. Campbell and Mei (1993) gave the main 
reason why we have to discount at a positive risk load. The reason pertains to the 
nature of long tail liabilities which might not display any correlation features with 
economic variables, whilst concealed in the underwriting cash flows is systematic risk. 
They identified the sources of systematic risk by decomposing the CAPM beta into 
three 17 broad categories, the insurance underwriting beta, the economy-wide beta and 
the company specific beta. Their result shows that the correlation between a 
company's cash flows and market returns are not the primary determinant of the firm's 
equity beta. Cornell (1999) reported similar results to those recorded by Campbell and 
Mei, with average betas for classes of assets tested significantly different from zero 
over the entire period of the study. 
p= the instantaneous correlation coefficient between the Brownian motion process, the market 
portfolio and the assets. 
17 flL,,, 
-, 
6rm 
-flL i"', 
Where: 6c CAPM beta arising from the correlation between the company's cash flows and market : (;., m 
returns (insurance underwriting beta). 
flei, 
m = 
Company specific beta resulting from the correlation between the expected excess return 
for the company's stock and future expected excess market returns. 
-8r, m ý Economy wide beta, resulting from correlated innovations in future realisations of the short- 
term rcal-rate of interest and future expected excess market returns. 
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Therefore, the existence of systematic risk means that underwriting cash flows 
have to be discounted at a rate below the risk free rate of interest in order to produce 
the positive risk load, rp. By discounting at a risk adjusted rate of return we account for 
any systematic risk contained in the cash flows, and the market imperfections which 
makes risk costly to bear. Therefore, the risk adjustment to the discount rate has the 
effect of mathematically eliminating risk so that the risk adjusted portfolio rate of 
return that results is the riskless rate. Failure to achieve this desired riskless state 
means that further risk remains in the portfolio, implying an incomplete risk 
adjustment process. 
In this rate is also reflected the level of risk transferred to the reinsurers and how 
much it will cost to finance it. Thus, depending on the level of volatility in the 
portfolio reinsurance companies will also demand compensation from the insurance 
company in the form of a risk adjusted discount rate that is below the risk free rate. 
This entails that the magnitude of the risk-adjusted discount rate below the risk-free 
rate depends on the surplus to liability ratio, which spells the level of equity beta. 
On the same vein, Bingham (2000) argued that fair premiums in a state where 
liability betas are always negative entail the readjustment of equity betas and the cost 
of capital in line with changes in leverage. This is done to reduce the unrealistic 
burden imposed on insurance pricing. Therefore, what our model gives is a contract 
price computation, which incorporates not only the loss payout ratio but also the 
investment yield, market risk premium and the leverage. The achievement of target 
returns given low levels of leverage, should either be met by increases in premiums, or 
reduced market risk premiums or cost of capital. What all this means is that total return 
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with risk-adjustments must equal the risk-free rate; otherwise without such 
adjustments it must equal the target cost of capital-based return. 
32.2 ModeRing Risk Factors for Multi-line Insurance Companies 
Insurance companies are not mono-line liability companies but they write a 
number of lines generating cash flows with diverse liability attributes. We consider a 
company that does not only sell insurance contracts in a number of lines, but also 
invests generated income in a number of assets. 
What we have not done though is the specification of the dynamics of each class 
of business and asset account, as these certainly follow a different dynamic process. 
This enables us to develop a model that capture the portfolio effects of diversification 
on capital allocation and insurance contract pricing, which is constructed on the 
principle of transfer pricing between liability and asset accounts. In order to simplify 
our model the offsetting risk-taking incentive of guarantee funds is ignored. This 
makes our model applicable to all insurance companies with different capitalisation 
levels. In developing this model, we maintain the assumption assets and liabilities 
accounts follow the Wiener processes (Cummins, 1988), defined by 
dV (rf + 7cm) Aidt+aAAidW (3.16) 
dLi (rL + 7rLi) Lidt+ aL, LidW (3.17) 
Ai and I, are the values of the ith asset and the i"' liability class, i=1... d and 
(r+7EA), (rL+7CL), CrAi. (TU are the drift and volatility of the asset and liabilities 
respectively, and dwAI and dwL, are the increarnents of the Weiner process. As before 
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we considered dW as a random number drawn from the normal distribution with mean 
zero and standard deviation 4dt so that: 
E(dWj) 
=0 and E(dWi2) = dt (3.18 a, b) 
These Brownian increments for assets and liabilities, dwAi, dwLi, dwAj and dwLj 
are instantaneously correlated with the following dynamics: 
dWA, dWAJ ý PAjAj, dWL, dWLJ 
-": PLjL,, and dWA. dWL, ý- PAU (3.19a 
- 
c)) 
In this case i# j. 
We also believe that investment funds should be split between surplus and 
premium accounts, as done by pervious researchers on this same subject, Doherty and 
Gavern (1986), Cummins (1988 & 1991) and Cummins, Allen and Phillips (1998). 
Investment funds are defined as the initial capital required originating the business 
plus the premiums generated on the capital committed up-front. This approach ties 
capital to liabilities; since originated liabilities are seen as loans with varying durations 
loaned to the asset accounts at a fee. It makes sense to view the interaction between 
assets and liabilities and the risk capital attaching thereto, as an incremental charge 
incorporated in each contract. The reason for this lies in the fact that a marginal 
approach to capital allocation will allocate all the capital available, 100% to each line 
of business (Myers and Read, 1999). Certainly, this supports our main theorem that 
asset accounts are equal to the liabilities originated plus the capital allocated to each 
line of business. 
Our method of viewing insurance business as that of borrowing from the 
policyholders and then lending to asset accounts is similar to the way banks classify 
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their business, depending on the type of liabilities. In this thesis we are not going to 
follow the traditional approach to classifying insurance business based the perils 
insured under each contract like property, casualty or marine. We base our 
classification as pointed out in Chapter (2), on the duration and convexity of liabilities 
originated. This classification brings in line insurance classification with that of other 
financial institutions, in that origination is linked to investment decisions. The present 
classification of business does not offer us this important element in capital allocation 
and the pricing of insurance contracts. Therefore, by making assets liability specific 
the issue of duration and convexity risk is resolved, this makes its specification and 
management easier. Thus, the proposed classification of a line of business based on the 
time it takes to settle a liability brings into play the impact liabilities have on the 
investment policy. 
We divide liabilities into three broad groups in this thesis, short-term liabilities, 
medium-tenn liabilities and long-term liabilities, depending on their duration and 
convexity. Originated funds in liability accounts are assumed borrowed to assets 
I 
account with similar duration and convexity structures, through a transfer pricing 
system as proposed by Cummins (2000). This transfer pricing system depends on how 
much an insurance company pays to originate the business, since it has a bearing on 
how much the assets accounts should earn in order to sustain this system. 
The rate at which insurance companies pay to policyholders in order to originate 
business is defined as the cost of float. It is the interest rate paid by liability accounts 
to policyholders for the business underwritten in respect to the underlying perils in 
each contract. These generated funds when lend to asset accounts are expected to earn 
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a rate of interest rcflccting the duration embedded in the funds, irrespective of the 
underlying perils insured. Liability accounts are expected to underwrite risk at interest 
rates below those envisaged in the financial markets for cash flows with similar 
duration and convexity characteristics. If the cost of origination is higher than return 
generated from the asset accounts, shareholder value will be destroyed and the reverse 
is true, with a qualification on the condition that the benchmark cost of equity is met. 
In order to manipulate multi-liability and multi-asset random variables, a 
multidimensional version of Ito's Lemma is used to value the option of the firm, 
Vi(Ai, Lj, i): 
i 
v Idd 1ddd 2V dd2 dV= 
L+-Y-Y-criajpijAiAj 
+-Y-EaiajpijLiLj-+2Y-, 5 
v 
dt 
dt 2i dAjdA i2i dLidLj iAI 
CF Lj PAiLi ý dLi 
d dV d dV 
+Y-A" 
-+EL" - i=1 1 dAi i=1 1 dAi 
We use the hedging argument, by assuming that assets are available that could 
provide a perfect dynamic hedge, within the same time interval, T-t. We set a portfolio 
of assets and liabilities options on an insurance trading portfolio and short a number of 
assets and liabilities. 
dd 
rI=V(Ati, Li, t)-Y-A Ai-Y-A Li 
i=l I% i=l ý- (3.21) 
vv Idd d 2V 1ddd 2V dd2v dll= 
L+ 
Y-EcFic; jpijAiAj-+-Y-EaiajpijLiLj-+2EaAlclLjvAiLi dt 2ii dAjdA i2ii dLidLj i dAidLi 
d dV d 
-dV 
i 
ý-A i 
dAi+ 
--Ajý dLi A (3.22) 
(3.2 
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Let: 
AAi = 
dV 
and 
dA i 
dV 
AU 
=- dLi 
Now for each i, it is implies that the portfolio is hedged and is risk free. Setting 
return equal to risk free date, we arrive at: 
dV Idd d 2V Iddd 2V dd2v 
-+-Y-Y-aiajpijAiAj-+-Y-I: aiajpijLi-j dL 2Y-CFAic; LjPAiLi dt 2ii dA i dA i2ii dL i dAidLi 
d dV d dV 
rf IA i-+rL ELi--rfV=O (3.23) i=l dA i i=l dLi 
In our equation, pij and PAL, are correlation coefficients between the ih and jh 
assets and liability returns. We can also calculate the covariance, which is denoted a'ij 
I 
and CFALfor returns on i assets and lines of liabilities. Suppose we have five liability 
lines and five assets in our portfolio, the following covariance matrix MEM will 
represent CF, 2 below. 
cr 
2 
A, (Y A2A, cr AA CF LIA, cr L2A, G L3A, 
CYAIA2 (Y 
2 
A2 cr A3A2 CY LIA2 cr L2A2 (Y L3A2 
(YAIA 
2 
(F A2A3 cr 
2 
A3 CY LIA3 cy L2A3 cr L3A3 
aAILI CFA2L, Cr A3L, cr 
2 
L, (F L2L, a L3L, 
(YAIL2 (YA2L2 (: FA L 32 a LIL 2 (Y 2 L2 cr L3L2 
(3 AIL3 cr A2L3 CY A3L3 cr LIL3 (Y L2L3 (Y 
2 
L3 
Note: aA, ý- GAj; aLU ý aLA O': p. i and 6ALi = 6LA; 
(3.24) 
This covariance matrix is important in as far as assessing the level of risk and risk 
capital required for a portfolio. Whilst correlation between lines of business and assets 
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gives a company the benefits of internal portfolio diversification, there is need to 
extend our assessment to how individual lines of business correlate with the whole 
portfolio (PLLi)- Capital allocation and overall risk taking behaviour within a company 
depend on how each line of business correlates with the overall portfolio. This means 
an extension to the definition of risk per line of business, which is based not only on 
the volatility parameter of the line and the correlation between the lineý liabilities but 
also the entire insurer's portfolio of liabilities and assets, Merton and Perold (1993) 
and Myers & Read (1999). 
The EPD and Cummins (1988) methodologies are opaque in their computation of 
default in that, they fail to link clearly the pricing formula to the state of the firm. 
Under these methodologies, the probability of default remains generally positive 
during the life of the company. In practice, the probability of default is low for firms 
that have survived through the underwriting cycles. In this thesis, we develop a model 
that takes into account the price of early default and the influence of regulators in both 
the cost and probability of default. This methodology brings us closýr to the actual 
behaviour of insurance cash flows as driven by the cost of compliance. 
3.3 Modelling for the Economic Significance of Insolvency 
Current literature on the on the pricing of liabilities though insightful, is however, 
limited in capturing the actual dynamics of an insurance company, when subjected to 
the cost of compliance. Most of the literature assumes that liabilities are not 
guaranteed, which is difficult to justify in practice given the role regulators play in 
protecting policyholders. The role which regulators play is similar to the objective 
achieved by covenants in corporate bonds, which gives the bondhold6rs the right to 
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bankrupt the company if its asset values fall below a pre-specified solvency threshold. 
This feature in insurance companies resembles the characteristics of barrier options, 
which knocks out equityholders' option on the company's assets, if asset values go 
down and reach the pre-specified insolvency threshold. The pre-condition to risk 
trading which triggers insolvency upon being breached is enshrined in the minimum 
solvency margin requirements. 
Minimum solvency margins arc a safety mechanism that gives regulators the 
right to intervene in the company's operations, force rcorganisation or liquidate the 
company if its performance fails to match the threshold specified. The threshold at 
which insolvency will occur or the outstrike price of assets follow that of Black and 
Cox (1976), Cummins (1991), and Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), with the value of 
H(t). This constitutes the barrier which need not be breached, if the company is to 
continue with its operations. This means that the value of insurance assets are path- 
dependent, in that the payoff is dependent on the realised asset path, which triggers 
certain parts of the contract if the asset price becomes too low. 
This structural barrier determined by the regulators defines the economic meaning 
of the insolvency-causing event. It determines the policyholder'9 payoff upon 
bankruptcy. This barrier when breached invokes action from the authorities to suspend 
operations to limit the dissipation of assets. In other words, default occurs the first time 
when the value of assets is lower than the stochastic barrier. Liabilities upon 
achievement of this outstrike price of assets; it is assumed that all other liability classes 
are simultaneously defaulted. 
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The outstrike price of assets is set as a pre-condition to underwriting a specified 
amount of liabilities, upon which asset values should not go below during the life of 
I 
the option. If they go below the specified asset values, the regulators will take over the 
company for the policyholders. In order to avoid the eventuality of a knockout, the 
insurance company should continue meeting their contractual obligations to all 
policyholders irrespective of the class of business. If regulators intervene at such a 
point, the option of equityliolders on the firm's assets is extinguished and they will 
receive nothing from their investments. 
The fact that regulators intervene before liabilities are greater than assets (L>V) 
means that equityholders should give up the company before they have recouped the 
residual assets eannarked for this cushion for policyholders. Early intervention takes 
us a step closer to how insurance companies behave in practice, given a higher exit 
price than envisaged under the perfect market scenario of the standard firm Black 
Scholes model elaborated above. This makes insurance cash flows unique from cash 
flows of ordinary firms, because they have to give up the company even before the 
face value of the assets is not yet equal to the value of liabilities. 
3.3.1 Firm-level Risk Measurement Model for Insurance Companies 
We will derive the valuation expression for risky liabilities in this section and 
examine their implications on risk premiums paid by insurance companies in order to 
underwrite business. In this section we will price contingent claims on an insurance 
company by using the extended option pricing model, also used by authors specified 
above on insurance portfolios and corporate bonds. The model used defines value in a 
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multi-line insurance risk portfolio as V(Ai, I,, rt). This mirrors the relationship 
established above where liabilities and assets interact in creating value. 
In order to capture solvency threshold H(t), over which default will be triggered 
we relax the assumptions made by Doherty and Gervem (1986), Cummins (1988, 
1991), Cummins and Danzon (1996), Cummins and Sommer (1996) and Cummins, 
Allen and Phillips (1997) that liabilities are not guaranteed. Let V,, denote the value of 
assets, if the value remain above the solvency margin H(u), and the time period t: 5 u: 5 
T. The value of the option Vd(Ai, Li, t) is equal to the standard option for insurance 
companies denoted by V(Ai, Li, t), because it retains the same characteristics if it is not 
knocked out during the holding period. We assume that cash outflows are financed 
first by premiums and thereafter by equity, which has a residual claim, and affords 
limited liability to its owners. Default is triggered simultaneously for all policies issued 
the first time the value of assets reach the critical level, H(t). The risk-adjusted 
dynamics of H(t), assuming that the barrier corresponds to the value of liabilities of the 
I 
firm, is modelled using the following diffusion: 
dH(t) 
= 
(rf + 7Ch)H(t)dt+ ah, H(t)dW, (t) (3.25) 
Where (Yhv is a positive constant and 7Ch adjusting risk for barrier is equivalent to rL 
the payout ratio to policyholders, used by Cummins (1988). The relationship between 
the knockout barrier and liabilities as envisaged in equation (3.25) means that 
uncertainty in this variable is also directly related to asset values of the finn. 
Therefore, this solvency threshold is stochastic as is evident for differing solvency 
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requirements between big and small companies under the European Union (EU) 
solvency requirements. 
We have made mention of the barrier denoted by H(t) above, it defines the 
policyholder's payoff upon bankruptcy. This is an exogenously determined constant, 
specified as follows: 
H= aLe-r°` (3.26) 
Where: 0: ý a<I 
The value for (x is specified as zero in Cummins's model, which defines a 
situation, where policyholders have no guarantees at all. On the other polar liabilities 
are totally guaranteed and riskless. This is attainable under a scenario when cc is equal 
to 1, but in this thesis we adopt the intermediate case where cc varies between 16% and 
23% for European companies and variable depending on the required risk-based 
capital for USA insurance companies. It is apparent that the insolvency barrier is 
stochastic because it is discounted at a risk free rate net of the growth in liabilities up 
to maturity rate. 
The cost associated with the level at which the barrier is fixed is ieflected in the 
credit spreads of the company, as it applies to each case. A breach of the barrier (Vt 
--5 
H forcing reorganisation or bankruptcy is as a means of allocating a fraction of the 
exogenously determined assets of the insurance company to various classes of 
liabilities, assuming application of the strict priority rule. When asset values go down, 
reaching the barrier denoted by H, regulators take over the company and the call 
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option of equilyholders on the asset values of the firm will become worthless. The 
boundary conditions for the value of equity are given as follows: 
E= 
OifV' :: ý H (3.27) 
V, else. 
Where: E= the down-and-out call option. 
Vt = Asset terminal price. 
H= Barrier 
It is apparent that the payoff of a down-and-out call option on insurance asset 
values is zero when, V, = aLe-rP". It can also be pointed out that irrespective of the 
method of restructuring an insurance company, policyholders will swap their original 
claim in a distressed company for a set of new assets. Furthermore, if default occurs 
we assume that the strict priority rule is observed, because regulators rather than the 
policyholders will take over the firm and in the process detennine what is due to each 
debtholder. This mean that there is no possibility of equityholders recovering value in 
the company and all liabilities are considered to have equal bargaining power and there 
is no priority over settling another. This is a sensible assumption because most 
insurance companies do not use senior debt to finance their liabilities. In other words, 
policyholders receive an exogenously specified fraction of the remaining assets; asset 
values will usually be lower after take over by regulators than it would be the case if 
the company had remained in the hands of equityholders. Regulatory company take- 
over reduces liquidity, which tends to dissipate asset values, a phenomenon well 
known in practice because most of the companies placed in administration rarely 
survive and become operational again. 
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Let us assume that in case of default before maturity, and a reorganisation of the 
company, policyholders will be paid a fixed value of 1-w multiplied by the face value 
of the liability at maturity. The factor w defines the proportion received by 
policyholders if there is a reorganisation of the insurance company during the holding 
period of the liability. Longstaff and Swchwartz (1995) pointed out that value of (w) is 
constrained by the adding-up constraint which stipulates that the total settlement of 
liability claims can not exceed H(t), and its an exogenous constant. This will mean a 
certainty equivalent payoff at maturity of 
1- WIc--qT (3.28) 
Where: I= indicator function taking the value of one when the barrier is 
breached and zero otherwise. 
t= First passage time of V(u) through H(u) 
The first time passage of V(u) through the barrier H(u), is defined as follows: 
y= inf tU 2ý t, V(u) = H(u) = aLe-TIT j= inf ýu 2ý tj(u) M logV(u)-logH(u)ý= 01 (3.29) 
The value of equity and liabilities depends not only on the value of V(t) and Le", 
through the solvency ratio Le-t N(t), denoted 14 but also by the relationship between 
H(t) and V(t), through the early insolvency ratio V(t)/H(t), denoted qt. Therefore, the 
payoff of each stakeholder on the value of an insurance company can be derived 
directly from both the solvency and the early insolvency ratios, without having to 
specify V(t) and H(t). In this context, It and qt can be seen as a proxy to the measure of 
default risk of an insurance company. 
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The value of liabilities and equity at maturity is given by 
LT= 
aL. , <T + L. IyaTVTk-L + VT - Iy; 
->T, VT<L 
(3.30) 
and, 
(v 
T'T- 
L) 
" 
Iy2: 
TVTkL (3.31) 
respective ly. 
The first part to equation (3.30) defines a scenario where default occurs prior to 
maturity, that is, policyholders receive an amount equal to the externally determined 
solvency threshold and nothing more. The second and third parts to this equation 
represent the payoff if there is no default during the holding period, but at time T. In 
other words the value of the firm is always above the solvency threshold (H(u)) and 
insolvency occurs at maturity. The whole equation is a summary of the cash flow at 
maturity given all these possibilities, of first passage time during the holding period. 
Using the risk-neutral pricing technique, the price of liabilities as at time t, is 
given by the discounted value of future expected cash flows under the risk-neutral 
probability Q: 
Lt 
= 
EQ [e-P'. (a L. 
I<T+ L. I-jk-TVTaL+ 
VT 
- 
I-fýTVTJ] (3.32) 
This equation on the value of liabilities collapses to the following closed fonn 
solution, by using the methodology of the change of nurneraires and time change: 
Lt 
= e-rl" DE 
(11)+ 1- DE(qt (3.33) 
it 
)l 
Where: 
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it Le-rlr and Vt 
H(t) 
q, Vt 
The second and third parts of equation (3.33) are European put options priced at 
time t, with maturity at time T, and standard normal distributions given as follows: 
DE(lt) 1 N(-dl)+N(-d 2) (3.34) 
t 
2 
DE (qt) 
= -- 1t 
N(-d 3) +N(-d 4) (3.35) 
t 
- 
Init + rp +a 
X2 
T 
d, d2+a-, fr (3.3 6 a; b) 
cy 
- 
Inqt+ 
( 
rp + C; X2 
d3 
=- 
CY 
IT- 
d4 + Cy 
VT (3.36a; b) 
Equation (3.33) is the closed form solution for the value of liabilities within an 
insurance company, constituted of three possible positions that could be taken by 
policyholders. The first part to the equation is equivalent to risk free liabilities, which 
is attained under the circumstances of qe=lt and a=l. Under such a scenario, default is 
forced when the value of assets is equal to the present value of liabilities discounted at 
the risk free rate (the term multiplied to the bracket). The term It is an unbiased 
estimate of the real asset-liability-ratio under the Q economy. The term q, is the ratio 
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of the current insolvency barrier to the current value of the company, and this ratio is 
known as the early insolvency ratio. 
The option pricing model for insurance companies tells us that shareholders have 
the right to receive the residual value of the company at the expiration date by virtue of 
I 
the call option they have on the company's value. This option is exercised if Vt>Lt, in 
which they receive Vt-Lt; they default either when Vt<Lt at expiry or when the 
threshold is breached (Vt<Ht). The default option discounts debt, because the value of 
equity increases with the value of default as this reduces the value of liabilities, but 
early default option increases the value of debt. 
The default put is enticing if there are no guarantees to policyholders, making 
shareholders prefer portfolios that are risky due to the benefits reaped from keeping the 
upside risk and transfer of the downside risk to policyholders. However, such a payoff 
comes at a cost, which will be reflected in the cost of borrowing funds from 
policyholders and raising external capital. This has an impact on the portfolio's Sharpe 
ratios, due to the effect of non-systematic risk which will be higher given a level of 
excess return per unit risk. Therefore, management will be obliged to maximise 
shareholder value, by earning a higher margin on investments over and above its 
marginal cost of capital, by reducing risk inherent in a portfolio. 
This equation (3.33) confirms the point we put forth in equation (3.1) that the 
value of the finn is divided between the shareholders (call option) and the 
policyholders (the second bracket 
- 
representing the risk-free debt minus the value of 
the insolvency put 
- 
incorporating the value of an option to an early default). The 
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value of policyholders' or debtholders' claim on the firm is represented by the 
relationship in the big bracket. This relationship tells that the value of debt in the firm 
devalues when the probability of default increases, but the existence of a guarantee 
increases the value of debt. This implies that an increase in the level of risk within a 
company is bound to reduce the value of equity. Shareholders rarely benefit from any 
asymmetric scenario existing when guarantees are absent, where they gain from the 
upside and walk away from the company when things go pear-shaped. Competition in 
the market, the need to continue creating value for shareholders and the costs 
embedded in regulation deters value arrogation activities. 
When an insurance company fails to meet the criterion stipulated by the regulators 
on the liabilities underwritten, or if a company fails to meet its obligations, default 
ensues. At this point the barrier H(t) is equal to the value of the firm Vt, which mean 
that default occurs when qt is equal to unit. The second part to equation (3.33) 
represents a standard put-to default at maturity as given by Cummins (1988 & 1991). 
The final cash flow in the equation is as result conditional upon the possibility of early 
default being triggered by premature forced insolvency, and represents a long position 
on a European put. It palliates the effects of the traditional Mertonian and Cummins 
put to default, due to the possibility of earning an early default. 
3.3.2 Risk Premium Computation on Insurance Cash Flows 
In this section we are going to develop theorems based on the cost structure of the 
firm, which can be tested from empirical data, using the option pricing theory in 
insurance firms based on the extended version of our option pricing model. Option 
pricing theory in insurance literature have been used to value assets and liabilities of 
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insurance firms, pricing of individual insurance contracts and show the portfolio effect 
on risk and capital requirements (Doherty and Gavem (1986), Cummins (1988) & 
(1991), Cummins and Danzon (1997) and Cummins, Allen and Phillips (1998)). 
The contribution which we are making by using option-pricing methodology is 
spelt out in the theorems outlined below, and the subsequent use of empirical data in 
testing these theorems. Our model is an extension to previous work on option pricing 
of insurance company by Cummins, whose empirical work is based on the Mertonian 
option pricing methodology. 
Our work is parallel to that of Black and Cox (1976), Kim, Ramaswamy and 
Sundaresan (1993), Longstaff and Swchwartz (1995), and Briys and De Verene (1997) 
in that we introduce the impact of solvency margins on risk premiums, pricing, overall 
risk of a portfolio and the total cost of risk management. By taking into consideration 
the impact of solvency margins and the stochastic nature of insurance liabilities, our 
approach is not only consistent with financial literature in Myers and Read (1999), 
Merton and Perold (1993), Campbell and Mei (1993), Cornell (1999), Fama and 
French (1993,1996,1997), MacKinlay and Pastor 1999), and Stambaugh (1999) but 
also actuarial in Daykin, Pentikainen and Pesonen (1994). This means our prices will 
be close to those observed in practice. This leads us to making our first proposition on 
performance measurement within a portfolio trading insurance risk. 
Proposition 1: 
The risk premium as measured by default risk is inversely related to the cost of carry 
of an insurance company and the exogenously detennined insolvency threshold. 
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This is consistent with previous literature in that the fortunes of stakeholders on 
assets of an insurance company are primarily determined by the cost of solvency 
requirements, Black and Cox (1976), Cummins (1991), and Longstaff and Swchwartz 
(1995). This cost arises from the cost of up-front capital required by regulators in order 
for the company to write business, with the guarantee that it will honour its promises 
to debtholders and remain solvent. 
Solvency margins are set over and above the breakeven. point of assets and 
liabilities as a percentage of liabilities, meaning liabilities need not exceed assets 
before regulators come in and intervene in the running of the company. The margin 
which is set at 18% means that equityholders will have to surrender the company to the 
debtholders before the market value of assets is equal to the market value of liabilities. 
This has the effect of reducing the value of equity and increasing the value of debt 
within an insurance risk-trading portfolio. 
The methodology we developed above tells us a different story, of the desire by 
equityholders to increase risk within a portfolio in order for them to increase the value 
of equity. What we know is that equityholders are interested in value creation than 
value arrogation, because the only way they can recoup their investment is through 
value that is created from underwriting risks. Thus, risks carried by investors of capital 
are rewarded by the creation of value through underwriting insurance risks. The 
methodology showing the dynamics of an insurance company subject to constrains of 
statutory margins is developed to show how it affects the behaviour of price of risk in 
insurance companies. 
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We adopted the methodology used in pricing risky corporate bonds by Briys and 
De Verene (1997), Black and Cox (1976), and Longstaff and Swchwartz (1995), to 
compute risk premiums paid by insurance companies to policyholders when 
originating busincss. This mcthodology is uscd bccausc it computcs crcdit risk 
embedded in insurance cash flows more efficiently, by taking into consideration the 
impact of default on the price of liabilities. The advantage which this method has over 
those used in the past to price insurance risk is that risk premiums are computed as a 
function of credit risk, portfolio risk (at), liability risk (aL) and asset risk (UA). Let risk 
premium be denoted by 7CT or YSPREAD (in Chapter 4). The cost of liabilities is 
derived 
, 
which is computed by the difference between the price of liabilities maturing 
in time T, and the price of an equivalent risk-free liabilities which have a face value of 
0. Remember that we derived the cost of liabilities is given by 
7ET 
=rL-rf =- 
1 In 1- DE ('t 91) + DE (qt, -t ) (3.37) T q, 
11 
Where: 7CT = default or policyholders' deficit spread for a standard default 
(SDSPRE) or for an early default spread (EDSPRE). 
- 
In 
Le-', T 
_ 
Dý/ 
T 
Lt rL 
-T (3.38) 
This equation tells us that the insolvency-triggering mechanism is directly related 
to the payoff received by policyholders when early bankruptcy is forced upon the 
insurance company. It has been elaborated above that the three parts of this equation 
rcprescnt all solvcney sccnarios of an insurancc company; a standard put-to dcfault at 
maturity, and the conditional possibility of early default being triggered by premature 
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forced insolvency. This makes our equation more incorporative of all the possible 
scenarios an insurance company operates under, bringing us a step closer to reality 
without unnecessary complexities. Therefore, the level at which the barrier is set is 
paramount to the risk taking activity within an insurance company, because under this 
asset pricing model volatility is bad for equityholders. 
The level at which the barrier is set is inversely related to the value of equity. In 
other words as the barrier level is increased, the value of debt in the company increases 
as this reduces the value of the insolvency put. By increasing the solvency margin, the 
barrier is brought closer to the face value of assets, this increases the probability of 
breaching the barrier knocking-out the claim of shareholders on the company's assets. 
Whilst this increases the probability of full recovery by debtholders/policyholders; it 
increases the probability of equityholders forfeiting their investment to debtholders. 
3.3.3 Regulatory Regime and the Price of Insurance contracts 
In this section, we propose the theorem on the effects of regulatory regimes on the 
cost of liabilities. We believe that regulatory regimes impose external costs on the 
price of liabilities, since they act as a form of structural guarantee against default. The 
theorem given below is a building to the fair price of insurance liabilities; we extend it 
in the next section to incorporate the cost of equity and other contingent risk financing 
methods. 
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Proposition IT: 
The price of liabilities is an increasing function of the default-risk variable It, and the 
barrier-to-asset value ratio (q), as policyholders' surplus is inversely related to risk and cost 
of compliance. 
This proposition is consistent with financial literature as given by Black and Cox 
(1976), Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), Briys and De Varenne (1997) and Klein and 
Inglis (1999). This body of literature points out that the levels of It dictates the leverage 
in a company, which is negatively related to risk premiums required to underwrite a 
unit of business. Thus, lower values of the asset-to-liability ratio imply that the value 
of the firm is closer to default threshold, meaning higher discounts for default risk, the 
reverse is true with high values of It. On the other hand, if the volatility of assets is 
higher irrespective of a high value of It, default risk increases making liabilities more 
risky. 
Insurance companies hold excess capital over and above that required by 
regulators in order to reduce the impact of volatility on the value of equity. An 
increase in asset value volatility means that there is a greater possibility of breaching 
the knock-out barrier set by thy the regulators, which spell a reduction in the value of 
equity and lower premiums policyholders are prepared to pay. This is consistent with 
the theory envisaged under barrier options in that volatility in assets values tends to 
increase when the value of assets moves close to the statutory margin barrier, so that 
equilyholders will desire to keep as far away from the knock-out barrier as possible. 
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It evident from equation (3.33) that the value of liabilities depends on the asset- 
liability-ratio, which can be interpreted as an instrumental variable for the credit rating 
of the insurance company (Briys, Bellalah, Mai and De Varenne - 1998). The default 
measure It, according to Ogden (1987) explains about 78% of the variations in agency 
ratings of corporate bonds, which makes this theorem central to how risk is managed 
within an insurance risk trading portfolio. The default-risk measure certainly affects 
the level of risk premium discounting required by policyholders in order for them to 
place their business with the company, as well as the structure of'risk financing 
programmes. We are also able to explain the survival instincts by insurance 
companies, which are encapsulated by their desire to keep as far away from the 
knockout barrier as possible. The reason why insurance companies tend to hold excess 
capital than necessary is governed by their perception of the risk and the difficulties 
associated with hedging extreme values around the barrier. 
3.3A Modelling the Cost of Financing Contingent Liabilities Origination 
The intrinsic cost of trading risk is the Default put an insurance company is bound 
to face the moment it enters the business of trading risk. The intrinsic cost is looked at 
as the starting point of analysing insurance company profitability, since the various 
cost components are then used to inflate this distribution into a more encompassing 
distribution. The theory that underlies our analogy is based on the fact that the price of 
risk at (t = 0) is equivalent to the intrinsic value. We further assert that, given that risk 
is to be carried to settlement date t, the price at time zero should incorporate the cost of 
capital required to service this risk to settlement date. It is from this insight that we can 
segregate the intrinsic and time value components, in any insurance pricing contract. 
This distinction is important since insurance pricing currently concentrate more on the 
- 
Page 164 
- 
intrinsic value than the time value element, culminating to the under-pricing and 
failure of insurance companies to manage risks for the policyholders. 
Value creation over a holding period depends on the ability of management to 
capture costs associated with these components into the pricing of individual risks. 
These two components determine the level of capital required supporting a risk 
portfolio and its cost during the holding period. It is also apparent that these two key 
components should be targeted and controlled within an insurance company in order to 
stabilise pay-off profiles. The intrinsic and time value components vary from one risk 
holding period to another. That's why it is important to establish what the key drivers 
are as far as their impact on economic value volatility is concerned. This is done in 
order to effectively control risk in a portfolio by targeting volatility at its very source. 
It is within company cash flow patterns that risk can be pinpointed, controlled and 
new pay-off profiles engineered to alternatively and effectively finance risk. It has 
been observed that portfolios using integrated risk management systems are more 
stable in their earnings and capital structure, with the efficacy of reducing the cost of 
debt, and consequently the overall cost of capital (Doherty, 1997). To secure such a 
position risks should be measured and financed in an integrated manner, by striking a 
balance between the cost of capital and profitability 
Capital needed to carry a claim forward is referred to as risk capital. Merton and 
Perold (1993) defined risk capital, as the smallest amount that can be invested to insure 
the value of an insurance company's net assets against a loss in value, relative to the 
risk-free investment of those net assets. They argued that given fixed liabilities, 
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riskiness in net assets is similar to riskiness of gross assets and they both require the 
same risk capital. Capital required for internal control to support risk assumed could be 
defined by any of these methods; probability of ruin, policyholder deficit, Value at 
Risk, cost of float, cost of carry, or as the standard deviation (See Meyers, 1999). 
These methods derive from the intrinsic value component; a more comprehensive 
model is the one that take into consideration of the economic significance of default 
risk, which lead us to the following proposition. 
Proposition III: 
The cost of risk capital factored in liability contracts is a function of both default risk and 
hedge instruments used. 
Capital is required to support risks assumed by a company and is derived from 
premiums, equity and leveraged through engineered risk financing payoffs. It is a 
condition for entering the market to comply with minimum solvency and this cost is 
embedded in the intrinsic/fair price of every contract. The cost of minimal security 
capital should first be factored in the fair price of a contract as propounded by our 
model above. This is concordant with antecedent literature by Cummins (1991), Kim, 
Ramaswamy and Sundaresan (1993), Briys and De Varenne (1997) and Klein and 
Inglis (1999), who emphasised the importance of incorporating the cost of compliance 
when pricing contingent liabilities. 
It has been observed under this methodology that the prices computed are close to 
prices observed in practice than those computed using vanilla option pricing methods 
by Merton (1973), Cummins (1988) and Cummins, Allen and Phillips (1998). There is 
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no empirical literature on the pricing of insurance contracts that specifically isolates 
the cost of compliance as a primary constituent of a fair price, except for the proposal 
by Cummins (1991) on which he stressed the need for further research on the subject. 
Other literature quoted above is mainly based on the pricing of corporate bonds, which 
have striking similarities with insurance companies' contingent liabilities. 
Condition 1: 
The price of risk is equal to the intrinsic cost (credit spread) plus the cost of capital 
required carrying risk forward to claim settlement date. 
This is consistent with antecedent literature by Cummins (1991), Kim, 
Ramaswarny and Sundaresan (1993), Briys and De Varenne (1997) and Klein and 
Inglis (1999), who emphasised the importance of incorporating the cost of default 
when pricing contingent liabilities. Cummins, Allen and Phillips (1998) pointed out 
that liability prices computed under the option pricing methodology are close to prices 
observed in practice. Irrespective of the fact that they were using vanilla option pricing 
methods (Merton (1973), Cummins (1988) and Sommer (19996)) in deriving their 
prices, this methodology capture risks that have not been captured by the Myers and 
Cohen (1987) and other financial economics pricing methodology. 
Under the risk measurement model developed above insurance companies are 
obliged to keep their asset values above the knock-out barrier. This capital is a cost to 
the company because regulators will come in and take control of the firm even when 
assets are still greater than liabilities; that is why, the cost of risk capital should be 
accounted for in the fair price of insurance contracts. The cost exists ex ante, and every 
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company bears it in the business of trading insurance risk, which makes it an intrinsic 
part of any portfolio where insurance risk is assumed. 
The definition of a fair price is all encompassing in that not only did we 
incorporate underwriting risk but also other risks, and of importance, the incorporation 
of idiosyncratic risk in our discounting factors. This means the intrinsic value 
definition is not only based on losses, but also categorically accounts for the cost of 
entering the business of trading insurance risk. However, the definition of intrinsic 
value is relative in that it depends on a number of factors, the risk environment, risk 
appetite and the regulatory regime. The stricter the regulatory regime is, the higher will 
be the solvency threshold and the more costly will be the capital supplied due to a 
higher risk of default. This renders the cost of risk portfolios different, depending of 
course on the regulatory regime of the country and the expectations of rating agents. A 
general equation for the economic cost of carrying risk for an uncertain future 
settlement date is represented by equation (3.39) given below: 
no; t = Lo 
(1 + ic) 
and 
1C = 
(7rT 
+ rE 
(3.39) 
Where: 920; t = price of liabilities at (t=O) for delivery within time interval T; 
4= The intrinsic value of trading insurance risks or the expected 
value of losses; 
7CT = The credit spread derived using the option pricing model above; 
rE = Rate of return required by shareholders (CAPM based); 
ic = The ratio of cost of capital required supporting risk until 
delivery date, to the expected value of losses. 
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As elaborated above, the value of risk-frcc liabilities at time zero, is the present 
value of liabilities minus the default put option, DE(It, qt, r, T, cr). The advantages of 
using our extended option pricing methodology is its ability to capture the overall 
volatility in assets and liabilities through the portfolio risk parameter SIGMA (a) and 
the impact of early forced bankruptcy. This is an important element because we are 
able to detennine the level of risk in the portfolio, by taking into account the 
diversification effect across the lines, as well as the impact of safeguards brought 
about by the early bankruptcy option. 
3.3.4.1 Duration and the Price of Liabilities 
In this case, we are able to price the overall risk embedded in a portfolio through 
the quantity K, and the cost of capital attached to it. This variable is similar to that used 
by Cummins (2000) in allocating economic capital to insurance operations. The 
economic capital used in deriving "K" is obtained by dividing the default put to 
liabilities and equalising this result at a designated target rate. The role played by this 
quantity is that of measuring the capital required in order to maximise shareholder 
value in the firm, which makes this methodology consistent with financial pricing 
theory. It is apparent from the equation above that as the value of K, increases the 
value of the default put declines and the more equity dominates the pricing of the 
contract. If our proposition should hold, the following condition is also true. 
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Condition II: 
The distant price of liabilities is equal to the nearby cost of liabilities plus the cost of 
capital required to support the liabilities from a nearby to a distant settlement date. 
We express this condition by the following equation: 
91 
O, d 
ý- 91 
O, n 
(1 + 'Cd ), d>n (3.40) 
Where: QOn = the cost of risk at time zero for the nearby contingent liability 
recoverable in the time interval n. 
no, d = the price of liabilities at time zero for distant contingent liability 
recoverable in time interval d; and 
Kd = the percentage cost of servicing liabilities from time n to time d. 
This condition arises from the fact that insurers, when trading risk, seek not only 
to diversify away underwriting risk, but also to spread risk across time as in finite 
insurance. Therefore, the longer it takes to settle a liability the more its pricing 
I 
fundamentals derive from the cost of capital required to service it. Short tailed risk's 
pricing is fundamentally underpinned on the behaviour of underwriting risk or the 
intrinsic cost component, with the level of capital needed determined by volatility and 
the magnitude of aggregate losses. 
This brings out the fact that the price of any liability insured has two distinct 
components, namely its intrinsic value and the value-adding component. This analogy 
distinguishes two elements of volatility, the first one deriving from the underlying 
portfolio as it relates time and the second one the cost of capital also as it relates to the 
lock-up cost of time. Underlying volatility is brought about by the nature of assets and 
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liabilities in a risk portfolio; we call it the drift element of the assets and liabilities. The 
intrinsic value in any risk trading contract is used to cover the basic cost of liabilities, 
I 
whilst the value adding component is related to the role time plays in holding that 
contact to settlement date. 
Time volatility on the other hand is the effect which time has on the volatility of 
the net assets and liabilities of a risk portfolio, vis-a-vis capital needed to support the 
liabilities. The effect of time on volatility depends on the time lag between the 
assumption of risk and the settlement date. Therefore, provided the intrinsic cost and 
the cost of capital are well provided for, a risk trading contract is deemed to supply the 
required return on capital. This means that the elements of volatility which concerns an 
insurer are those pertaining to risk associated with the intrinsic cost and the cost of 
capital as they move in relation to the cost of borrowing funds from policyholders. 
If we are to account for the cost of capital required to support liabilities, then the 
discounting in the price should be done on the intrinsic cost component rather than the 
capital cost component. In order for our price to reflect what shareholders really 
require, when their funds are tied to liabilities with a long duration, the capital cost 
component should be higher than it would be for liabilities with shorter durations. 
Therefore, for liabilities with the same underlying intrinsic cost, their prices should 
differ in two ways. Firstly, the intrinsic cost component should be discounted to take 
into account the benefits of investment income. Secondly, the capital cost component 
should reflect the costs embedded in holding capital over a longer and risky holding 
period. 
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It is evident that more capital is needed to service a portfolio with a longer 
settlement time than the one with a shorter one, due to the level of uncertainty brought 
in by greater exposure to risks as to time. In order to allow for uncertainty embedded 
in the time element, companies have to operate at high solvency thresholds so as to be 
assured that volatility in losses would not eclipse the underlying pricing structure. 
Therefore, the efficient pricing of a risk portfolio entails the proper accounting of the 
cost of capital required to carry the risk from the nearby date to an uncertain date in the 
future. Long tailed risks require a longer-term commitment of capital; pre-empting 
greater exposure to stochastic risk elements brought in by time. The same can be said 
for portfolios affected by catastrophe risk, in that the intrinsic and capital cost 
components will be high because of the need to accumulate capital and the nature of 
risk factors. 
Our method of allocating capital according to the entire risk of a line, helps us 
capture the risk characteristics of each line and prompts different equity requirements 
across lines. This is based on the advantages of Myers-Reed's method and that of 
Bustic (1994) who allocated equity as a linear function of the line's betals, is also 
echoed by Cummins et al (2000) that they resolve the problem of optimal capital 
allocation by allocating all equity to line of business, since the weighted sum of lines 
of liability betas is unit. It is true that capital allocation per line of business is directly 
proportional to the correlation with the loss portfolio (puL) and inversely proportional 
to its correlation with the asset portfolio (PUA), Cummins (2000). 
Ll P LiL -ý-L' , Where: (y Li = Line's volatility parameter. CFL 
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An insurance company's risk levels increase as the correlation between a line of 
business and total liability portfolio increases. This implies that more equity is needed 
to carry the risk forward to loss settlement date (this subject is discussed in detail at the 
end of this chapter). This means that lines of business that have high-risk parameters 
will receive the same treatment with those that are highly correlated with the portfolio. 
Conversely, a high correlation between a line of business and that of assets require less 
capital, by virtue of the fact that the correlation between assets and liabilities is 
inversely related to the risk of the whole portfolio. The reason for this lies in the 
natural hedge that is created due to a positive correlation between assets and liabilities, 
which reduces the overall risk of the firm (Cummins, 2000). 
This point is certainly important when underwriting homeowners' policies in 
catastrophe prone regions, because risk underwritten from the same geographical 
location tends to correlate with the portfolio, increasing the absolute risk in the 
process. That is why it is important not to base our assessment entirely on individual 
line risk and inter-line diversification but the consideration of systematic risks 
resulting from the introduction of a line of business to the overall portfolio. Merton 
and Perold (1993) used a macro-finn capital allocation approach to argue that the 
stand-alone line allocation of equity is inefficient, in that it fails to take into account 
the effects of diversification. This approach is similar to our proposal, which asserts 
that capital allocation should be done on a marginal basis, by adding on a line of 
business to the portfolio, and measures the marginal capital required. 
Cr L= Entire loss portfolio's volatility parameter. 
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A macro-finn approach whilst theoretically appealing in as far as taking into 
account the effect of diversification is concerned, this method does not reflect the 
underwriting decisions taken in the insurance industry on a day to day basis. Lines of 
business are not simply added to the portfolio, but business comes in trickles, resulting 
in instantaneous changes in the liability as well as the risk profiles. This behaviour is 
more reflective of the micro changes in risk with respect to the trickles of business 
coming into the portfolio, a sensible idea because each set of assets derive from a set 
of liabilities, by tying their duration and convexity together. 
A micro approach to the way capital is allocated as it comes into the portfolio, 
originating from each line of business will mean the cost of capital will be actually 
factored in each contract written. It will also enable an insurance company to decide 
the optimal point at which it should stop writing more business in a line, given the 
rates prevailing in the market and the threshold which should be met. This approach to 
allocating capital which leads to optimal capital structures, high RAROC and EVAOC, 
is consistent with recent literature on the subject by Myers and Read (1999). Their 
methodology leads to 100 percent capital allocation to each line of business. 
Therefore, our methodology is an efficient and cost effective way of allocating capital, 
because the accumulation of excessive capital has taxation and free agency cost 
disadvantages. Since our methodology avoids these pitfalls through optimal capital 
allocation structures, this cost of risk management is limited. 
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3.3.4.2 Contingent Risk Financing and the Price of Liabilities 
What equation (3.39) portrays is that in every premium paid there is a cost of 
carry that is taken into account before value could be created. If the price charged for 
the holding period is not matched to the outflow at settlement date, value would be 
created or destroyed depending on whether liabilities are fairly priced, Lt :5 Vt. 
Equation (3.39) accounts for the internal cost that arises due to the need to comply 
with and guarantee that policyholders will recover their claims on promises sold to 
them by insurance companies. This cost is synonymous with the cost of borrowing 
funds from policyholders. A quality book lowers not only the cost of borrowing but 
also improves the value adding bounds of the insurer. 
As we will see from the empirical analysis, the risk cost of carry factored portfolio 
is only an absolute cost, which is controlled through risk financing and expense 
management. This leads us to our next condition on the impact of risk financing on the 
overall cost of risk management and the importance of attacking risk from the source. 
Condition III: 
Insurance companies' value creation bounds are a function of the cost structures and 
the cost of borrowing external capital. 
The cost of capital required to support assumed risk consumed should be in line 
with that of other players in the market. Otherwise, the cost of risk will not remain 
within the bounds of the insurer with the lowest cost structure. This means that as long 
as the price of risk drifts (Fig. 3.1) from the lowest bounds, insurers with the lowest 
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cost structures will start exploiting the value adding opportunity. This is illustrated in 
Figure (3.1), where the 45 degrees line gives the optimum price of risk and cost 
structures. Companies with low cost structures will exploit the quasi-value addition, 
the moment cost of risk curves begin to drift in either direction 19 
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'9 The objectives for mergers and acquisitions are designed to make operating bounds narrower, by reducing 
the cost of capital associated with transacting insurance risks. The thinner the non-cost saving bounds are the 
greater the probability of adding value given the price movements in the risk market This is implied by the 
potential to quasi-add value from a place and retain strategy or retain and carry strategy. Inter market 
correlation indicate that those trading in these markets ought to manage the cost of transacting risk in line 
with players in other markets in order to continue trading beyond the non-cost saving bounds. This is why 
French insurance companies are now using catastrophe bonds to finance risk, because it is cheaper than 
reinsurance and does not have any credit risk. The initial reinsurance programmes were exhausted by the 
2000 French storms, a cost, which was embedded in the risk factors bur not considered in the pricing. By 
using catastrophe bonds to supplement capacity, the risk of default is reduced, so also is the cost of risk. 
Therefore, cost structures derive not only the underlying perils insured, but also the instruments used in 
fmancing. Those companies that are efficient in both managing the physical risk and risk financing 
structures, will occupy the lowest cost structures. 
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Figure (3.1) gives us an illustration of how price drifts lead to quasi-value addition 
given a constant supply of risk capital and risk factors (default risk). The lower part of 
the diagram shows that insurers with low cost structures (CS2) will be adding value to 
shareholders wealth if price of risk (RPc) is equal to the intrinsic value (Risk Factors). 
However, those with high cost structures will be shading value, and have to 
compensate this through other areas where they have competitive advantage e. g. 
investment management or risk financing. In competitive insurance markets, the 
I intrinsic risk price curve is not a replica of the risk factors curve. It is represented by 
the region between curve RPe and curve RP2, which coincides with cost curves of 
insurance companies with low cost structures. Companies trading risk at cost curves 
CSe and CS2 will have to either consolidate or compete based on areas of their 
competitive advantage. 
Solvency thresholds affect the value adding bounds, in which insurance 
companies operate within. The cost of trading risk within the market is dependent on 
how best capital available is utilised to borrow funds from insureds at favourable rates 
and aid surplus at lower as well as stable costs. In order for an insurance company to 
I 
acquire risk for its retention theorem (III) defined by the following equation must be 
satisfied: 
LE (1 + K) ý: nE%t (3.41) 
Where: LE 
-'ý the intrinsic cost of risk grossed up for the cost structure of the 
insurance company. 
no; t = Price of liabilities taking into account grossed up intrinsic cost 
at time zero for delivery within time interval T 
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In equation (3.41) we factor the cost of transacting risk, which includes among 
other things, cost structure, taxation, limitations on investment instruments, negative 
impact of trading in the alternative market (e. g. derivatives), credit risk, liquidity risk, 
etc. The decision to originate liabilities depends not only on the cost of capital supplied 
by equityholders, but also risk capital bought from the risk financing markets. The 
overall cost of capital should enable an insurance company to trade within its value 
adding bounds, which are defined by the following equation (3.42): 
L 
El 
0+ 10: 5 fl 0, t :5L Eu 
(I + 1c) (3.42) 
The subscripts El and Eu in the equation are notations for lower and high cost 
structures respectively. The cost of transacting risk has a loosening effect on the price 
relationship elaborated in equation (3.42). The level risk a company assumes should be 
equivalent to the level of capital in the portfolio. Optimal capital allocated to risks 
assumed defines the lower bounds for adding value. The upper bounds are defined by a 
sub-optimal risk capital position that is able to maintain minimal return on equity to a 
company. An optimal capital-to-risk position generates the highest possible returns 
earned on any portfolio with similar risk characteristics. What makes an equity-risk 
position unique is the way risk characteristics are matched with risk financing 
techniques. The equity to risk position determines whether the company is optimising 
risk in the portfolio or not. It also helps define the return volatility structure of the 
firm, with those companies optimising their equity-risk positions having more stable 
portfolios. 
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3.3.4.3 The Value of Cash Flow Engineering to the Firm 
In their analogy, Mutenga and Dinenis (1999) pointed out that the cost of capital 
is company specific and follows the market trends tending toward that of the company 
with the lowest cost of capital structure, irrespective of the risk category. It is company 
specific because insurance companies have different cost structures in as far as 
transacting insurance risk is concerned. They observed that bounds also echo the 
relationship between company risk and cost of capital. Their analysis reveals that the 
cost of capital is a major factor in determining value creation, there was a significant 
relationship between the cost of capital and the cost structures under which companies 
operate. That is why we believe it is essential to manage the cost of transacting risk in 
order for a company to improve its value adding bounds. This cost of transacting risk 
advocated explains the whole process of insurance pricing, so it should be incorporated 
in pricing insurance contracts. 
Default risk is reduced through hedging arrangements that reflect the 
characteristics of underlying risky cash flows. In fact, value is added when capacity 
required to write business can be generated at a lower cost than the return of funds 
raised. Therefore, given that the cost of generating capacity should be lower than that 
of lending capacity, this relationship is given by the following condition (IV) defined 
by equation (3.43): 
LE (1 + 'CB): 5 nF (3.43) 
Where: rB = the cost of capital less the net cost risk financing; 
CIF = Price of liabilities after considering the net cost of risk financing. 
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As pointed above when pricing a portfolio of insurance risks, consideration should 
be also be taken on the other charge on capital supplied, the cost of renting capital to 
liabilities. This cost is considered in relation to the effect of hedging 20 on the level of 
capital released on the payoff profile and the cost of carry. It follows that when pricing 
primary contracts, the cost of engineering an optimal payoff profile should be 
incorporated, since this is part of the cost of servicing the risk presented. Capital 
supplied through cash flow engineering in order to leverage, is dependent on the 
characteristics of the risk portfolio, but from an economic point of view, it is 
determined by the cost of renting capital to liability accounts. 
Hedging insurance risks is a function of both the existence of default and the 
process followed by the default boundary. Hedging is the art of explaining and sizing 
the behaviour and attributes of underlying cash flows and minimising corporate risk 
premium spreads. Cost structures are the major determinants of profitability and 
internal capital generation, the more efficient they are managed the greater the 
possibility of generating internal capital at lower spreads. 
The current hedging techniques for insurance portfolios fail to explain the 
characteristics of insurance cash flows as divulged in volatility paths under the barrier 
option pricing methodology. Hedging the extreme values that are characteristic of 
barrier option cash flows is difficulty, due to the sign taken by gamma under different 
volatility paths. This makes it difficulty to hedge, due to the discontinuity of delta at 
the barrier. The discontinuity of delta means that the gamma is instantaneously infinite 
20 A general derivation of the cost of risk financing is by subtracting expected ceded premium from ceding 
commissions; and expected ceded losses. The denominator is obtained from the reduction in gross capital 
requirements resulting from the risk-financing payoff; otherwise, reduction in capital requirement is equal to 
risk financing. 
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at the barrier. This explains why it is costly and difficult to delta hedge insurance 
portfolios at the extreme value, and the bast hedging techniques. 
Insurance companies always attempt to generate capacity at a lower rate, than 
what they tend to earn from lending generated funds to asset accounts. Insurers need 
capital as security in order for them to raise funds through premiums and make sure 
that the policy provisions are met. Thus when generating capacity, the price an 
insurance company is prepared to pay depends on how much in terms of leverage it 
needs in order to optimise value addition. Therefore, the cost of creating capacity, the 
cost at which generated investment funds are borrowed and how much return is 
generated from these funds is important when deciding to use a risk-financing 
instrument. 
A general derivation of the cost of risk financing is by subtracting expected ceded 
premium from ceding commissions and expected ceded losses. The denominator is 
obtained from the reduction in gross capital requirements resulting from the risk- 
financing payoff-, otherwise, reduction in capital requirement is equal to risk financing. 
All that matters is the effectiveness of each instrument in as far as correlation between 
their payoff and portfolio losses in question is concerned. The cost of capital rented to 
liabilities should be stable in the long-run. This will help yield the required return 
within an insurance company's portfolio and establish an effective transfer pricing 
system. However, some risks by their very nature require more capital than others, this 
of course will be based on the loss distribution and capacity consumption rate. If 
buying capital to support a portion of risk assumed is expensive, from, say, the 
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reinsurance market, then those placing risk will retain more or seek placement in 
alternative markets, such action should generate cost savings. 
The level of savings generated is dependent on whether funding obtained can 
effectively better reinsurance, which currently scores high due to its standings at law. 
However, reinsurers tend to be reactive rather than proactive when it comes to the 
supply of such capital. On the other hand shareholders require those who manage their 
capital to be proactive, meaning they should not move with the tides. It is important for 
management to manage the cost of trading risk economically, since the cost of capital 
utilised to create various cash flows has a bearing on the level of profitability. The use 
of different instruments in sourcing contingent capital is mainly aimed at smoothing 
the cost component, thereby stabilising return. 
Traditional markets like reinsurance have a positive aspect, in that they receive 
favourable treatment at law than other alternative cash flow engineering methods. This 
makes them an expensive means of funding contingent claims and less appealing, 
hence making the capital provided by alternatives less competitive or equivalent. 
Market imperfections also make alternative risk financing instruments different from 
reinsurance as far as capital released is concerned. That is why it is difficult to adjudge 
arbitrage opportunities because the alternatives are not a replica. Partialities in 
treatment at law now per the regulatory framework mean that the level of capital 
released is not the same. 
Value is added if cost reduction is achieved by obtaining capital in alternative 
markets at lower rates than those prevailing in traditional markets. In perfect markets 
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the price of risk should be the same through out the markets supplying payoff- 
engineering funds; otherwise those purchasing such funds will arbitrage. Payoff 
engineering should also enable a risky portfolio to deliver stable rates required by 
those who sell risk, in exchange for securities to be delivered at settlement date. 
However, it is still possible to create value where the cost of risk in one market is 
lower than it is sold in another market, provided minimum solvability levels are met. 
Thus, with different price levels on the same tranche of risk in two markets releasing 
the same level of capital, an insurer can arbitrage by buying risk low and selling high 
in another market. In this case, an insurer can sell the burning cost of risk in the 
traditional market, thereby obtaining capital to service the risk at a lower price than 
would have been supplied to it by alternative markets. 
Payoff engineering helps insurers manage risk more effectively, in an integrated 
manner and helps them earn an acceptable holding period return on risk securities 
issued to insureds. Due to a high intrinsic value, the cost of capital required to finance 
catastrophic risks is high, making it difficult to source all the capital from the 
traditional reinsurance market. Seeking alternative sources of financing are all attempts 
to control the cost of capital supplied, so that the return could be earned on 
underwriting risks rather than from shareholder funds. This is what makes an insurer's 
payoff profile different from that of conventional investment trusts. This distinction of 
capital generation is important in as far as, understanding when an insurance company 
is justified to reduce prices to gain market share, because the cost of generating capital 
as pointed above depends on the instrument used. 
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The cost of capital to service risk is embedded in the risk characteristics of a 
portfolio and the cost of leverage funds to engineer the desired payoff profiles. A 
pOrtfOlIO Susceptible to catastrophic losses requires more capital and depending on the 
level of capital available in the market, there is a higher tag in terms of risk pl-CIIIILIIII. 
The level of capital required for a single catastrophic event in the US is now estimated 
at $100billion, whilst the insurance industry's equity and surplus is only $240billion. 
A loss of this magnitude will wipe away the insurance industry capital isation. Capital 
markets are capitalised at $33trillion, with an average daily standard deviation of' 
around the sarne figure as the capitallsation of the insurance industry. Makim, 
underwriting risks tradable in financial markets enhances the capacity of the insurance 
markets and brings transparency in the pricing of insurance risk. It will also bring the 
required equilibrium in the pricing of risk in insurance. However, the current 
i nsurance-I inked securities traded have a higher mark-Lip than the traditional 
reinsurance instruments. This is due to conflicting methods of pricing these risks; as 
well, there are few speculators prepared to take positions on these risks. 
FIGURE 3.2: INSURANCE OMPANY PAYOFFS WITH THE INTRODUCTION OF HEDGING 
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In Figure (3.2), the optimal a-a is the one that is more risky than the others, a 
reflection of the level of retention vis-A-vis capital levels in a portfolio. This portfolio 
is however desirable on the upside, unlike a conservative portfolio that under utilise 
equity compatible with risks in the underlying portfolio, as reflected in the gradient of 
the upside which is flatter and a less risky downside curve b-bl. An important factor 
here to note is the impact of hedging on the portfolios; firstly it turns a risky portfolio 
into an efficient one c-cl. It does improve the other portfolios but not to the level that a 
portfolio efficiently utilising retention-based instnunents is pegged, because the 
essence here is not just to reduce risk but to arbitrage risk-trading activity. 
The new payoff profiles are flat, given the assumption that the risk-financing 
programme works for each portfolio. The hedge is effective if it eliminates all the 
underwriting risk, unfortunately this is not the case since insurance risk hedge 
instruments only alter the gradient of the slope of the payoffs. The curve retain the 
downward slope due to the existence of some systemic and basis risk as there are 
clauses of co-participation on losses exceeding a certain ratio, reinstatement 
limitations, reinstatement premiums, event limitations, inflationary control clauses and 
credit risk arising from counter parties. If this cover is the best deal for an insurance 
company then the curve can not be flexed upwards further beyond the cost of risk 
factors. Thus, the gradient of the lower part of the curve detennines how effective the 
risk financing arrangement has been in providing the needed security, which might be 
at the expense of profitability on the upside. Thus the new upside and downside payoff 
can either be represented by curve "a-al", if the company is optimising its cash flows 
and curve "b-b I" if there is over protection. 
- 
Page 185 
- 
An attempt to retain more risk should be justified by the underlying strength 
provided by instruments used in altering the risk profiles. This is because, any increase 
in return means that a company would be assuming more risk. The risk assumption 
should be done when the company has a competitive advantage in carrying more risk 
than the party it wants trade risk with. The trend in the insurance industry is that 
companies are retaining more risk than ever before (Figure 2.4), hence, the marked 
reduction in business being reinsured. Instruments used in financing reiained risks are 
the one that enables the insurer to have more access to the investment income where 
good risks are rewarded. 
If a company has a competitive advantage in financing retained risk, then curve 
44c-cl" will be a more representative pay-off curve, where the curve tilts upwards 
(gradient increased). A point to be noted is that the break-even point assumed is now at 
a higher operating ratio, implying a better stability in returns from trading risk. 
Therefore, any risk-financing strategy endeavours to push and flex the pay-off profiles 
as far to the right as possible. The longer the lower curve (security) stays above the 
knock-out barrier; the more stable will be the results of the insurance company. 
Beyond this threshold is the non-value adding bounds, a point reached by many 
companies in the UK in 1992, when losses arising from mortgage indemnity claims 
eroded reserves. 
The figures (3.3 & 3.4) below elaborate cash flow alteration through the 
implementation of different techniques on an insurance risk profile, using curves more 
representative of insurance payoffs. The best results are obtained by utilising any of 
the instruments discussed above individually or in combination, depending on the 
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nature of underlying cash flows. It is interesting to note that from such cash flow 
profiling techniques, insurance companies can optimise their position by exploiting 
their competitive advantage in trading both the upside and downside risks. 
FIGURE 3.3: INSURANCE ompANY PAYoFF PRoFELEs UNDER TRADmoNAL HEDGING 
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The figures above show the impact of two risk financing programmes when 
applied to portfolios with distinct risk retention policies. The Post of each programme 
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is indicated by the level it occupies, with the cost effective one occupying the upper 
option profile and a more expensive the lower of the curves. The pay-off profiles 
above show that traditional risk financing techniques in their own right are inefficient 
in delivering the lowest possible costs of financing risk. A reinsurance-based 
instrument whilst delivering the desired correlation characteristics, it does not however 
totally alter the distribution of losses in the portfolio because of credit and systematic 
risk. The instrument only alters that part of the loss distribution efficiently funded by 
the arrangement; otherwise it does not effectively alter losses in the super-cat region. 
Figure (3.3) show this characteristic of reinsurance based instruments in the new 
pay-off profile which whilst deflecting the lower part of the curve of the curve 
upwards, the cost of over conservatism is paid by throwing away a lot of float. The 
risk financing programmes applied to the underlying portfolios are a reflection of cost 
structures and hedge effectiveness. Traditional methods are more expensive than 
integrated programmes, because they do not utilise equity efficiently, making the 
ultimate cost of capital high. Therefore, an effective financing integrated programme is 
bound to have a lower cost of capital structure, than the one that leaves gaps and 
exposes other equity components of the financial structure. 
In Figure (3.3) and (3.4) the two progranunes are applied to portfolios using 
different retention based techniques, with the result of payoff profiles with unique 
characteristics. A portfolio adopting a conservative policy is faced with an asymmetric 
payoff, of a flatter upside payoff and a steeper downside profile. This is due to the fact 
that an impaired internal capital generating potential, does not only affect profitability 
but also stability in the portfolio. An unstable portfolio will mean high marginal tax 
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rates, increased agency problem and a higher risk premium on equity funding risks in 
the portfolio. In our study, we discovered that companies with poor internal capital 
generation, usually experience capitalisation problems after a prolonged spell of 
experiencing such a problem. This is also observed in company economic value added 
(EVA) and market value added (MVA), as pointed out by (Mutenga and Dinenis, 
1999). 
Curves to the right are more efficient payoffs than the ones to the left, though they 
do not reflect the level of retention but the efficiency of equity embedded in the 
portfolios in question. Insurance companies use risk-financing instruments in order to 
stabilise their portfolios, this expectation is satisfied in Figure (3.4) by the curve that is 
flirther to the right. The unique characteristic of payoff profiles generated by cash flow 
engineering is the steeping of the upside, a stretched effect on the middle section and a 
flatter profile when the curve is tapering. The stretched middle section represents 
stability endowed in a portfolio, the longer this section stays over the knock-out barrier 
the more stable the portfolio will be and the shorter this profile will be the more 
volatile will be the portfolio. This is the most critical factor to look at when you are 
measuring the impact of cash flow engineering, it must stretch this region as far as 
possible. The cost of failing to achieve optimum payoffs could be measured by 
comparing the attained profile and what is deemed an optimal profile. 
3.4 Conclusion 
In Chapter, (2) we classified risks faced by an insurance company, in this chapter 
we isolate and use the grouped risks to derive the firm-wide risk. The model developed 
in this chapter presents a new risk measurement framework that incorporates the 
I 
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effects of solvency margins on the overall risk of firm. The model is developed from 
robust techniques, which have been used to measure default risk in corporate bonds 
and insurance companies alike. Our model is an extension to an already existing body 
of literature, which use option pricing to value insurance liabilities. This model 
provides a better measure of frimwide risk than models based on standard option 
pricing models, because it captures all the variables that determine cash flow 
variability in insurance companies. Furthermore, risk derived from the default put does 
not capture cash flows affecting shareholder interests only, but also risks that affect 
policyholders and spreads that insurance companies are prepared to pay, for investment 
funds. 
This model is empirically tested in Chapter (4), to establish the relationship of 
default risk and spreads derived from our model, to risk capital cost variability and the 
quality of operational profitability. We are able to show that this model is efficient in 
explaining the theorems proposed in this chapter. The only drawback with this model 
is its use of the normal distribution in modelling the loss distribution. It is not efficient 
at capturing risk embedded in the tails; enigma risk in insurance cash flows is better 
explained by Weibull or Pareto distribution. Irrespective if this, our model's efficiency 
in measuring firmwide risk is not diminished, because the liability classes manifesting 
cat risk characteristics only form part of the total loss distribution which is derived 
from different asset and liability accounts. 
This methodology is also a more practical approach to measure risk, as it captures 
the additional risk associated with illiquidity when the company trades close to its 
solvency threshold. This is a well-established phenomenon in barrier options that 
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volatility increases drastically as asset-to-liability ratios approaches the knockout 
barrier. We realise this phenomenon and that financial structure decisions are primarily 
based the level of solvency thresholds, and are made to believe that risk-taking 
behaviour is underpinned by solvency margin levels. That is why we incorporated 
solvency thresholds in our option-pricing methodology to capture this risk factor that 
has been missed by many insurance risk measurement models. The strength of our 
findings in Chapter (4) is a result of the incorporation of this factor, as you will 
discover. 
- 
Page 191 
- 
91 CHAPTER 4.
THE COST OF INSURANCE COMPANY 
RISK 
4.1 Introduction 
he purpose of this thesis is to explore and isolate the impact of default risk 
on the cost of carry and spreads paid by an insurer to its policyholders. 
The cost of carry is the amount that an insurance company pays! for a unit of 
investment funds borrowed from policyholders. In this chapter we look at the 
empirical evidence using the model developed above to be established whether default 
risk and the safety margins introduced by the regulators affect the cost of carry and 
incidentally the behaviour of constituents of the profitability profile of an insurance 
company, and if it does to what extent. 
We also develop a transfer pricing system, which we consider necessary for 
improving performance in property/casualty insurance companies, based on the 
observations, and conclusions raised in this thesis. This thesis also establishes the link 
between the insolvency put, the cost of carry and the investment return. This chain is 
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the driving force for sustainable performance in an insurance company, because 
instability in any of these variables either increases the cost of equity, or destabilises 
the whole portfolio and ultimately drags down return on equity with it. As you read 
the chapter you will realise that the quality of investment return is a function of the 
cost of carry as this is considered a good measure of quality in the underwriting book. 
Therefore, volatility in the cost of carry is always reflected in the overall return on 
average invested assets, because funds invested in assets are tied to liabilities. 
We have seen that the success of Berkshire Hathaway is underpinned by its cost 
of float/cost of carry management, as this ratio determines what it takes to acquire a 
unit of investible funds. This ratio is a measure of the quality of underwriting as it 
contributes to investment funds, which makes it a critical ratio, because profitability is 
determined by the quality of underwriting and investment cash flows. Through this 
ratio we are be able to pinpoint that the under-perfonnance of property and casualty 
insurance companies against the S&P 500 and other indices is more to do with the 
quality of underwriting cash flows than merely limiting the argument to excessive 
capital. The reason behind performance is not merely underpinned in the disparities to 
the costs of borrowing as compared to other financial institutions, but the quality of 
cash flows relative to the risks these sub-sectors face. Therefore, the cost of carry is at 
the heart of insurance companies' operations, because a company that does not have 
good underwriting cash flows is more likely to fail in the long run, even though its 
investment earnings might be stable. The length of time before a company with poor 
underwriting cash flows fails depends on the quality of investment income and the 
magnitudes of cancerous cost of carry structures. 
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The cost of carry has been ignored as a performance measure, in preference to 
absolute factors like the combined and operating ratios. Whilst we are not disputing 
the potency of these factors in performance measurement, this paper puts the cost of 
carry at the forefront of financial indicators attributing profitability to the way cost 
structures are efficiently managed in insurance companies. Ratios capturing the 
absolute performance of underwriting structures like the combined ratio do not 
actually tell us what it costs us to underwrite the next risk, but relative terms like the 
cost of carry enable us to see the potential profitability of the next generated unit of 
investible funds. The level of borrowed funds affects the ratio propounded in this 
paper more than the magnitude of combined ratios, because the cost of borrowing 
increase with each unit of investment funds generated beyond the equilibrium point. 
This point does not diminish the importance of combined ratios, our aim is to extend 
the platform on which underwriting profitability is measured and develop tools that 
enable companies to easily define and isolate costs inherent in their portfolios. 
The cost of carry is an important quantity in as far as the quality of cash flows is 
concerned, because insurance companies unlike investment trusts; generate wealth 
through funds originated from underwriting activities. This quantity enables insurance 
companies to identify lines of business they can arbitrage liability risk, those they have 
to exit or keep in order to diversify away certain risks and balance their portfolios. The 
fact that we are computing the cost of carrying a risk forward to settlement date makes 
it easy to link and compare this to quantities like the cost equity, risk free rate of 
borrowing, the cost of funds in other markets and whether investment income is 
enough to cover the cost of borrowing. It can be said that the cost of carry is the 
amount paid to policyholders for the cost of default, the costs are in the fonn of 
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spreads reflecting premium to be paid for the value of the put option shareholders hold 
against the value of the firm. 
Merton's default model envisages that the value of equity increases by virtue of a 
put option that allows shareholders to transfer wealth from policyholders when things 
go pear shaped, by virtue of the limited liability option. This asymmetric nature means 
that shareholders can walk away if the value of assets falls below the value of 
liabilities, leaving human equity without jobs, and policyholders with a depleted 
portfolio and individuals having recourse to guarantee funds. Therefore, whilst the 
default rate brought about by increased risk in a portfolio reduces the value of debt on 
one hand, and increases the value of equity and the cost of carry with it on the other. 
This prompts policyholders to require insurance companies to pay them a premium 
commensurate with the risk of default, a value well captured in the cost of carry 
methodology. Thus the lower the asset levels the more expensive it will be to borrow 
money from the policyholders, since the high cost of carry ratios are reminiscent of 
poor underwriting cash flows. 
The under-performance of insurance companies against other financial institutions 
has been linked to excessive capital, principally correct, but we believe this is more to 
do with cash flow quality rather than by just reducing the size of portfolios. We have 
more to leam from the artefacts of the cost of carry, than we have attributed to the 
celebrated measures like the combined and operational ratios. The slumps in return and 
underperformance of insurance companies linked to tight margins are conspicuous in 
this ratio, as well as the impact of catastrophic losses and underwriting cycles. This 
factor can easily and reliably be used as a measure of liability risk because movements 
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in borrowing costs are always captured in the overall profitability profile and the 
quality of underlying cash flows. 
4.2 Data and Methodology 
In this section, we specify the variables and the data that will enable us to do an 
empirical analysis on the influence of the cost of carry. We first outline our sample and 
data sources before we move on to the specification of variables necessary for the 
computation of our statistic and analysis. Our analysis is based on company data rather 
than market figures because the purpose of this analysis is to improve internal controls 
in an insurance company and the establishment of efficient internal financial 
structures. Another reason for not considering market data is that very few 
property/casualty insurance companies publicly trade on the London Stock Exchange, 
that they will not constitute a good sample. The methodology used help establish the 
relationship between the quality of underwriting cash flows and borrowing costs, and 
underlying risks as captured by spreads in the cost of default. 
41.1 Endogenous Variables: 
- 
Risk and 
41.2 Return Estimations 
The data sets used in this study are the UK General Insurance Companies 
Analysis data is obtained from A. M. Best International data CD-ROM version 7.7 
published in November 2000, and the DataStream financial data is obtained online 
from DataStream financial data updated everyday. UK Insurance companies data 
obtained is for the period 1981 to 1999, though our analysis is based on the period 
1986 to 1998. This sample period chosen eliminates companies which were in 
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operation in 1981 but have cease operations as the sample period progresses. It also 
helps us include new concept and specialist companies like Directline, DAS and 
Independent Insurance Company which have outperformed the traditional insurance 
companies since they commenced their operations. These companies started operating 
around the period 1984 to 1986; our sample period choice enables us to capture risk 
characteristics associated with all the players in the London market today. Data 
obtained from this source is drawn out from statutory annual accounts filed by insurers 
with the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). 
The sample period chosen also enables us to avoid distortions brought about by 
the mergers and start-ups occurring mainly after 1995. This entails that companies 
recently formed due to mergers in the LJK in the past few years are not included, as 
these do not satisfy the five-year or ten-year selection criteria. In 1998 and 1999, a 
total of 344 and 323 companies respectively traded on the London companies market, 
of which only 13 companies are composites forming our initial population. Companies 
that meet our ten-year period selection criteria were 316 (See Appendix: A for the list 
of companies considered in this study). These samples are larger than those used by 
Cummins, Allen and Phillip (1997) in their analysis with only 90 companies and 315 
observations of which only 270 were for the whole five-year period. Our data gives us 
at most 3,160 observations for each variable for the ten-year sample period. The 
number of observations in our sample is sufficient to give us robust results, since the 
number of observations is larger than those used in recent insurance literature, 
Cummins, Allen and Phillips (1997) and in Ronn and Verma (1987) where only 43 
banks were used in assessing volatility in banks using option pricing methodology. 
The data extracted from underwriting results, technical reserves, surplus, assets, 
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liabilities and pre-tax return are explained in detail under the specific sections defining 
the variables. 
For composite companies, only the general business statistics is considered, and 
the data is easy to extract since regulatory authorities require separation in the 
accounting of these businesses. The criteria set for the selection of a company in our 
data set is based on the companies having been trading as an authorised insurer in the 
London market for the entire period and their financial data being recorded on the 
A. M. Best Companies analysis CD-ROM published in November 2000. This is 
necessary for the computation of liability growth rates. 
4.2.2.1 Liability Growth Rates 
Liability growth rates are calculated using market loss data for each line of 
business as reported in the statutory accounts. UK statutory accounts record eleven 
lines of business namely Health and Accident, Property, Motor, Marine, Aviation, 
Miscellaneous and Pecuniary, Transportation, Third Party Liability, Proportional 
Treaty, Non-Proportional Treaty, and Marine, Aviation and Transportation (MAT) 
Treaty. These classes are grouped into two major accounts depending on the duration 
of liabilities irrespective of the line of business. In the statutory accounts as recorded in 
A. M. Best data tapes, each line of business is accounted in either one year or three year 
account. These accounts are used to distinguish both premiums and liabilities falling in 
short tail classes from those falling in long-tail classes. This classification means that 
liabilities, losses incurred and premiums are properly classified according to the 
average time period it takes to settle losses. This approach is therefore, based on the 
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predominant feature of liability characteristics rather than an approximation on the 
volume of losses settled within a specified period. 
The classification based on one-year and three-year account basis is also 
supported by the argument of the volume of losses settled before or after three years, 
which is more than 80% for these accounts, respectively. The information pertaining to 
the duration of liabilities in each class was obtained from the total claims paid percent 
to total claims paid and outstanding for one-year and three year account triangles. This 
type of classification is common in insurance and has been used in insurance literature 
to capture risk characteristics associated with each group. The method of classification 
used in the UK reduces errors of misclassification than those based on estimations. 
The only shortcoming with this grouping methodology is our inability to account for 
fat tails, common in classes prone to catastrophic risk contamination. 
The computation of liability growth rates is based on the losses incurred market 
data for the one-year and three-year accounts. This is consistent with a body of 
actuarial and financial economics literature, since the aim is to eliminate non- 
synchronous characteristics of individual companies' data. The main assumption here 
is that insurance companies are price takers and do not have any influence on the 
overall rates charged in a competitive market. Thus, in order to compute growth rates 
that are likely to be repeated in the future, insurance market data is used in the 
computation of yearly growth rates for each account. Liability growth rates are 
calculated by taking the natural logarithms market total incurred losses for year T, and 
T-1, given by 
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-,: 
In(L ýlLiT-l 
) 
(4.1) 
Where: rLit = growth rates on liability class i, and 
Lit = loss index value of liability class i, at year T. 
Annual data representing the index for incurred losses is used because there is no 
comprehensive quarterly recorded data for each company. The use of quarterly 
recorded data would substantially improve the quality of our results, and move us 
closer to the assumptions in our model; however, the use of annual does not 
t 
significantly affect the purpose of our empirical analysis. The proportions for each 
company's liability account is based on total for losses outstanding and loss 
adjustment expenses (LAE) reserves, unearned premium reserves (UPR), unexpired 
risk provisions (URP), IIBNR provisions and acquisition costs provisions for each year 
constituted. The provisions for each year for account of business are divided by the 
total for one-year and three-year accounts to obtain the liability allocations for each 
account for each year. The proportions of liabilities in each of the portfolios is then 
multiplied by market growth rates obtained in equation (4.1), to obtain annual liability 
growth rates for each company, for each year and for each account of business. The 
liability growth rates for each of these two accounts are abbreviated L, IBGRO1 and 
LIBGRO3 for short tail (one-year account) and long tail (three-year account) lines of 
business, respectively. Line growth rates obtained for each company and account of 
business are summed up to obtain annual liability portfolio growth rates. This is the rL 
derived in Chapter (3), it is used in adjusting the risk-free rate when computing the 
insolvency put and default spreads. 
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4.2.2.2 Asset Retums 
I 
The data central to the computation of asset returns and the risk-free rates is 
obtained from two sources the DataStream Online files and A. M. Best UK General 
Insurance Companies Analysis CD-ROMs. The main factor that influences our choice 
of data on assets from Datastrearn is based on the way assets are classified on the 
statutory DTI accounts. Unlike the liabilities assets on UK insurance companies' 
balance sheets are not classified according to their duration, but on the type of security. 
The dilemma we face is that we do not know the duration of variable and fixed interest 
securities which are just classified into these major groups. Therefore, our 
classification is based on the approach used in statutory accounts, by classifying assets 
into five major groups, namely Fixed Income Securities, Variable Income Securities, 
I 
Equities, Real Estate and Insurance debtors. 
We assumed that insurance debt, mainly represented by balances due from 
brokers and other insurance companies receives a rate of return equal to zero since no 
interest is paid. This argument is consistent with mainstream insurance literature, 
meaning there is no total return index representing return on insurance debt. If we use 
this assumption it eliminates insurance debt from our analysis of return on assets and 
asset risk. This makes our risk measurement method incomplete, because balances 
from agencies still carry credit risk. In order to cater for this phenomenon, the total 
return index is based on the 90 days NCDs, because duration of this type of insurance 
debt is usually equal to three months. Even though this will be a negative return 
account it gives us the return and risk structure of these insurance debts. 
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The grouped assets for each company for each year are added together to obtain 
annual totals, from 1986 to 1999. The annual asset portfolio totals are used to obtain 
the asset allocation in each year by dividing it by each asset grouping constituting the 
portfolio for each year. Market asset data used in computing returns was obtained from 
the FTSE Real Estate Index, the Financial Times Fixed Interest 
- 
price index 
(FTFixed), the FTSE-All Share Index, and the FTA British Government Index Link 
five year price index from 1985 to 1999. The reason for using asset indices is based on 
the assumption that insurance companies have perfectly diversified portfolios that 
closely resemble the index of each of the asset they are investing in. Furthermore, in 
competitive markets insurers are price takers meaning they do not have any influence 
on the prices offered in these markets. Quarterly market data is used to compute 
returns on each asset class by taking their natural logarithms for quarter t, and t-1, 
given by 
rA,, 
= 
In(Ay. 
itj 
(4.2) 
1 
Where: rAil = return on asset i, at quarter t; and 
Ait, = index value of asset i, at quarter t. 
Adding returns for each quarter and taking their average figure for the year 
annualises these returns. The annual figures are then multiplied by asset proportions to 
obtain asset returns for each company based on its portfolio allocations. Thus, asset 
returns for each year for an insurance company are determined by its investment 
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policy, as reflected in the asset allocations. The same procedures are followed when 
computing asset risk, which is determined by asset allocations. 
4.23 Portfolio Risk 
The model developed in Chapter (3) points to carry spreads paid by insurance 
companies to originate investment funds as a function of the risk inherent in the 
company. In this section we take the necessary steps required to measure portfolio risk, 
so as to test empirically the implications of the developed theoretical methodology. 
Since our concern is on internal controls, we are looking at balance sheet risk 
measures, as they influence the carry or default spreads. This is a sensible measure due 
to limitations in market data on stock trading insurance companies in the UK; very few 
companies trading insurance risk are listed on the London Stock Exchange. It is 
therefore necessary to assess risk embedded in balance sheet cash flows, since all the 
stakeholders assessing the strength of each company use the balance sheet and 
statutory accounts in their analysis. One such group that uses statutory data to assess 
risk embedded in insurance cash flows are the rating agencies. 
Our computation of internal cash flow risk measure is consistent with the model 
presented in Chapter (3), and option pricing methodologies in Briys et al (1998), 
1 
Cummins and Danzon (1997) and Sommer (1996). This study extends the option 
pricing methodology to the examination of the effect of solvency margins in 
computing the insolvency put and ultimately default spreads. It captures not only the 
stochastic nature of liabilities ingrained in liability growth rates, but also a stochastic 
knockout barrier, and more importantly absolute risk embedded in contaminated 
portfolios. It enables us to investigate the relationship between the cost of carry and 
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risk-taking activities within a company given the existence of implicit and explicit 
bankruptcy costs. We use the risk parameter obtained from our multi-line/asset option- 
pricing model in Chapter (2), given as follows: 
dd 
SIGMA = 2: 2: (ý7., i CrAj+ CLiaLi) 
- 
2a, 
4iC; 'LIP, 4V (4.3) 
i-I j-1 
Where: SIGMA = Portfolio Risk Parameter. 
The problem with the data we obtained is that assets are not matched specifically 
to liabilities due to general balance sheet data on assets, which makes the computation 
of a portfolio risk parameter difficult. It is also difficult to ascertain the investment 
policy of a company, but in order to be consistent with previous literature we assume 
that every insurance company matches assets to liabilities based on their duration. We 
go on to do the estimates of volatilities in assets, and liability accounts using market 
returns and growth rates computed using equation (4.1) and (4.2) above. Proportions of 
asset and liability accounts are used to calculate the share of risk based on the portfolio 
allocations. This means that risk in each company depends on the variations in the 
portfolio asset and liability mixtures annually for each company. The measurement 
method is consistent with financial literature as propounded by Cummins and Sommer 
(1996) and helps us in testing our hypothesis on the efficiency of insurance companies 
transfer pricing systems. 
The covariance matrix elaborated in Chapter (3) was produced to account for the t 
co-movement among asset indices and liability indices, and between assets and 
liabilities market indices. This results in us obtaining asset (liability) risk parameter 
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after only taking into account individual asset (liability) risks and their covariance, and 
the portfolio risk by accounting for these risk parameters and the covariance between 
the asset and liability accounts. The risk parameter obtained from our computation is 
used in computing both the insolvency put and the default spreads using following 
equation. 
YSPRE 
=-1 In I-PE(It, l) + PE(qt, (4.4) T[ 
yqt] 
I 
Where: YSPRE = Default or Policyholder Deficit Spread for a Standard Default 
Spread (SDSPRE) or for an Early Default Spread (EDSPRE). 
This risk parameter could also be used as a regressor in our regression model 
presented in equation (4.4), to test our hypotheses specified in chapter three. The use 
of the risk parameter SIGMA as a regressor helps us account for risk information 
pertaining both to liabilities and assets and provides a better measure of portfolio risk 
than the one used by regulatory authorities in the EU or USA. However, the overall 
finn risk as represented by the insolvency put (surplus deficit) provides a better 
I 
measure, since it does not only take into account portfolio risk for assets and liabilities 
but also the risk embedded in the leverage and solvency margins. 
Another piece of information required in the calculation of both the insolvency 
put and the default spreads are the asset-to-liability ratio (It) and the early default ratio 
(qt). The data on both assets and liabilities are obtained from assets and total liabilities 
as reported for the same period on the financial accounts as recorded in the A. M. Best 
international General Insurance Companies Analysis CD-ROM. The first ratio is 
obtained by dividing the book value of assets with the book value of liabilities for each 
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year. The purpose of this ratio has been pointed out as an indicator of gearing in a 
portfolio. In the absence of early default solvency margin this ratio represents 
Cummins's default put option. In order to take into account the impact of solvency 
requirements by regulatory authorities the required solvency ratio on the statutory 
accounts is used to represent qt. These two variables are important in the demand for 
insurance especially from the corporate quarters, which is more concerned with the 
level of capitalisation of the company. These variables are important because 
insurance markets are so responsive to changes in safety levels, so their stability is 
important since they influence spreads paid when borrowing funds from policyholders. 
Our model requires us to risk-adjust the risk-free rate as denoted by Treasury Bills 
(TBs) for asset accounts and by the liability growth rates (rL) for liability accounts. 
The information on the risk free rate is obtained from DataStrearn British Government 
3 months TBs returns. The total value of liability growth rates 21 for each year is the 
annual weighted average of liability growth rates for each company. The risk-adjusted 
figure is then used in the computation of the insolvency put and the default spreads as 
propounded in chapter three. 
The procedure in Chapter (3) is followed in the computation of both insolvency 
put and default spreads, by feeding the empirical information into the. option pricing 
models. The values for d, to d4 are first obtained, before DE(lt) and DE(qt) are 
computed using the normal distribution function in excel for the 'N's. The figures for 
DE(lt) and DE(qt) are then used to compute the standard insolvency puts and default 
21 A detailed account on the computation of liability growth rate is given in Cununins (1988), and the 
following formula shows how risk-adjusted discount rates are obtained: 
r, = rf 
- 
(ZLI 
rL. ++zL, rL, ) 
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spreads, and the early default option puts and spreads, for each company, and for each 
year. It is apparent from the model that both the puts and spreads obtained are more 
representative of the risk profile of the firm, since they incorporate all the components 
that detennine the riskiness of a finn. While the insolvency put reveals the risk 
perception from the policyholder's view point, spreads represent the risk premium 
required for investing funds in that portfolio. The reason for this argument about 
spreads is elaborated in the next section, which specifies the dependent variable used 
in this analysis. 
Through this model we are able to show that the solvency level influences risk- 
taking activity in an insurance company. It has been pointed that the higher the 
solvency margins, the lower the value of equity due to higher insolvency put values as 
a result of the early default option value. It therefore, means that if a, company is to 
retain cheaper internal generated funds it has to control its portfolio risk, in the process 
reducing spreads paid on borrowed funds. In order to substantiate our proposition on 
the impact of solvency margins on the overall risk taking activity within a company, 
we use standard option pricing in our computation of the insolvency put and carry 
spreads and the extended version proposed in this thesis. This enables us to effectively 
isolate the impact solvency margin has on the cost of carry, by comparing the results 
of the two methods. 
4.2.4 The Explanatory Variable: 
- 
Cost of Carry Estimations. 
In this section we specify our dependant variable, which is composed of two 
components, the cost of float and return on invested assets. The reason for requiring 
Where rp - portfolio risk adjusted rate; rf risk free rate; Zu = proportion of liability i, to the whole 
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these components to be present at the same time is that not only are liability growth 
rates considered in the model but also asset returns in the computation of risk. This 
means that liability growth rates will not be considered as regressors in our analysis, 
because they have already been accounted for in the model. Our approach differs from 
that of Cummins et. al. (1997) who incorporated liability growth rates in the 
regression, even though it was used in the risk adjustment process in the model. We 
will use fewer variables in our regression model than those used in previous studies 
since we believe our model is all encompassing for regressors; insolvency puts and 
default spreads which explains most of the variability in insurance cash flows. 
The first component of our dependent variable, the cost of float (COF), is used to 
measure the quality of the cash flows from the underwriting side. It represents the cost 
of borrowing funds from policyholders. These funds are treated as liabilities in 
financial statements, because they are a legitimate property of policyholders, obliging 
insurance companies to pay a certain percentage denoted by COF to the owners of 
these funds. This liability on insurance books termed, float or carry, proyides insurance 
companies with funds for investments, in return for the risks assumed under the 
contracts. In fact these funds recorded as technical funds on insurance companies' 
books have been a major contributor (80%) of investment funds for insurance 
companies, according to the AM Best Averages and Aggregates USA 
Property/Casualty statistics for the period 1938 to 2000. This is the essence of being in 
insurance business 
- 
arbitraging underwriting risks. A ratio that incorporates these 
funds captures the cost embedded in utilising the funds; a better measure of prudence 
portfolio; and ru = growth rate of Liability i. 
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than combined ratios and enables a company to set-up effective risk transfer pricing 
systems. 
The percentage rate that insurance companies pay in order to secure investment 
funds is a product of the underwriting result divided by the technical reserves (See 
equation 4.6). This is the cost of carry or precisely the cost of borrowing funds from 
policyholders. The numerator is a net figure of what is actually paid to the 
policyholders for putting their faith in the company and denominator the level of funds 
that belongs to them. 
COF,,, 
= 
Lt+, 
-Pt+l X100% (4.6) Ut+l 
Where: COF = the cost of float; 
P= premiums earned net of risk financing expenditure; 
L= liabilities (incurred losses net of risk financing payoffs and 
expenses); 
U= technical reserves. 
Another way of defining the numerator is to visualise it as beingnet cash flows 
paid by policyholders in exchange for contingent risk capital. If this net figure is 
negative it entails that an insurance company is actually paying policyholders for 
holding their funds and if positive, these funds will be generated at a negative implied 
interest rates. The higher insurance companies pay policyholders the less will be their 
ability to generate large Sharpe ratios, leading to less flexible financial structures and 
constrained internal capital generation. This method of computing the cost of liabilities 
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has been used successfully by Berkshire Hathaway in defining the quality of 
underwriting cash flows. 
The data that is used to compute this ratio is extracted from A. M. Best UK 
General Business Data CD-ROMs published in November 2000. Data is extracted 
from the Revenue Account and Balance Sheet of both one-year and three-year 
accounts, from the declared underwriting results and General Business Reserves for 
the years 1985 to 1999. Ratios for each company and for each year are then obtained 
by dividing the underwriting results by the figure for borrowed fund to compute the 
cost of borrowing expressed as a percentage. 
The second component is the return that is generated on borrowed funds, termed 
return on invested assets (ROIA). This measures the average return on the company's 
invested assets by dividing the company's annual net investment income by the mean 
of the net invested assets. In the same vein, data used in the computation is obtained 
from the Revenue Account and Balance Sheets. The ratio obtained is then added to the 
cost of borrowing to obtain the explanatory variable used in the regression model 
specified below. Another way of looking at this variable from the point of view our 
option-pricing model is to consider it as a return on policyholders' surplus otherwise 
termed cost of carry (CCRRY) in this analysis. This measures the overall company's 
profitability from underwriting and investment activity after tax divided by the mean 
of prior and current year-end surplus. This should represent a good, proxy for the 
spread generated from our model, viewed from the policyholder's point of view. Our 
empirical analysis is done using a regression model and is specified in the next section. 
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4.3 Analysis and Results 
In this section we test the ramifications of the model we developed in Chapter (3), 
by carrying out a number of empirical tests. We establish the relationship between the 
cost of carry and risk, and default-spread and the level of protection provided by 
solvency margins. In order to achieve this we run regressions for each financial year 
for both accounts with solvency margin restrictions and those without such 
protections. The variables used in our regression have been expounded above, the 
summary statistics of which are presented below and the result of our analysis in the 
ensuing sections. This analysis will also enable us to isolate the importance of efficient 
transfer pricing systems, capital allocation, risk financing systems and the 
development of recommendations with regards to findings. 
43.1 Descriptive Statistics 
We report descriptive statistics for all the variables used in this study in Table 
(4.1). The average portfolio risk for insurance companies during the period is 0.27. 
This compare with volatility figures for publicly traded insurance companies based on 
USA data of 0.379 and implied volatility of 0.115 on studies by Cummins, Allen and 
Phillips (1997). The main account that contributes to portfolio volatility is the 
liabilities account, rather than assets account. This is due to internal contarnination of 
insurance liability portfolios arising in catastrophic years, which tend to magnify the 
level of volatility. The assets account on the other hand, is composed of diversified 
portfolios mainly invested in fixed income securities that are more stable. This 
confirms the need to control liability accounts by using transfer pricing systems. There 
is greater variability in the level of risk in liability accounts mainly based on the lines 
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of business, as short-tailed lines are more volatile than long-tailed lines. The same 
story is inferred from the liability growth rates, which show that short-tailed accounts, 
have higher liability growth rates than long-tailed lines. This is quite consistent with 
duration features and pricing practices in the insurance industry, which tend to affect 
short-tailed lines more than the long-tailed lines. 
The values of standard and early default put options are 8.98 million and 51 
million respectively. These are 1.07% and 6.109% of average policyholder surplus 
respectively. The average figures, of course, vary from company to company and are 
quite high for EDPUT in years with catastrophic losses. As expected, the default put 
that incorporates the effects of solvency thresholds is higher than the standard one, 
which confirms the notion that solvency margins increase the cost of default on 
Equityholders. Therefore, solvency thresholds increase the overall risk of a firm, by 
virtue of the option to an early default. It also confirms the notion that solvency margin 
levels determine not only the risk taking behaviour of insurance companies but also the 
ultimate capital levels. This also includes economic capital, which imposes greater 
capital requirements with its primary reference being the equity requirements imposed 
by the solvency threshold. 
Default spreads paid on standard default risk are on average 
-0.035, whilst those 
paid on the early default spread (EDSPRE) are 
-0.229. This shows that policyholders 
are prepared to pay less when there are no safety margins in place and they are quite 
high when there is protection. We believe that by using 'A' equivalent rating as the 
solvency margin the spreads paid by policyholders for insuring with a company with 
greater protection will be higher than those with protection based on regulatory 
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solvency margins. Spreads computed using EDSPRE are also closer to the cost of float 
are observed in practice, averaging 0.203 during catastrophic years when most 
insolvencies occur and 0.05 during good underwriting years. Our study therefore, 
confirms the importance of solvency margins in both determining firm risk and 
spreads paid by policyholder for contingent securities sold to them. 
Table 4.1: Results 
- 
DescriDtive Statistics 
Notation Observ- 
ations 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic 
Cost of Carry CCRRY 3160 
-1619 2782.4 8.6932 4.0509 132.0748 
Return on 
P/holder Surplus 
ROPI IS 3160 
-12425 26834.9 6.0604 1 2.697 640.6657 
Net Premium to 
Asset Ratio 
NPRASS 3160 
I 
-131131.6 211789 93.7145 61.9449 3072.3678 
Standard 
Insolvency Put 
SDIPUT 3160 
-605088.007 26269.82828 -8984.097676 642.4373574 31993.12239 
Insolvency Put 
- 
Early Default 
EDPUT 3160 
-2785698.01 21269.61131 -51045.13978 3162.501685 154898.0283 
Default Spread 
Standard 
SDSPRE 3160 
-1.471591 1.506911 3.5183618E-02 2.5499483E-03 8.3254934E-02 
Spread With Early 
Default Option 
EDSPRE 3160 
-0.912911 1.666795 -0.22907252 5.4106391E-03 0.17305589 
Asset Risk ASIGNU 3160 0-00N9 0.02537 5.215584E-03 6.220069E-05 
. 
1.0.12240E-03 
Liability Risk I. SIGIUN 3160 0.108967 0.388554 0.15193842 1.401180411-03 4.3930971E, 
-02 
Portfolio Risk SIG, vLk 3160 1 0 0.492724 0.27244486 1.0259838E-02 0.18353355 
Liab/Asset Ratio ASSUBR 3160 0.0343 4.51316 0.6630376 7.3.15240E-03 0.2391666 
Short Tail Risk 
Adjusted Rate 
STRAR 3160 
-0.05587 1.14011 0.1566805 4.92277211-03 0.1607268 
Long Tail Risk 
Adjusted Rate 
LTILXA 3160 
-0.06798 
I 
1.10153 0.132966 4.731031E-03 0.1544665 
Rate of Return on 
Inv. Assets 
ROIA 3160 
-14.23943 119.89796 6.2594111 0.1283099 6.3743028 
Policyholders' 
Surplus 
SFUNDS 3160 
-14.13378 33950500 835586.9 191328.3 3438.591 
Total Assets TASSETS 3160 653.5 4684776 230988.7 41613.06 578107.2 
Net Asset Values NAV 3160 
-109498 2201630 46198.43 11406.1 201398.2 
Total Liabilities TLIABS 3160 269.7 3011967 168066.12 30353.452 415077.21 
L/Tailed Liability 
Growth Rate 
LIBGROL 3160 
-1.00333 0.2999 9.835920E-03 4.194964E-03 0.1757385 
S/Tailed Liability 
Growth Rates 
LIBGROS 3160 
-0.13799 0.219494 4.38146OL-02 2.376757E-03 0.1016741 
Solvency Ratio RSK 3160 
-862.2 1 1465.2 35.7596 2.8233 91.748 
Reserves GBRES 3160 1095.6 2717549 123590.1 20258.39 336557.6 
Risk Financing 
(1/6) of Net Assets 
IU`IN 
I 
3160 
I 
-3.1445.5 21723.4 40.0931 17.1828 844.0563 
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431 Cost of Carry Aberration 
The empirical analysis on the model proposed in Chapter (3) seeks to establish the 
linear relationship between risk premiums on policyholders' deficit and the model. The 
explanatory variable used is termed the cost of carry for both portfolios with and 
without solvency restrictions. Models without solvency restrictions have been tested 
on the pricing of insurance contracts; our regression analysis incorporates the early 
default option arising from the provisions of solvency restrictions as an endogenous 
variable. The regression used to estimate the relationship between the risk-premium, 
cost-of carry and in general the portfolio risk is given as follows: 
CCRRYkt 
=a+ PIEDSPREkt + P2SDSPREkt + ekt (4.7) 
Where: CCRRYkt = Cost of Carry for company k, in year t. 
EDSPREkt = The insolvency spread with solvency restrictions to net 
assets for company k, in year t, 
SDSPREkt = The insolvency spread without solvency restrictions to net 
assets for company k, in year t, 
ckt = Error term for company k, in year t. 
The above regression equation only shows a model for the estimation of the cost 
of carry or precisely the cost of risk. The variables to this equation are standard default 
and early default spreads, the results of which are presented in table (4.2) and (4.3). 
This is done in order to observe the model that provides the best explanation for 
insurance cash flows given the incorporation of safety margins. In the process, we are 
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able to test proposition (I) which states that value creation is a function of the rate at 
which a company borrows from its policyholder and the utilisation of generated 
underwriting funds. We are also able to test this proposition which attributes 
policyholder deficit risk premium to movements in the liability-to-asset ratio and the 
exogenously deten-nined insolvency threshold, which is already, incorporated in both 
our standard and early defaults spreads. 
The data used to ran our regressions is the time-series pooled panel data for the 
period 1992 to 1999. The pooled data is assessed for the entire period and for all the 
companies with available data over the period. The software used in our analysis 
allows us to exclude cases on a pair-wise basis if data for either of the variables is 
missing. This method calculates the correlation coefficient between a pair of variables 
based on all cases with complete information for the two variables, regardless of 
whether the cases are missing for any other variables. This helps us capture data in 
both long-tail and short-tail business accounts since some companies only write one of 
these business accounts. This scenario could lead to a lot of cases being eliminated if 
we use listwise missing-value treatment which eliminates cases with missing values 
completely. The pair-wise treatment ensures that we do not eliminate too many cases 
unnecessarily, thus maintaining a large sample. The sample is robust and has more 
observations than the one used by Cummins et. al. on similar studies. 
The proposition we made is that the standard default and early default spreads are 
negatively related to the cost of carry. This cost detennines what actually should be 
paid to ultimate stakeholders, given the costs associated with raising investment funds 
I 
and the return earned on invested assets. The estimated spreads from put option pricing 
- 
Page 217 
- 
model are regressed against the cost of carry. The computation of these variables 
clearly shows that not only is leverage risk and asset-liability risk incorporated but also 
the risk associated with the solvency margins. 
SIGMA used in computing volatility in both assets and liability returns includes 
their covariances as well. We also use risk-adjusted interest rates in our model, which 
incorporates the impact of growth rates in both shorttail and longtail business. What 
the model pointed out is that volatility increases as the company's assets drop toward 
the required solvency threshold, a phenomenon common to barrier options. This has 
the effect of increasing the cost of borrowing funds from policyholders, and that of 
shareholders in the form of higher profit margins to shield against borrowing costs. 
The results we report in table (4.2) and (4.3) on proposition Q) are based on these two 
factors. 
The results provide support for propositions I. As pointed out in proposition 1, the 
signs of the coefficients support the proposition that the cost of carry is negatively 
related to both the standard default and early default spreads that incorporate the cost 
of compliance and leverage ratios. The selection of these variables into our model was 
based on the criteria that enter a variable with an T' probability of 0.050 :5F ; 
-> 
0.1. 
The results reject the null hypothesis that there is no linear relationship between 
default spreads and the cost of carry, with an adjusted R square of 0.419 and high V 
values, significant at one percent or better. It also supports the assertions that solvency 
thresholds are important in determining the rate of return required by equityliolders. 
This evidence can be gleaned from the R square change, which had a 0.382 and 0.038 
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contribution rate to the model for early default and standard default spreads 
respectively. 
The student T statistic test for the coefficients support our conclusion that default 
spreads contribute significantly to the cost of carry. This observation of 't' statistics 
for coefficients significant at 1 percent or better is consistent with our observation on 
contributions to risk parameter (SIGMA), from asset and liabilities accounts. We 
observed that on average, liability accounts were contributing 75% to SIGMA, with 
the remainder coming from asset accounts and the asset-liability covariance. With this 
we can say there is a strong link between the cost of carry and the default spreads paid 
to policyholders when originating insurance risks. Thus, we also confirm what has 
been established by the broad body of literature that the fortunes of an insurance 
company depend more on its underwriting philosophy than on its investment side. The 
main reason for this lies in their contribution to SIGMA; investments accounts 
contributes less because they are more diversified than liabilities accounts which tend 
to suffer from portfolio contamination. 
These results confirm a strong link between default spreads and spreads earned by 
equityholders as they relate to the interaction between the cost of borrowing and 
investment return on these invested funds. They also support our observations that a 
transfer pricing system could improve profitability within an insurance company, by 
charging each centre that uses funds originated from underwriting insurance risk. The 
strong relationship between risk spreads and the cost of carry composed of the cost of 
float and return on invested assets, supports the proposition for transfer pricing 
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systems in insurance companies. This will enable insurance companies to effectively 
control the cost embedded in borrowing and match these to asset returns. 
Therefore, if spreads paid on liabilities on origination of business are important in 
determining the cost of carry, our argument for rewarding these accounts when lending 
originated funds to asset accounts is a noble one. Our findings justify the proposition 
for the reclassification of insurance liabilities into short-term, medium-term and long- 
term classes rather than on the perils insured basis. This we said would enhance the 
management of duration risk between assets and liabilities, as argued by Cummins, 
Allen and Phillips (1997), that, prices do not vary by line after adjusting for line- 
specific liability growth rates, so our classification will not alter class specific risk 
profiles. 
With this strong link between the cost of carry and spreads paid on liability 
accounts, our proposed classification will enhance class performance as liabilities 
could easily be matched to assets based on duration and convexity profiles rather than 
insured risk perils. The underperformance of the insurance market against other 
financial institutions is anchored in the misclassification of liabilities which makes it 
difficult to finance them as this is based on underlying perils rather than the financial 
aspects of the risk. This should provide food for thought for those who are trying to 
securitize insurance risk, the question is should we stick to the traditional way of 
financing peril-based risk or the proposed duration-based classification. Our results 
support our proposed duration-and-convexity-based classification, because it addresses 
the real factors that determine the cost of carry for an insurance company. 
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433 Variability in Return on Policyholder Surplus 
In this section we specify and test for the model which proposes that return on 
policyholder surplus is a function of default risk, liability spreads and return on 
invested assets. The reason we are using the return on policyholder surplus is 
enshrined in the idea that an insolvency put option is equivalent to expected 
policyholder deficit. What we intend to test in this section is whether the perceived 
policyholder deficit is a determinant of the year to year realised return on 
policyholder's surplus (ROPHS). 
This variable is used to measure an insurance company's operational profitability, 
before capital gains and losses and before income tax. It is computed as given in 
equation (4.8) below: 
ROPHS, 
= 
PHOI (4.8) %PHS 
t-I + PHS, ]/2) 
Where: ROPHSt = Return on Policyholders' Surplus in year t. 
P HSt = Policyholders' Surplus in year t. 
PHOIt = Policyholders' Operating Income in year t. 
The advantage of using this variable is that it is based on the recurring internal 
earnings and captures the impact of items like the level and mix of business writings, 
its geographical orientation and regulatory environment, investment philosophy and 
financial market environment. It also captures other factors such as growth, taxes, 
expenses, persistence of reinsurance coverage, and premium and loss reserve 
adequacy. Operational profitability is the single most important source of surplus 
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growth, an important element in providing protection against shocks from unexpected 
loss events. So our test on proposition number (II) seek to establish the relationship 
between persistent quality return on policyholders' surplus and firm default risk, as 
well as spreads paid to policyholders for the perceived default risk and return on 
invested assets. The model is specified in equation (4.9) below: 
ROPHS kt =a+ PIEDPUTkt + P2EDSPREkt +P3 ROIA kt + ekt (4.9) 
Where: ROPHSkt = Return on Policyholders' Surplus for company k, in year t. 
EDPUTkt = The ratio of insolvency put with solvency restrictions to net 
assets for company k, in year t, 
ROIAkt = Ratio of Investment Income to Invested Assets for company 
k, in year t, 
Ekt = error term for company k, in year t. 
Regression results that are reported in Table (4.2) and (4.3) are for the test of the 
relationship between return on policyholders' surplus and default risk and spreads as 
envisaged in equation (4.9). The default put option with provisions for an early default 
arising from the existence of required solvency margins is used to represent the overall 
firm risk. This variable is a better measure of risk, because its computation is based not 
only on portfolio theory derived asset-liability risk, but also risk present in asset- 
liability gearing as it interacts with required solvency margins. 
The first part of our proposition in Chapter (3) points to the importance of the 
asset-liability ratio (ASSLIBR) and solvency margins (SOLVR) in determining the 
quality of returns. Tests using ASSLIBR and SOLVR, and default spreads as 
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regressors were carried out to confirm whether the quality of return linearly related to 
these factors. The results which have not been reported in Table (4.2) and (4.3), 
support the hypothesis that the return on policyholder surplus is negatively related to a 
stochastic knock-out barrier. This observation of a negative coefficient with 't' 
statistics significant at 1 percent or better is quite consistent with the observation from 
financial mathematics literature by Wilmot (1999) that, volatility increases as the 
asset-to-liability ratio approaches the knock out barrier. 
The rationale here is that higher solvency margins lead to companies 
accumulating more equity to provide for the cushion, so as to maintain a safe margin 
away from the knockout barrier. On average, UK insurance companies maintain 
margins three times larger than the required solvency margins. Albeit each time the 
solvency margin is raised, more capital is accumulated to provide a buffer zone. That 
is why we are incorporating the option to an early default in our insolvency put, 
because risk-taking activity within an insurance company revolves around the 
solvency threshold. In fact companies have to tread carefully because trading close to 
the solvency threshold, has long-term survival and profitability ramifications. 
In equation (4.9) we use the insolvency put with an option to early default, as a 
proxy for firm risk incorporating the leverage and solvency threshold risk. We address 
the second part of proposition (11), which states that the quality of operational 
profitability is a function of default risk as defined by the insolvency put with an 
option to early default. As the computation of the insolvency put shows, there is no 
need for us to include SOLVR and ASSLIBR as variables in the equation because they 
have already been catered for. We also believe that due to the number of variables 
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entered when computing our insolvency put, it is able to explain most of the variability 
in return on policyholders' surplus. Therefore, we have only limited our independent 
variables to three. 
We selected the independent variables in equation (4.9) using as similar technique 
of setting the interval for the probability of T' to fall between 0.05 and 0.1 for a point 
in and out respectively. The results confinn our proposition which asserts that the 
return on policyholders' surplus is negatively related to overall finn default risk, 
incorporating both leverage and knock-out barrier risk factors. The positive 
coefficients for the other independent variables in Table (4.3) also confirm that there is 
a positive relationship between the quality of operational profitability and liability and 
asset spreads. The 't' statistics for the coefficient are also significant at 1 percent or 
better, the standard errors are also very low. It is also not surprising that the insolvency 
put is a major contributor to the R square. The adjusted R square of 0.89 and an T' 
value 4847.461 supports our hypothesis, and reject the null hypothesis that there is no 
linear relationship. These values were either significant at I percent or better, 
confirming the linear relationship between default risk and the rate of return required 
by equityholders. 
43.4 Variability in Liabilities Price per Pound of Assets Committed 
In this section we proceed to test proposition (III) by using the Premium-to-Asset 
ratio as the independent variable. The first part of proposition (III) states that the price 
of liabilities is an increasing function of both the default-risk variable (ASSLIBR) and 
the barrier-to-asset ratio (SOLVR). Proposition (III) goes further to assert that 
embedded in the price of liabilities is the cost of capital required to carry risk forward 
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to settlement date. The cost of this capital committed to liabilities underwritten is 
measured by the per unit assets committed to premiums net of risk financing. This 
ratio is obtained by dividing net premiums underwritten to average net assets for the 
year, for both long- and short-tail accounts. We do not segregate between long-tail and 
short-tail lines because insurance prices across lines of business for a given insurer are 
equal when default risk and line-specific liability growth rates are controlled 
(Cummins et. al. 1997). The regression model linking the price of an insurance 
contract to capital is given by equation (4.10) below: 
NPRASS kt =a+ PIEDPUTkt + P2ROlAkt + P3 EDSPRE kt +P4 RFIN kt + Fkt (4.10) 
Where: 
NPRASSkt = Net Premium to Asset Ratio for company k, in year t. 
I 
EDPUTkt = The ratio of insolvency put with solvency restrictions to net 
assets for company k, in year t, 
ROIAkt = Return on Invested Assets for company k, in year t, 
EDSPREkt = The insolvency Spread with solvency restrictions to net assets 
for company k, in year t, 
RFINkt = Risk Financing for company k, in year t, 
ekt = Error term for company k, in year t. 
Similar selection procedures for the variables used in the regression models above 
were also adopted in this model. All the other three independent variables used in the 
analysis are derived as defined above. Risk financing (RFIN) is defined as the 
percentage of ceded reinsurance premiums to gross premiums. Data for this variable is 
also obtained from statutory revenue accounts recorded on the A. M. Best International 
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UK General Insurance Business data tapes of the year 2000. Risk financing is used in 
our model because it reduces the pound assets committed to liabilities, and when well- 
sourced it improves the strength of the balance sheet. It is also one variable looked at 
closely by rating agencies when determining the strength of a company's book, 
whether risk financing is adequate or there is over reliance on it. So we expect risk 
financing to play a part on determining the cost of an insurance contract per unit of 
assets committed. 
In the same vein we expect firm default risk to continue playing a major role in 
determining this cost of carrying risk forward to settlement date. Our measurement 
method is quite crude though, because as the life of an insurance contract is reduced 
during the course of the year assets committed to these liabilities will also be reduced. 
Reduced commitment of assets at any point in time during the life of the contact means 
reduced cost of carrying the risk forward to settlement date. This issue was raised in 
our proposition, and we believe that an arbitrage situation is avoided if this condition is 
met. However, based on the assumption that insurance companies business does not 
flow in at one go, but it trickles in throughout the underwriting period, capital 
commitment should not change significantly from the average at any point in time. 
Therefore, with capital released, being committed to new risks trickling in throughout 
the underwriting period, our dependent variable is a good proxy for the cost of 
carrying the risk forward to settlement date. 
The results for this regression equation are also reported in Tables (4.2) and (4.3) 
in the lower half The evidence from these tests confinns our proposition that the ratio 
of assets committed to premiums underwritten is positively related to firm default risk. 
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The betas also confirin risk financing, liabilities spread and ROIA as increasing 
functions of premium-to-asset ratio. The student 't' statistic for the coefficients for a 
two-tailed test is significant at 1% or better, except for ROIA which is significant at 
10% level. The model is a good fit, with an adjusted R square of 0.507 significant at 
I% or better for a two-tailed test. 
The results establish a piece of evidence that capital commitment to liabilities 
underwritten is a linear function of default risk and spreads in the forin of risk 
financing, liabilities growth rates and asset returns. The dominance of default risk is 
also not surprising, as this result is consistent with observations by Briys et al. (1998) 
that firm risk explains 78% of the ratings given to companies by rating agencies. What 
makes these results special though is that ours is the first empirical study on insurance 
data using option-pricing theory with an early default option. The results are better 
than those in previous studies using the standard option pricing methodology because 
of the increased explanatory power of our models. Our model though not directly 
comparable to those of Cummins, Allen and Phillips (1997), Cummins and Sommer 
(1996) and Sommer (1996), because we used different independent variables, different 
market data and sample sizes, our result looks more superior than the ones they 
reported, due to lower beta standard errors. 
Another important piece of evidence is the positioning of risk financing in the 
model, it is neither dominant nor insignificant, it just occupies the middle ground it 
does in the day to day trading of insurance business. Insurance companies retain most 
of the business up to 85% for big companies and ranging from 70-80% for medium 
sized companies. This high retention quotient is well reflected in the contribution risk- 
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financing make to insurance companies' portfolio. High retentions also mean high 
liability risk, an issue well-captured by our model, since default risk tends to dominate 
the contributions to the model as evidenced in the coefficients. 
43.5 The Impfications of Autocorrelation and Multi-ColUnearity 
The data used in our regression analysis for testing proposition (I), (II) and (III) is 
time series data, hence the need to test for autocorrelation. The null hypothesis we test 
against is that there is autocorrelation in the error terms of our regression models. We 
use the Durbin-Watson 22 statistic to test for any sequential correlation of error terms in 
our models. The results for the Durbin-Watson statistic test are presented in Table 
(4.2). We reject the null hypothesis in all the three models tested, as the values for the 
statistic are insignificantly different from the value of 2. A Durbin-Watson statistic 
with the value of 2 shows that there is no autocorrelation in the in the error terms, so 
our values of 2.001,1.995 and 1.972 are not significantly different to 2, confinning the 
robustness of our results. 
We also carried out statistical tests for collinearity for all the tested models. The 
tests for co-linearity are done in order to check for correlation in the independent 
variables. The null hypothesis against which this is tested against is that the significant 
adjusted Rý are a result of correlation in the independent variables. The method we use 
to test for multi-collinearity is the proportion of variability not explained by the 
variables when the ih independent variable is considered the dependent variable and 
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the regression equation between it and the other independent variables is calculated. 
2 The proportion of variability not explained by the other variables is 1-R, 
. 
This 
quantity, known as the tolerance of the variable is the one we use to test for multi- 
collinearity. The co-linearity statistics measuring the level of tolerance for each 
variable that is reported in Table (4.3) reject the null hypothesis that significant 
adjusted R square is a result independent variables correlation. This also confinns the 
robustness of our result in that all the tolerance of the variables for all the regression 
models tested are all close to the value of 1. 
N 
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CHAPTER 5:
CONCLUSION A D FUTURE RESEARCH 
his thesis develops a simple novel framework for measuring insurance 
companies' firm-wide risk that incorporates an early default option. The 
option pricing methodology is applied to derive the closed form valuation for overall 
firm risk as measured by the insolvency put option. The main advantage of using the 
option pricing is that it can easily be used to value insurance companies even for 
companies with complex financial structures and loss settlement pattern. 
One important aspect yielded by this study is that firm risk measured by the 
insolvency put is equivalent to expected policyholder's surplus deficit an even more 
efficient tool for measuring risk than VaR. We show that the correlation between 
assets and liabilities has a significant effect on the overall risk profile of the finn, as 
well as the overall spread paid for originating liabilities. We also show that the model 
provides three primary empirical results that: 
a) spreads paid for originating insurance business are negatively related to 
the level of cost of carry and default risk; 
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b) insolvency risk with an early default option is functionally related both to 
operational profitability and the cost of capital required to carry liabilities 
to settlement date; and 
c) our model has many implications for hedging default risk. 
The evidence from our empirical results strongly supports that the implications of 
this model are consistent with implicit risk levels considered by rating agencies when 
awarding ratings to insurance companies. In particular, the default risk explains more 
than 50% of the variability in insurance cash flows. There is compelling evidence that 
solvency consciousness in insurance companies is a major factor in determining the 
risk taking behaviour and the incorporation of the impact of the solvency threshold is 
an important step to a more comprehensive, and realistic firm-wide risk measurement 
technique. 
Our models manage to unravel the reasons behind the tendency by insurers to 
maintain high asset-to-liability ratios even if their default risk is quite low. This 
behaviour is consistent with barrier option pricing theory which asserts that trading at 
assets-to-liability ratios close to the solvency threshold leads to a steep increase of 
volatility in the cash flows. So the desire by human capital to trade as far away from 
the solvency threshold usually spells this risk-taking behaviour, which provides further 
evidence why insurance companies accumulate rather than allocate capital to 
liabilities. 
The implications implicit in our results are that insurance companies can measure 
risk inherent in their portfolios with precision provided they incorporate the stochastic 
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knockout barrier in their risk measurement models. We honestly believe that capital 
should be allocated rather than accumulated against liabilities, because such practices 
lead to underperformance of insurance companies, as is the case now. It is rather 
bizarre that the return on equity in our findings is negatively related to risk, it should 
be the other way round, and this evidence strongly supports the culture of 
accumulating capital against liabilities. Excessive capital in the insurance industry has 
been the major factor in poor performances, against other financial institutions where 
risk capital is allocated to liabilities and not accumulated. The results of the models 
suggest that there are great rewards to be reaped by adopting a disciplined risk 
management structure, ranging from measurement to hedging default risk. This will 
extricate insurance companies from the trap of capital accumulation, as they could 
easily assess their risk positions and allocate capital based on their default risk. We 
have shown that firm default risk is the major driver in insurance companies' 
operational profitability, so focusing on the elements contributing most to cash flow 
variability should control it. 
Other important insights about our valuation of liability spreads emerge from this 
analysis. We show that the cost of carry is inversely related to spreads paid for 
originating liabilities. The evidence from this analysis provides strong support for the 
need for insurance companies to reclassify liability risks to bring them in line with 
those of other financial institutions. Our proposition is also supported by evidence in 
main stream insurance literature that places liabilities as the main determinant of 
performance within an insurance company, with operational profitability depending on 
the quality of underwriting results 75-85% of the times. This piece of evidence really 
spells the business insurance companies are really in, the business of trading 
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underwriting risk. The reclassification of liabilities according to their financial nature, 
rather than perils insured enables insurance companies to match liabilities to asset 
accounts and makes it easier for a transfer pricing system to be established. 
The way liability and asset spreads interact to create wealth, provides further 
evidence for the need to reclassify insurance liabilities. The implications of a 
classification structure proposed in this thesis are consistent with the current structures 
in the banking sector, where the classification of liabilities is based on the duration and 
convexity risk, and thereafter matched with appropriate asset accounts. This structure 
will enable insurance companies to better control the cost of borrowing investment 
funds from policyholders, because insurers can see what they are really paying to 
acquire the funds. A transfer pricing system links assets and liabilities based on their 
financial risk characteristics rather than insured perils. Such a structure has wider 
implications on the way asset and liability spreads could be controlled to improve 
performance and the nature of risk financing tools used to manage risk in these 
accounts. Since spreads determine the superiority of insurance company performance, 
it is not good enough to lose money in the liability accounts, to recover it from 
investment accounts. 
Companies that have been posting good results like Swiss Re, Aegon and 
Directline, to mention just a few, have learnt to control their spreads through prudent 
underwriting, hence their good performance. Under a transfer pricing system, how 
much an insurance company pays to borrow investment funds, determines how much 
it must earn from its assets accounts in order to satisfy its shareholders. A more 
onerous position will be a failure to control the liabilities accounts, with the hope of 
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recovering from investments, because how much you borrow at determines the rate of 
interest they should be lend at to asset accounts, and at how much asset accounts 
should earn to satisfy shareholders. A transfer system injects prudence in the way 
liability accounts are managed, because they are the main drivers of quality operational 
profitability. The results provide insurance managers with great benefits to be reaped 
when they devise effective ways of controlling liability accounts, and a transfer pricing 
system is one of them. After all, there is strong evidence that most of the volatility in 
the firm originates from this quarter; good underwriting practice is the only way 
forward to reduce unnecessary excessive accumulation capital backing the liabilities. 
A transfer pricing system will also greatly enhance the performance of risk 
management techniques and the management of duration and convexity risk more 
effectively. 
We were also able to establish a strong link between the cost of risk capital 
allocated to liabilities carried forward by insurance companies to settlement date and 
default risk. As expected from our propositions, default risk affects immensely the cost 
of capital used to back liabilities, with risk financing also playing a role as a means of 
releasing assets committed to liabilities. The contribution risk financing plays in our 
model is quite consistent with the risk financing policy of high retention quotients in 
the insurance industry. The diversity and effectiveness of risk financing techniques is 
not well captured in our model. However, there is strong evidence to suggest that risk 
financing is used for two main reasons to avoid financial distress by strengthening the 
balance sheet position or for pure financial reasons by reducing the cost of capital per 
liability commitments. By using the diverse risk financing techniques available, 
insurance companies are able to shore up their knockout barriers, relieving surplus in 
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the process and enabling the company to superficially trade as further away from the 
from the solvency threshold as possible. 
Risk financing tools like contingent equity puts, are geared to address the problem 
of asset values encroaching into the solvency threshold after a catastrophic event. This 
equity put fluffs up the company's financial position away from the solvency threshold 
as soon as the equity put is triggered. The only shortcoming of measuring the cost of 
capital per liability contract is the failure by our option-pricing model to capture fat- 
tails unique to insurance business. However, this does not denigrate our findings as the 
model is quite robust in explaining the sole aim of our study, which is to establish the 
relationship between default risk with an early default option, and components key to 
operational profitability and that includes risk financing. Further, evidence is also 
available from insurance risk pricing literature which shows that the option pricing 
methodology outperforms any other insurance risk pricing models in its predictive 
power of rates actually charged in practice. 
Finally, we observed that while traditional models of valuing insurance company 
risk are conceptually true, they do not go far enough to capture all the risks embedded 
in insurance portfolios. The main advantage of our valuation procedure is that it 
provides a solid practical basis for valuing risk in multi-line insurance companies and 
can be used to provide specific solutions for asset and liability spread problems, and 
better risk financing results. Through the use of this risk measurement methodology 
and transfer pricing systems, companies will be able to choose the best risk financing 
solutions best suited to the financial aspects of the risk rather than the effect of insured 
perils. In particular, the model provides means of isolating problem areas that could 
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easily be tackled, by tailoring risk-financing solutions that best explain the observed 
properties of the underlying risk. This should be able to provide new avenues for new 
risk financing techniques that do not solely focus on perils but the financial aspects of 
insurance liabilities. We believe that future research should focus on models 
incorporating the jump processes, variable interest rates and the implications of a three 
year period model for companies operating at Lloyds. A model with jump processes 
will be able to explain the effect of catastrophic risks, something not captured in our 
model. 
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APPENDIX A: 
INSURANCE COMPANIES USED FOR THIS STUDY 
Acceleration Insurance Co Ltd Chubb Ins Co ofEuropeSA (UKBr) 
Aegon Insurance Co (UK) Ltd Churchill Insurance Co Ltd 
AGF Insurance Ltd CIGNA InsCo of EuropeSA-NV(Br) 
Albion Insurance Co Ltd CIGNA Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd 
All Counties Insurance Co Ltd City Fire Ins Company Ltd 
AMBAC Insurance UK Ltd City International Ins Co Ltd 
Ambassador Ins Co Ltd City of Westminster Ins Co Ltd 
American Life Ins Co (UKBr) CNA Ins (Europe) Ltd 
American Reliable InsCo (UKBr) CNA Reinsurance Co Ltd 
Ancon Insurance Co (UK) Ltd Colbourne, Insurance Co Ltd 
Andrew Weir Insurance Co Ltd Cologne Reinsurance Co Ltd 
Anglo American Insurance Co Ltd Colonia Baltica Insurance Ltd 
Ansvar Insurance Company Ltd Combined Ins Co of America (UKBr) 
Arig Insurance Co Ltd Commercial Union Ass Co Plc 
Ashdowns Ltd Congregational & Gen Ins Plc 
Assicurazioni Generali SpA (UKBr) Consolidated M&G Ins Co Ltd 
Assitalia. (LeAssicD'Italia) (UKBr) Consumer Electronics Ins Co Ltd 
Assurances Gen. de France (UKBr) Continental Ass Co of Lond Plc 
Athel Reinsurance Co Ltd Continental Mgmt Services Ltd 
Automobile Assoc U/w Serv Ltd Continental Rein Corp (UK) Ltd 
Aviation & General Ins Ltd Co-operative Ins Society Ltd 
Avon Insurance Plc Copenhagen Reins Co (UK) Ltd 
AXA (Cardiff) Ltd Cornhill Insurance plc 
AXA Global Risks (UK) Ltd Credit & Guarantee Ins Co Plc 
AXA Insurance plc Criterion Insurance Co Ltd 
AXA Nordstem Art Insurance Ltd Crombie Insurance Co (UK) Ltd 
AXA Reinsurance UK Plc Cumberland Insurance Co Ltd 
BAI (Run-Off) Ltd Dai-Tokyo Insurance Co (UK) Ltd 
Baltica Insurance Co (UK) Ltd DAS Legal Expenses Ins Co, Ltd 
Bankers Insurance Co Ltd De Montfort Insurance Co Plc 
Beaufort Insurance Co Ltd Deutsche Ruck UK Reins Co Ltd 
Beaver Insurance Ltd Direct Line Insurance Plc 
Bimeh Iran Ins Co (UK) Ltd Domestic & General Ins Co Ltd 
Bishopsgate Insurance Ltd Dominion Insurance Co Ltd 
Blackfriars Insurances Ltd Dowa Insurance Co (Europe) Ltd 
Blacksea&Baltic Gen Ins Co Ltd Drake Insurance Plc 
Britannia Life Assur Ltd Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd 
Britannic Assurance Ple East West Insurance Co Ltd 
British Aerospace (Ins) Ltd Ecclesiastical Ins Office Plc 
British Aviation Ins Co Ltd El Paso Insurance Company Ltd 
British Reserve Ins Co Ltd Electrical Contractors Ins Ltd 
British Utd Provident Assoc Ltd Employers Reins Infl Ltd 
Bryanston Insurance Co, Ltd Energy Employers Mutual InsAssocLtd 
Budget Insurance Co Ltd English & American Ins Co Ltd 
Cedar Insurance Co, Ltd Equine & Livestock Ins Co Ltd 
Chain Insurance Co Ltd EULER Trade Indemnity plc 
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Chancellor Insurance Co Ltd Europ Assistance Insurance Ltd 
Charter Reinsurance Co Ltd European Nichido Ins Co Ltd 
Chemists Defence Assoc Ltd Everest Re Ltd 
China Insurance Co (UK) Ltd Excelsior Insurance Co Ltd 
Chiyoda F&M Ins Co (Europe)Ltd Excess Insurance Co Ltd 
Financial Insurance Co Ltd Family Health Plan Ltd 
FM Insurance Co Ltd Fenton Insurance Co Ltd 
Folgate Insurance Co Ltd FIGRE Ltd 
Folksam. Int'l Ins Co (UK) Ltd Irwell Insurance Co Ltd 
Frankona Reins Co (UK) Ltd Kemper Reinsurance London Ltd 
Fremont Insurance Co (UK) Ltd Kingscroft Insurance Co Ltd 
Fuji International Ins Co Ltd Koa Insurance Co (Europe) Ltd 
GA Bonus Plc Korean Insurance Co (UK) Ltd 
GAN Insurance Company Ltd Kyoei F&M Insurance (UK) Ltd 
Gen Accident F&L Ass Corp PIc Lakewood Insurance Co Ltd 
General Re Europe Ltd Landmark Insurance Co (UK) Ltd 
Gerling Global Gen & Rein Co Ltd Leadenhall Insurance Co Ltd 
Gerling-Konzern A V-AG (UKBr) Legal & General Ass Society Ltd 
GIL Insurance Ltd Legal & General Insurance Ltd 
GIO (UK) Ltd Liberty Mutual Ins Co (UK) Ltd 
Globe Insurance Co Ltd Lime Street Insurance Co Ltd 
Grand Union Reins Co (UK) Ltd Lincoln General Ins Co Ltd 
Great Lakes Reins (UK) PIc Lion Insurance Company Ltd 
Gresham Insurance Company Ltd Lloyds TSB General Insurance Ltd 
Greyfiriars Insurance Co Ltd Lombard General Ins Co Ltd 
Guardian Royal Exchange plc Lond&AachenMunichMarine InsCoLtd 
Gulf Insurance Co (UK) Ltd London & Edinburgh Ins Co Ltd 
Hamilton Insurance Co Ltd London & Kingston Ins Co Ltd 
Hansa General Ins Co (UK) Ltd London General Ins Co Ltd 
Hansa Industrial Ins NV (UKBr) Ludgate Insurance Company Ltd 
Harbour Assurance Co (UK) Ltd Magnus Insurance Co Ltd 
Harleysville Insurance Co (UK) Ltd Malayan Insurance Co (UK) Ltd 
Hassneh Insurance Co (UK) Ltd Mapfre Re Compania de Reass SA 
Haven Insurance Policies Ltd Maritime Insurance Co Ltd 
Heddington Insurance (UK) Ltd Mediterranean Ins&Reins Co Ltd 
Hibernian Insurance Co Ltd Mercantile & Gen Reins Co Plc 
Highlands Insurance Co (UK) Ltd Mercantile Indemnity Co Ltd 
HIH Cas & Gen Ins Ltd (UKBr) Methodist Insurance Plc 
HIR (UK) Ltd Metropolitan Reins Co (UK) Ltd 
Hiscox Insurance Co Ltd Mitsui M&F Ins Co (Europe) Ltd 
Homecare Insurance Ltd Monument Insurance Co Ltd 
HSB Engineering Insurance Ltd Moorgate Insurance Co Ltd 
IC Insurance Ltd Motors Insurance Co Ltd 
Icarom plc Municipal General Ins Ltd 
ICHEM Insurance Co Ltd Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd 
IdealInsurance Co Ltd Mutual of Omaha Int'l Ltd 
IGI Insurance Co Ltd Mutual of Omaha UK Ltd 
Imperial Fire & Marine Re Co Ltd Mytilus Insurance Co Ltd 
Imperio Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd NAC Reinsurance Int'l Ltd 
Indemnity International Ltd Nat Farmers Union Mutual Ins Soc 
Independent Insurance Co Ltd National House Building Council 
Ins Co of N America (UK) Ltd National Ins & Guarantee Corp Plc 
Ins Corp of Singapore (UK) Ltd NCM Credit Insurance Ltd 
Insurance (GB) Ltd New Hampshire Ins Co 
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Intercargo Ins Co (UKBr) 
Int'l Ins Co of Hannover Ltd 
Irish National Ins Co Ltd (UKBr) 
Iron Trades EmpI Ins Assoc Ltd 
Iron Trades Insurance Co Ltd 
NRG Fenchurch Insurance Co, Ltd 
NRG London Reinsurance Co Ltd 
NRG Victory Reinsurance Co Ltd 
NW Reinsurance Corporation Ltd 
Ocaso, SA SegurosYReaseguros(Br 
Odyssey Re (London) Ltd 
Orion Insurance (General) Ltd 
Orion Insurance Co, Plc 
Oslo Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd 
Palatine Insurance Co Ltd 
Pan Atlantic Insurance Co Ltd 
PanFinancial Insurance Co Ltd 
Paramount Insurance Co Ltd 
Patients'Aid. Association 
Pearl Assurance Plc 
Personal Assurance Plc: 
Pharmacy Mutual Ins Co Ltd 
Pine Top Insurance Co, Ltd 
Pinnacle Insurance Co, Ltd 
Polygon Insurance (LTK) Ltd 
Pool Reinsurance Co Ltd 
PPP Healthcare Ltd 
Preferred Assurance Co Ltd 
Prime Health Ltd 
Privilege Ins Co, Ltd 
Professional Travel InsCoLtd (UKBr) 
Proteus Insurance Co Ltd 
Provident Insurance Plc 
Prudential Assurance Co Ltd 
QBE Insurance (UK) Ltd 
QBE International InsuranceLtd 
QBE Reinsurance (LJK) Ltd 
RAC Insurance Ltd 
Refuge Assurance Plc 
Reliance F&A Ins Corp Ltd 
Reliance National Ins Co UK Ltd 
RI Holdings Plc: 
River Thames Insurance Co Ltd 
Royal London General Ins Co Ltd 
Sabre Insurance Company Ltd 
Samsung Ins Co of Europe Ltd 
Scan Re Insurance Co Ltd 
Scor (UK) Company Ltd 
Scotsure Insurance Co Ltd 
Scottish Eagle Insurance Co Ltd 
Scottish Lion Insurance Co Ltd 
Security Insurance Co (UK) Ltd 
Security Insurance Ltd 
Sirius (UK) Insurance PIc: 
New Hampshire Ins Co (UKBr) 
New India Assurance Co Ltd (UKBr) 
New Zealand Reins Co (UK) Ltd 
Nippon Ins Co of Europe Ltd 
Nissan Ins Co (Europe) Ltd 
Norman Insurance Co Ltd 
Northern Star Insurance Co Ltd 
Norwich Union Fire Ins Soc Ltd 
SR Int'l Business Co Ltd 
St Andrews Insurance plc 
St Paul Int'l Insurance Co, Ltd 
St Paul Reinsurance Co Ltd 
Stockholm Reins Co (UK) Ltd 
Stronghold Insurance Co Ltd 
Suecia Re & Marine Ins Co Ltd 
Sumitomo M&F Ins Co (Eur) Ltd 
Sun Alliance & London Ins Plc 
Swiss Reinsurance Co UK Ltd 
Tanker Insurance Co Ltd 
Teachers Assurance Co Ltd 
Terra Nova Insurance Co Ltd 
TGB Insurance Services Ltd 
Toa-Re Insurance Co (UK) Ltd 
Tobacco Insurance Co, Ltd 
Tokio, M&F Ins Co (UK) Ltd 
Top-UK Insurance Ltd 
Trafalgar Insurance Plc 
Travel & General Ins Co Plc 
Travelers Corporation (UK) Ltd 
Trenwick International Ltd 
Trinity Insurance Co Ltd 
UIA (Insurance) Limited 
UIC Insurance Co Ltd 
UK Insurance Ltd 
Unionamerica Insurance Co Ltd 
Unione Italiana, (UK) Re Co Ltd 
United Friendly General Ins Ltd 
United Friendly Insurance Plc 
United Standard Ins Co, Ltd 
USAA Ltd 
Uzbekinvest Int'l Ins Co Ltd 
Victory Health Reinsurance Co Ltd 
Walbrook Insurance Co, Ltd 
WASA Int'l (UK) Ins Co Ltd 
Wausau Insurance Co (UK) Ltd 
Wesleyan Assurance Society 
Wessex Ins Co Ltd 
West Yorkshire Insurance Co Ltd 
Western Australian Ins Co Ltd(UKBr) 
Western Provident Association Ltd 
Westminster Motor Ins Ass Ltd 
Winterthur International Ins Co Ltd 
World Marine & General Ins PLC 
Yasuda F&M Ins Co of Europe Ltd 
- 
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Sirius Insurance Co (UK) Ltd 
Skandia Marine Ins Co (LTK) Ltd 
Skandia UK Insurance Co Plc 
Sovereign Insurance (UK) Ltd 
Yasuda Kasai Ins Co of Europe Ltd 
Zeneca Insurance Co Ltd 
Zurich GSG Ltd 
Zurich Insurance Co (UK Br) 
- 
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